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Summary findings
The insurance industry is underdeveloped in many of the  Financial supervisors in jurisdictions that have updated
world's emerging markets and transition economies,  their systems with this approach in mind now see their
sometimes because of restrictive regulations or  main task as gauging the financial risk or risk profile of
inadequate supervision of insurance companies.  each company and allocating most of their resources to
Many countries are considering reforming regulation  the higher-risk situations.
of their insurance systems and strengthening supervision.  In doing so, their objective will be to understand  a
Savage's analysis is designed to help them choose the  firms's business strategy, to assess the firm management's
program of regulation and supervision that best fits their  competence and appetite for risk, and to assess the firm's
circumstances.  outlook and financial viability.
He draws on experience in industrial countries that  Savage highlights the special role played in supervision
have examined the reasons financial institutions failed.  by industry specialists such as the auditors and actuaries
He concludes that the old approach to supervising the  who support insurance companies.
financial sector - covering a broad range of issues and  He identifies the priorities needed in the reform of
devoting considerable energy to verifying data - must  insurance supervision and suggests steps needed for
be replaced by a more focused approach that targets  change - and helpful ways for officials to organize.
insurer solvency by getting supervisors to pay attention  He discusses not only issues associated with the
to management performance and business strategy.  supervision of solvency and financial strength but ways
to protect consumers.
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1. Introduction, Objectives and Summary
A.  Introduction:  Emerging  Demand  for High  Level  of Insurance  Supervision
The insurance industry in Latin American, the Caribbean and other emerging markets will
continue to expand with the widespread emphasis  on private sector development. Risk transfer
services are increasingly in demand, and attention is increasingly  being focused on the potential
fragilities in the industry and the role of insurers as financial intermediaries. There are a number
of important factors leading to this surge in demand for insurance products:
x0 The development of private pension funds that depend on a vibrant, competitive insurance
industry both for the provision of disability insurance and more especially for the provision of
life annuities ba,sed  on the built up value of the pension reserve;
ER A movement towards the privatization  of insurance services traditionally offered by the
government (e.g. health insurance, worker's compensation,  etc);
0x Privatization of state owned enterprises (which as privatized entities will demand access to
insurance coverages);
0  Rapid growth in the private sector generally;
01 A growing imiddle  class which will increasingly  seek insurance protection for their assets and
savings products for their future; and
El  Increasing availability of foreign investment capital to fund development.
Much of the demand will be for competitively  priced risk transfer and risk management services
offered by property/casualty insurers. After all, the primary function of property/casualty
insurance is to transform  the uncertainty inherent in a situation having a low probability of
catastrophic loss (for example, the slight chance that all of a business's capital is lost as a result
of a fire), to the certainty of a small loss (the business pays an insurance premium to protect
against loss by fire). Without access to the risk spreading  mechanism of insurance coverage, the
chance of catastrophic loss would curtail major capital projects and business ventures.
*  Lawrie Savage is a former Superintendent of Insurance for Government of Ontario. Lawrie has over 30 years of
experience in the insurance industry and has held senior positions in both life and property/casualty insurance fields.
He was CEO of a life insurance company for several years and for 8 years directed the Federal Government's
supervision of property and casualty insurance companies in Canada. More recently, he has managed a number of
consulting assigmnents in developing countries, assisting with the 're-engineering' of the insurance regulatory
function.
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An additional challenge is that many countries have recently privatized or liquidated state-owned
insurers and/or reinsurers (or are in the process of doing so) and are encouraging competition in
both primary and reinsurance markets. Thus in many countries we have the dual problems of an
insurance industry having to adapt to the new realities of a private marketplace,  while at the same
time attempting to meet the rapidly increasing need for insurance referred to above.
In these circumstances there will be significant  pressures on insurance supervisory systems.
Unfortunately, however, in many cases the sophistication  of govermnent insurance supervision
does not reflect the growing importance of the insurance  business to the countries concerned.
Many supervisory agencies are considered ineffective and are not ready to take on the additional
responsibilities associated with growing and changing markets. There is often a lack of clarity
regarding primary supervisory tasks and how these can best be accomplished. Many agencies do
not have adequate financial resources nor the operational independence  needed to undertake
effective supervision. Information gathered by the supervisor is often inadequate, both in terms
of the quality of data and the timeliness of reporting. As well, information technology is
generally not utilized to increase the efficiency and effectiveness  with which financial data can
be analyzed and acted upon.  Likewise, supervisory agencies are often lacking (in both number
and quality) the well trained, motivated personnel needed to oversee the insurance industry.
Thus in these countries we have on the one hand, surging demand for private sector insurance
facilities, and on the other, a frequent inability of governments  to ensure that the subject
institutions will actually be in a position to fulfil the needs they are intended to serve. In
developed countries it has been found by experience that a sound insurance supervisory system,
encompassing concerns related to both solvency of insurers and their conduct in the marketplace,
is an important factor in maintaining public confidence in the financial sector and ensuring that
foreign investment is not discouraged.
One can argue that insurance supervision in the emerging country context is even more vital than
in developed countries: there is greater need to build public and international confidence in the
quality and soundness of financial institutions. Insurers must be able to fulfil their role in the
spreading of risk, thereby protecting invested capital and facilitating the growth of businesses, as
well as providing the public with high quality investment vehicles and life insurance for estate
planning and other purposes.
B.  Objectives  of Paper: Best  Practices  in Re-engineering  the Supervisory
Function  in the Developing  Country  Context
In light of the foregoing, there is a demonstrated  need for a comprehensive  paper dealing with
issues that commonly arise in the development of insurance supervisory systems in emerging
countries. Many such countries recognize the importance of this matter and are currently
struggling to put in place supervisory systems that will facilitate the growth of a sound private
insurance industry within their countries, while also providing protection for consumers of
insurance products.
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Consumer protection really has two aspects: (1) protection against losses arising from the
insolvency of institutions and (2) protection against losses caused by fraudulent practices and
other market conduct abuses. Both solvency supervision  and market conduct supervision have a
role to play in underpinning an insurance industry that is vibrant, financially sound and entitled
to the confidence of the insuring public. In turn, an industry having these characteristics will
benefit the nation by facilitating foreign investment and providing a sound financial
infrastructure that will benefit the economy as a whole.
In the area of insurance market supervision, the Inter-American  Development  Bank and the
World Bank wish not only to be able to document issues and to provide an overview of various
approaches that might be considered, but in fact believes that the need is for a more
comprehensive cataloguing of best practices in these areas. That is the objective of this paper.
C.  Summairy
The nature of insurance supervision in developed countries has changed considerably in recent
years.  Governinents in the United States, Canada and Europe have conducted extensive
investigations into the circumstances  which have led to the collapse of major financial
institutions. Flowing from these investigations  has been a growing recognition that a new
supervisory paradigm is required. In the "Legal Framework" section of this paper the Canadian
situation  is presented  as an example -- one the writer happens  to be familiar  with -- to illustrate
how market forces have led to the development  of just such a new approach. Whether one looks
at the Canadian experience or the experience in other countries, however, there is a common
thread running thfrough  the conclusions  of virtually every developed country that has studied
these matters. That is that the old style of financial supervision, which tended to be very broad in
scope and highly oriented towards verification of data, must be replaced by a much more
focused, higher level approach which targets insurer solvency  through attention to management
performance and business strategy. The latter areas become the key recipient of supervisory
attention. Financial supervisors in these  jurisdictions now see their primary task as gauging the
financial risk or risk profile of each company, and then allocating the bulk of their available
resources to the higher risk situations.
As they look at these higher risk situations their objectives will be to understand the business
strategy, to assess the competency of senior management and their appetite for risk, and to
generally be in a position to assess the future outlook and financial viability of the companies.
An underlying assumption is that the independent  auditors and actuaries  will be doing their jobs,
which provides the supervisor with a high degree of confidence  that the data being reported to
the supervisor is reasonably accurate and that reserve amounts are within professionally
acceptable tolerances. (Naturally there will still be some checking of the data by the supervisor
in order to confirm that the confidence  has not been misplaced.)
It is probably fair to say that this new supervisory  paradigm has developed in two stages. In the
first stage one typically sees a number of well thought out amendments  to insurance acts,
increasing the powers of the supervisors,  limiting the extent to which insurers are able to enter
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into transactions with related parties and introducing  more sophisticated  and more stringent
minimum capital requirements. The second stage tends to have been driven by a combination of
increasing fiscal pressure on governments, so there is a perceived need to limit the cost of
regulation on the one hand, and, we think even more importantly, by a recognition that many
insolvencies could not have been prevented by the supervisors,  even if substantially greater
resources had been available to them.
On this latter point, one sees ample evidence that most of the problems of financially troubled
companies are attributable to the introduction  of (what turn out to be) unprofitable  products,
uncontrolled expansion, self dealing and other circumstances  related to the institution's business
strategy and internal culture. Concerns in these areas are of a sort which do not lend themselves
to straightforward legislative solutions. Nor can one expect that these types of difficulties would
be adequately remedied merely by having more supervisory staff, or better computers, or more
supervisory resources in other areas. Thus the need to limit the cost of supervision, together with
the realization that company's business plans and strategies were central to the achievement of
supervisory objectives, has led supervisors and governments  to conclude that supervisory
resources need to be more focused, and especially more focused on the assessment and
evaluation of the company's management and business strategy.
This paper discusses the upgrading of the supervisory function in emerging and developing
countries from the perspective of the new supervisory  paradigm. There are two distinct
components of the upgrading process, although portions of each component can proceed on an
independent basis. One component is to upgrade the legislation in order to give the supervisors
additional powers corresponding  to those that have been recognized as necessary in developed
countries. The second component is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the
supervisory process itself. The paper describes  both components in detail and discuss strategies
for design and implementation.
On the legislative side, in addition to strengthening the powers of the supervisors  in specific
ways, we recommend an approach which stresses improved  transparency and higher standards of
corporate governance -- the placing of more responsibility on boards of directors and
management for ensuring that their institutions are operated in accordance with standards of
sound business and financial practice. This of course implies the existence of appropriate
sanctions on boards of directors and managers that do not maintain such standards.
In terms of increased efficiency and effectiveness,  the focus of the paper is on techniques that
will improve the supervisor's ability to understand  the financial institution and its business
strategy and so to be better able to anticipate  the onset of financial difficulties. We recommend
the use of the Regulatory Ladder as a means of formalizing  the supervisory approach to financial
risk and ensuring consistency of response over time and relative to the risk profile of the insurer.
We strongly encourage the establishment of regional supervisory  organizations which will help
lead to greater harmonization of supervisory  techniques and especially, to harmonization of the
financial filings required from insurers. We discuss resource  requirements and sources of
information and assistance to the supervisory authorities. Techniques for financial and ratio
analysis are described, as are some of the ratios themselves, as well as the processes and
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procedures pertaining to the on-site inspection of companies. The roles of the independent
auditor and actuary are also important in the modem approach to supervision, and this is an area
where emerging countries often face a significant  difficulty. Frequently, entrance qualifications
and standards of practice for auditors and actuaries are not at the same level as in developed
countries, so developing country supervisors  may not be able to place the same degree of reliance
on their work.  Nevertheless,  our consulting experience  in smaller and developing countries leads
us to believe that fairly rapid progress can be made in raising the standards -- it is clearly in the
interests of these professional groups to be able to assume more responsibility in the overall
supervisory process.
The time horizon for change is also discussed. It is important to remember that major change
cannot be effected overnight. On the other hand, new approaches  can be phased in over time,
and as will be pointed out, much can be done relatively quickly, so that in our estimation, within
one to two years most jurisdictions should be able to advance to the point that the majority of
their goals have been accomplished. Some aspects, such as raising the standards of auditors and
actuaries, are within the realm of influence of the supervisor  but not direct control, and a longer
period of time may be required to achieve objectives  in these areas. Another area for attention
over the longer term is the need for improved co-ordination  between banking and insurance
supervisors. Likewise, time is needed by the supervisors  to gain experience in the exercise of the
new techniques and to build confidence in their dealings with the industry.
Developing countries are in an excellent position to benefit from the supervisory experiences of
countries such as the United States and Canada. For developing countries especially, access to
resources is a primary concern, and corporate practices are often strongly in need of
improvement. Therefore supervisory methodologies  that maximize efficiency and effectiveness
of resource utilization, and which require companies to adopt higher standards of corporate
governance, go to the heart of the problems faced by developing country supervisors. We
believe they can move quickly, and hopefully on a harmonized  basis with neighbouring countries
having the same concerns, to implement the key attributes  of these new approaches to insurance
supervision.
II.  Basic Concepts
A.  The Necessity of Supervision
A system of insurance supervision is a system of oversight which is intended to ensure that to the
greatest degree possible, (1) insurers will have the financial resources required to pay all claims
as they become due (i.e. solvency supervision) and (2) insurers will treat consumers in an
equitable manner in all financial dealings (i.e. marketplace supervision).
Supervision can, at one end of the spectrum, be through a governmental  agency administered by
public servants or, at the other end of the range, through self-regulation by insurers and their
trade organizations. In between, there are many possible combinations  where supervisory
responsibilities can be shared by governments; by insurers' boards of directors through
7Re-Engineering  Insurance  Supervision
appropriate procedures of corporate governance;  by independent auditors, actuaries and other
professional advisors to the insurers; and by industry associations that can advocate member
codes of ethics and other behaviour that will reinforce the objectives of supervision. This paper
will comment on the extent to which possible interrelationships  between these approaches can
result in a more satisfactory system than one which relies on any one approach.
The business of insurance has a number of special features which make financial supervision
particularly important. In transacting  the business of insurance, the insurer receives premiums
from persons and corporations seeking coverage. In the aggregate these premiums, together with
investment earnings, should be sufficient: (1) to pay the claims that will be incurred during the
terms of the policies, (2) to cover administrative  and other expenses associated with the writing
and distribution of the product, and (3) to generate a satisfactory rate of return to the shareholders
of the insurance company or to fund future growth in the case of a mutual insurer (i.e. an insurer
which is owned by its policyholders).
Because premiums are paid now, in return for a benefit which may not occur until many years in
the future, the purchaser of insurance is entirely reliant on the expectation that the insurer will
still be in business at that unspecified future date and that it will then have sufficient financial
resources to discharge its obligation. In this changing and uncertain world it is not a foregone
conclusion that this will always be the case, particularly having in mind the difficult and volatile
economic circumstances that are frequently characteristic  of developing countries. Nor can one
rule out the possibility that negligence or unscrupulous  behaviour, rather than difficult economic
circumstances, will be the cause of the company's inability to pay.  It is not surprising then that a
system of supervisory oversight is required to help assure that a company having such important
responsibilities to the public will be able to meet its financial obligations when called upon to do
so.
In terms of marketplace characteristics  there are also particular features of the insurance business,
different from other types of financial institutions, which suggest that a supervisory system will
be required. When a consumer deals with a deposit taking institution such as a bank or credit
union, there is not a great likelihood of dispute -- the consumer has made a deposit, has evidence
of having done so, and the institution is clearly obligated to return the deposit upon demand or
subject to the particular conditions governing  the transaction.
By contrast, an insurer is providing indemnity with respect to circumstances  that are often much
more complex than a banking transaction and to protect the company, many exclusions and other
terms of coverage usually apply. (These terms of coverage also protect the consumer in the sense
that for an open-ended contract providing extremely broad coverage, the claims payments will be
extremely high, in turn giving rise to very high, if not prohibitive, premium levels.)
Unfortunately, these contractual complexities  tend to put the insurer in a position of strength
when it comes time to settle a claim. The insurer has the legal and financial resources to dispute
a claim, even if on a technicality. Also, the insurer has possession of the funds and the
policyholder is dependent on the insurer to gain access to them. By unfairly resisting claims an
irresponsible insurer is therefore in a position to retain funds rightly due to policyholders and it
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can be difficult for policyholders to protect themselves against such abuses.
Thus we see that in assessing the risk of both insolvency  and unfair consumer treatment, there
are special reasons why insurance supervisory systems are important in building public
confidence and providing the stability of financial infrastructure  that every country finds
desirable.
B.  The Role and Importance of Insurance Supervision in Developing Countries
Developed countries have a long tradition of insurance  supervision. For example, in Canada the
first federal Superintendent of Insurance was appointed in 1876, only nine years after the country
was formed. Countries in Europe witnessed the growth of the insurance industry from the early
1700's and along with that, experienced  many practical difficulties in terms of losses to the
public and various financial scandals. Thus they had many years in which to learn about the
benefits of a sound supervisory regime.
Developing countries are in the difficult position of trying to "catch up" in an economic sense
with the developed countries. They therefore face the huge challenge of having to bridge within
a few years, a transition which the developed countries managed in several hundred.
Nevertheless, most developing countries are now of the view that to meet these challenges, they
must not be left behind as countries world wide scramble to participate in the global economy.
Realistically, this brings with it a need to ensure a stable financial environment; otherwise
foreign capital w:ill  be reluctant to find a home in the country. While it is widely recognized  that
appropriate standards of banking supervision are critical in this regard, our observation is that
insurance superviision  also plays an important role in meeting the needs of foreign investors.
There are two reasons for this.  First, sound programs of risk management are seen by modern
businesses as an essential part of their corporate responsibility. As has been described above,
given the nature of the property/casualty insurance product, insurance protection  tends to play a
central role in their risk management programs. Therefore today's corporations attach
considerable importance to the insurance regime. As with banking, they see the health and
financial strength of the insurance industry as a proxy for the financial stability of the country
itself.
The second reason that insurance supervision is so important in a developing country is that the
world is changing very rapidly, and lost opportunities at this juncture may be opportunities that
will never come again. Where the insurance industry has seen public outcry and suffering as a
result of a large number of insurer insolvencies, it is a red flag to prospective investors. Those
who control large flows of capital in developed countries know that their shareholders  expect
careful stewardship of their funds. They will be loathe to commit their financial expertise and
money in any environment which lacks financial stability. If they do so they will be open to
criticism from shareholders  and possibly even exposed to legal liability if the corporation suffers
any major losses as a result of its activities it the jurisdiction.
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C.  What are the Objectives of Supervision? Are Objectives Different in a Developing
Country from those in a Developed Country?
One might be inclined to quickly venture that the objective of insurance supervision is to make
sure that insurance companies remain solvent and that insurance consumers are fairly treated.
Obviously that's an important part of it, but in our experience such a simple statement over
estimates the capability of an insurance supervisory  system. It's a complicated world we live in,
and insurance regulators certainly don't know all the answers (anymore than anyone else does).
A supervisory  system that is overly conservative  -- designed to avoid failures at any cost -- will
stifle competition, rule out foreign expansion by domestic firms and give rise to excessive
supervisory expense, which in the long run will have to be borne by the public.  Systems which
attempt to regulate every aspect of corporate activity are, in our view, doomed to failure as they
overlook the necessity of innovation and creativity in any corporate system that is to be vibrant
and healthy.
At the other extreme, an overly permissive system will lead to an increase in the number of
company failures. The costs will show up as direct losses to the public by way of unpaid claims,
along with a general loss of credibility and confidence in the financial infrastructure of the
country as a whole, with potentially incalculable loss.
The objective is to develop a set of rules that will strike an appropriate balance between the
public policy aims of ensuring strong financial institutions and public protection on the one hand,
and competitiveness, entrepreneurial  spirit and efficiency,  on the other. We see this as an
objective which is independent of the current state of economic development in the country
concerned. In fact, given the fragility of the economies in many developing countries, one can
argue that these concerns are more important in those circumstances  than in the robust economic
environments of most developed countries.
Having said this, at a level of detail there will certainly be differences between developed and
developing countries in terms of what is practicable, depending on the stage of development of
the country and its insurance system.  For example, in Appendix 1 of this paper we provide a
summary of the Canadian approach to financial supervision, which draws heavily on procedures
of corporate governance and the role of the independent  auditor and actuary. While such a
system has many advantages, there are also aspects of this system which present difficulties for
some developing countries in terms of current implementation.
While imported solutions from developed countries may not be instantly applicable, neither
should they be dismissed too quickly. Because financial institutions in developing countries are
probably subject to more stresses and strains than in other countries, the supervisory system must
be robust, containing checks, balances and incentives  that will lead to a healthy financial sector.
We believe that a system which incorporates an increasing component of self regulation through
procedures of sound corporate governance is more likely to be able to cope with the  growing
complexity of a rapidly emerging financial sector (particularly given the scarcity of government
resources that are typically allocated to the supervisory system) than is one which relies more or
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less totally on government supervision.  In other words, even what may at first appear to be quite
a sophisticated supervisory system from a developed country, may be able to provide a highly
relevant model for a developing country, subject to the need for the phasing in of certain aspects
over a period of time.
As mentioned, developed country models generally place considerable  reliance on the role of the
auditor and actuary. This type of approach can also be relevant in the developing country context
because national organizations  of accountants,  auditors and actuaries in each country tend to be
extremely supporltive  of upgrading the professional skills and standards of their members. Not
surprisingly, they will be prepared to dedicate resources to approaches that result in a more
significant role for their members. Even so, it will take time for professional organizations  to
upgrade the standards for their members to a level commensurate with the responsibilities
envisaged in the developed country models. In thinking about the achievability of this objective,
one should keep in mind that most major professional firms are represented in developing
countries and these firms typically do have local personnel whom they have trained to their
firn's  world wide standards. As well, these firms have significant  financial resources on an
international basis to support the development  of their organizations.
We believe the odds are good that programs can be put in place that will, over a reasonably short
time horizon, lead to the development of a professional  advisory group which will be able to
assume an increasingly responsible role in the supervisory  structure. In most countries we think
the fundamental conditions are in place to make the emergence of a so called "developed
country" model feasible, perhaps not today, but quite possibly in the near future.
In summary, we think it is important to design supervisory systems in developing countries in
such a way as to lay the foundation for systems which will be as efficient and effective as
possible in the future. Thus we favour supervisory approaches that recognize current realities,
but which have the potential to evolve fairly quickly to more modern supervisory techniques.
D.  Typical Supervisory Challenges in Developing Countries
The following areas typically represent the key challenges for supervisory systems in developing
countries:
1x Unreliable data or absence of data from insurers, needed by the supervisor for proper analysis
and monitoring of the industry;
0M  Financial data that is not timely, either when it is received by the supervisor or by the time
the supervisor is in a position to take action on it;
0  Outmoded leg:islative  requirements  that do not reflect the attributes either of a modern
supervisory systemn  nor recognize the needs of a healthy, vibrant insurance industry;
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0M  Historical lack of determination  in pursuing those who fail to comply with existing rules, so
that even if rules are updated, the supervisor lacks the confidence  or doesn't have the experience
needed to enforce them;
0M  The legal system itself may contribute  to a lack of determination  by the supervisor if the
enforcement of legal contracts within the country tends to be a frustrating and difficult process;
0  Supervisory personnel require training and upgrading of skills;
0  Supervisory personnel are not adequately compensated,  even by the standards of their own
countries, so it is difficult to attract and retain high calibre personnel;
0  Professional standards of financial reporting, auditing and actuarial reporting are not
consistent and cannot be relied upon by the supervisor;
0x Boards of directors frequently lack independence from shareholders and management and so
are often not in a position to provide direction  and leadership; and
03 Supervisory personnel require greater access to computer systems in order to analyse and
monitor financial information efficiently and effectively.
These are fairly serious potential issues. Nevertheless, with reasonable allocation of resources
and goodwill, all can be overcome. With many of these issues, important improvements can be
effected relatively quickly. Others are more systemic in nature. In the case of issues that can be
dealt with relatively quickly, it is often  just a matter of the regulators having the opportunity to
work with someone who can provide guidance and assistance as to the steps that need to be
taken. In other cases there will have to be an investment over time, as new skills are learned and
the ground work is laid for the implementation  of new ways of doing things.  And as we've
already noted, changes will not be limited to the supervisory  body:  insurers and their
professional advisors also have an important  role to play in the upgrading process.
One issue not listed above, but which in practice is extremely important, is the tendency in many
small and developing countries to have insurance supervisory personnel graded at very low
levels in the overall structure of the public service. It will obviously be very difficult to retain
competent staff when job grades, and therefore pay levels, are low relative to the responsibilities
inherent in the positions. This has typically not been a problem for bank supervisory personnel,
because of widespread recognition of the importance  of having sound bank regulation. However,
insurance supervision is also important to the overall financial health of the country. Insurance
supervisors must be compensated  on a scale which is reasonable within the context of the
government concerned and which is also not extraordinarily out of line with pay scales in the
insurance industry. This point is discussed in more detail in Part V of this paper, "Special
Problems of Smaller Countries".
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E.  The Rolle  of Self-regulation
We are not aware of many self-regulatory  models for solvency supervision, although one could
argue that the corporate governance model described later in this paper is actually a step in that
direction.
In terms of market conduct supervision, however, self-regulatory  organizations  are quite
common in developed countries. We are speaking here of special purpose organizations  having
self-regulation as their only responsibility, as opposed to a trade associations, which tend to be in
a conflict of interest position if they have self-regulatory  responsibilities. Self-regulation  of
intermediaries can have a number of important benefits:
03 Members of the industry will almost always have a better sense than a government
supervisory bod;y  as to where the real problems lie.
El  An enlightened industry will recognize that poor practices reflect badly on all, and that it is in
the long term inlterests  of the industry to raise the standards.
0  Self-regulation may cost the system less than government supervision because it may tend to
be more efficient (although this is not necessarily  the case).
0x  Self-regulation shifts the cost burden of supervision more directly to the industry, reducing
the need for governments to allocate resources to this area (although some government oversight
will usually be considered desirable).
The self-regulatory organizations  with which we are familiar are created by statute and are
subject to oversight by the Superintendent  of Insurance or corresponding official.
A potentially major disadvantage of self-regulatory  models is the extent to which they can
actually carry out their responsibilities in an unbiased manner. If the industry group is mature
and professional the problems will be less. On the other hand, if the group responsible for self-
regulation see their involvement as a means of achieving  an advantage over their competitors, or
as an opportunity to bend the rules to their own benefit, then the self-regulatory  environment may
well be worse for the public than a totally unregulated regime. The critical point is for the
regulated group to recognize that an environment  which is supervised in an unbiased and
professional marmner  is good for both the industry and the public.
To assist with the realization of this concept, it is usually beneficial to have a significant
component of the self regulatory organization's board of directors comprised of public members
who are chosen by the government. To maximize the credibility of the organization the
government should establish criteria for public members. We have two suggestions as a starting
point: (1) public members do not have a background,  directly or indirectly, in the insurance
industry and (2) public members have distinguished themselves as citizens. The latter could
13Re-Engineering  Insurance  Supervision
include someone who has taken a leadership role in a charitable organization, a business person,
a lawyer, a doctor, nurse, school principal, teacher, etc. The public component is required to
ensure both fairness and the perception  of fairness by the public.
In some cases it may be possible to facilitate the creation of a self regulatory infrastructure  by
offering to the supervisory staff currently involved in agent/broker  affairs, the opportunity to
transfer to employment with the new self regulatory organization. If specialized software has
been developed for use in intermediary licensing or related applications, a new self regulatory
organization may be interested in exploring the possibility of acquiring it rather than having to
find or develop new software.
Usually the supervisor will have to go part way down the path towards self regulation, by way of
working groups, hearings and so on, in order to form an opinion as to whether there is a
reasonable possibility that self regulation is a real alternative, given the nature of the group
involved. Often there will be a certain amount of controversy amongst the agent/broker group as
to whether self regulation would be a good thing, especially if there are concerns about fair
treatment.
F.  The Role of External Auditors and External Actuaries in the Supervisory Process
As with self-regulation,  the interposition of other professionals into the supervisory  process can
save considerable resources of governments  and leave the supervisors with more time to deal
with the important issues -- such as assessing the business prospects of insurers and working
closely with insurers to overcome identified problem areas.
We make the point several times in this paper that the "old style" system of insurance
supervision was largely based on verifying figures, checking numbers, making sure everything
balanced and other similar activities. These activities were data focused rather than analysis
focused, they contributed little towards helping the supervisor gauge the extent of financial risk
present in a company, and most importantly, they had little impact on changing the behaviour of
companies. The "new style" of insurance supervision focuses resources at a high level within the
company, on the areas of greatest financial risk, and tends to use supervisory  resources for the
purpose of effecting positive change in the supervised company. When we speak of "high level"
we mean areas such as management decision making and planning, and we are concerned with
such supervisory techniques as business plan analysis, discussion of business alternatives with
management, financial analysis, the company's strategic planning process and so on.
In order to move from "old style" to "new style" supervision, much greater reliance will have to
be placed on the professional auditors and actuaries. The checking and verifying of data, the
assurance of appropriate financial control systems and the like are their professional
responsibility. The supervisor will not be able to devote the required resources to the types of
activities described generally in this paper if most of the supervisory staff are still employed in
activities related to the checking and verifying of data. Most often the supervisor hasn't made
the transition to the new style because of a belief that the professional advisors do not have
sufficiently high standards that they can be relied upon to carry out the responsibilities described
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above. In many developing countries this may be correct. Steps that can be taken to help bring
about the necessary transition are discussed further in a number of sections of this paper.
Note also that the shift in supervisory paradigms  outlined above mirrors what has occurred in the
area of banking supervision, and for the same reasons.
G.  Time Horizons and Prioritizing of Key Issues, Challenges
Considering the issues and challenges discussed in the above three sections, we can say that
upgrading the financial package for filing with the supervisors, modernizing  the legislative
framework and providing an appropriate level of technical support, are all areas which can be
readily addressed and in which significant  improvements  can be effected within a relatively short
period of time, say over the course of one to two years.  Upgrading of professional skills can also
be accomplished within this time frame if suitable arrangements  can be put in place. The
establishment of a self regulatory organization  capable of supervising agent/broker affairs may
take somewhat longer because there is usually no existing infrastructure upon which to build.
Also, if the supervisors are busy with other elements of the change process, there is only so much
that can be done at one time.  The aspect of the upgrading  process that is likely to take the
longest time to accomplish is the improvement  of professional standards for auditors and
actuaries. This is a process that the supervisor can encourage and facilitate, but which ultimately
will have to be driven by the professional  organizations involved. We discuss this transitional
process in more detail below, but we are optimistic that with the experience of the developed
countries to serve as a model, the process may take place much more quickly than was the case in
those countries..
In terms of priorities, the upgrading of the financial reporting package is a good place to start.
This is because it is usually within the authority of the supervisor  to modify, and as mentioned
earlier, sound decisions cannot be made without sound information. The ability to carry out ratio
analysis and monitor other financial trends is a matter of training and understanding, but cannot
take place if the basic information is not being received by the supervisor. If supervisory training
programs are organized too early in the re-engineering  process, the new learning will not be able
to be applied until other changes have been made, by which time much of the impact of the
training may have been lost.  For example, if training in computer based financial analysis is
provided before the financial reporting package has been redesigned to provide the required
information for analysis, there will be nothing for the newly trained employees to work with.  If
there are then delays in effecting the required modifications  to the financial reporting package,
some of the trained employees will have moved to other positions and those remaining will have
forgotten much of what was learned. Problems such as this can greatly reduce the effectiveness
and increase the overall cost of upgrading the supervisory system and it is important that they be
avoided.
Working with the professional associations  to improve their standards is also a high priority
because as menlioned, the shift from a data focused style to a high level, risk based style of
supervision is going to be somewhat dependent on the supervisor being able to rely on the work
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of the auditors and actuaries. The supervisor  can encourage and facilitate this process by means
of appropriately constituted working groups and so on, in parallel with the other changes
discussed above. Therefore, if all goes well, during the several year period which will likely be
required to move through the entire process of regulatory re-engineering,  the professional
associations will have been able to revise their standards of practice and qualification
requirements and will be ready to assume a higher level of responsibility in the new supervisory
system.
H.  The  Process  of Change
It is well known that the process of change is difficult and always gives rise to uncertainty and
concern for employees. A major undertaking such as broadly re-engineering  the supervisory
process will certainly be seen as a major change by all who are concerned with the supervisory
system, including the supervised companies.
It has been found by researchers that one of the most powerful ways of dealing with the anxieties
brought about by wholesale change, is communication. When engaged in the processes
described in this paper it will be extremely important  to continuously update employees about
what is happening and what is expected to be happening in the coming periods. Training
opportunities should be especially emphasized  because many employees will have concerns
about whether they will be able to understand  or master the "new procedures". This is especially
true when computers and automation are involved, so considerable reassurance should be given.
One project handled this problem by establishing an internal working group for each key
functional area within the supervisory organization. The consultant then worked directly with
the working groups as change occurred, and since the working groups were comprised of a cross
section of employees from all levels of the supervisor's office, there was always a good
understanding amongst staff members as to what was being done, when it would be done and
why it was being done. This type of direct involvement  provides ample opportunity for input
and discussion and can have a major impact on the ultimate success of the project. The opposite
end of the spectrum is when an outside consultant works closely with only one or two senior
people in the supervisor's office, and those senior people don't communicate at all with their
staff about the changes being discussed.
Industry members will likewise have to be kept fully abreast of what is happening. They should
be aware of the objectives of the process because they should have played an important role in
determining the changes that should be made. Incidentally, industry organizations  are generally
supportive of supervisory upgrading because they recognize  that modern approaches to
supervision are beneficial to the insurance industry. Nevertheless, in order to keep them in a
supportive mode, frequent progress reports and periodic face to face meetings will be helpful.
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I.  Sources of Information and Assistance
The office of the supervisor does not have to work through this process of re-engineering without
the assistance of others.
Normally a consultant with direct experience in financial supervision and with experience in the
upgrading of supervisory systems will need to be involved, if only for the purpose of having had
hands on experience in a number of similar situations. The outside consultant should work with
the supervisors (including a cross section of supervisory staff as mentioned above) as a resource
person and provide an on going sounding board for discussion of ideas and issues as they
surface. The outside consultant should provide overall guidance without dictating how the
project should be carried out.
Supervisors in other  jurisdictions will also be able to be of assistance and in most cases are glad
to lend a hand.,  either in terms of training or in terms of discussing their own experiences in
supervisory upgrading. The outside consultant will likely have many contacts in the supervisory
world with whom he or she can put you in touch.
There are also a number of organizations that can provide assistance. Most notable at the present
time is the International Association of Insurance Supervisors  (IAIS), which is very much
concerned with the processes being discussed in this paper. The IAIS was founded in 1994 and
has become a leader in the whole area of supervisory  upgrading. Recent papers published by
IAIS include "Principles Applicable to the Supervision of International Insurers and Insurance
Groups and Their Cross-Border  Establishments",  "Guidance on Insurance Regulation and
Supervision for Emerging Market Economies" and "Insurance Supervisory Principles". IAIS
also has an internet web site, which is at http://www.naic.org/otherinf/iais/iaistoc.htm.  The web
site includes newsletters with information  about supervisory changes  taking place in various
jurisdictions and other information of interest to insurance supervisors, especially those in
developing coumtries. Because of the pressures and trends mentioned at the outset of this paper,
many governments are presently interested in modernizing  their insurance supervisory systems.
The work of the IAIS reflects this trend and the web site material includes many cross references
to work being done by other organizations  and governments.
Industry associations can also provide assistance to supervisors. As we have mentioned, industry
groups tend to be supportive of supervisory  upgrading and will almost certainly be pleased to be
consulted about any changes being considered. We believe supervised companies can be a very
good source of advice, especially in terms of designing processes that will meet the needs of the
supervisor while minimizing additional expense required for the insurers. (At the same time, we
also believe the supervisor should not refrain from requiring the insurers to provide information
which experience from elsewhere has shown to be invaluable for both the supervisors and the
supervised. An example is the tracking of claims incurred by both year of reporting and year of
occurrence, so that claims reserving can be accurately monitored.)
Professional organizations such as institutes of actuaries and accountants will also generally be
agreeable to carrying out research and obtaining information from their members. This is
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especially true when they believe it will help to modernize  the supervisory system and lead to an
opportunity for their members to play a broader role in the supervisory process in the future.
III.  Issues in Solvency  Supervision
A.  Supervisory Infrastructure  Issues
1.  Resource Requirements of the Supervisor
An insurance supervisory system can be thought of as corresponding  to an investment advisor,
mutual fund or other business that has as its objective the identification of investments that are
expected to outperform the market. In the case of the financial supervisor, however, the task is to
identify the companies that will under  perform the market. But very similar techniques can be
applied in each case. The investment advisor will use computer screening techniques to identify
companies that have particular characteristics  which, will, in the analyst's opinion serve as
indicators of potentially superior performance. The financial supervisor will similarly consider
various ratios and other financial indicators which experience,  and sometimes more formal
studies, have shown to be worthwhile indicators of approaching problems. As well, the larger
mutual funds and other commercial  investment advisors do not confine their investigations to a
review of historical financial information  and ratios. They know that one of most powerful ways
to gain insights into a company and its prospects is to actually go to the company's premises to
meet with management, assess their business strategy and generally "size them up".
Correspondingly, financial supervisors  around the world have found that the on-site inspection is
an invaluable tool in the identification  of potentially problematic financial institutions.
It is with the key supervisory functions of analysis and inspection in mind that we must think
about resource requirements.  More specifically, the two functions are:
0x On-site examinations or inspections: This work represents the "eyes and ears" of the
supervisory process. One cannot have a real understanding of what is happening in a company
without visiting its main office, meeting the management and observing how the business is
being conducted.
03 Financial analysis: The supervisor must assess the financial data for the institutions involved
so as to identify disturbing or unusual trends which could lead to more serious difficulties.
The staff involved in these two functions are the heart of the supervisory system. Each area can
in turn be further described in terms of required skills and training:
[E  On-site Inspections: Here our objective is to find out about a company's business, in real
time.  How is the company being managed? What is the culture in terms of its business
practices, financial controls and other important characteristics  of a soundly operated institution?
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How does the company market its products? Does the company have an explicit strategy for
moving forward? These and many other questions can only be answered by going to the
company, observing its operations and talking to the management.
(In some countries there is a differentiation  between financial inspectors, who are primarily
focused on financial controls and the accounting  area, and actuarial or technical inspectors, who
are particularly concerned with the accuracy of the company's reserve calculations and adequacy
of pricing.  For the purpose of this discussion we assume that one group of on site inspectors will
be sufficient to deal with all the functional areas within the companies. However, the comments
would not be significantly changed if the on site inspectors  were comprised of several specialized
sub-groupings.)
As to the backgrounds of such individuals, on the academic side we favour a mix of areas of
specialization. This  could include inspectors  having university training in areas such as
business, accounting, actuarial science and economics. For inspectors, industry experience is
also a particular plus, for three reasons. First, company officials may be more forthcoming with
someone whom they recognize as having "real world" experience. Second, the person with an
industry background is liable to be more attuned to subtle environmental  indicators within the
company that could suggest the existence of problems  beneath the surface. And third, with
company experience, an inspector may be less likely to be deceived by unusual transactions
which are intended to make it difficult for the supervisor to recognize what is actually happening.
At least as important as academic training or working background, however, we see the ideal
inspector as a person who has a good understanding of industry practices, is well versed in the
technical side of the business and, very  importantly,  is personable, friendly, outgoing and
inquisitive. These latter characteristics are particularly beneficial for the inspector because his or
her primary job is meeting with people and talking to them about their work, all with a view to
understanding their business and learning about any prospective problems. Inspectors who spend
all their time "checking numbers", to the exclusion of discussing issues with company
management, are generally going to make a less significant  contribution in terms of finding out
about the business and gaining information about developing problems. As well, as part of the
process of change, one of the objectives is to put processes in place which will lead to
professional auditors and actuaries  assuming more responsibility in terms of data verification.
x  Financial Analysts:  Here the emphasis is on financial and operational statistics, so rather
than people who are skilled in drawing out information  through discussion with others, one
should generally be looking for persons who have the insight to recognize trends in ratios and
other indicators which will give an indication of what may lie ahead. (Of course as in any job, an
outgoing and fiiendly manner is never a disadvantage,  whether one is an inspector or an analyst.)
As to academic training, particularly useful backgrounds can include finance, economics,
investment analysis, mathematics,  actuarial science and other similar disciplines. The persons
concerned should be skilled in reading finapcial statements and knowledgeable  about the various
financial ratios and trends that are indicative of potential financial problems. (Much of the
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specific knowledge about the insurance industry will be learned on the job, as their are few
academic programs that focus on this industry.)
1E1  Information Technology Support Staff: Depending on the extent of computerization
available, some specially trained IT staff may be required to keep the technology functioning
properly.
In some marketplaces, reinsurance arrangements  are crucial, either because primary insurers have
not yet developed to the point where they have meaningful capacity, or because there are
environmental factors such as a potential for earthquakes,  hurricanes and so on, which make
reinsurance an especially vital commodity. In markets such as these, and if the resources are
available, a reinsurance specialty  group (or person) can be very helpful to the supervisory
organization. This is because reinsurance is a particularly complex area and the nature of the
reinsurance arrangements can make a big difference  to a company's financial results and its
ability to withstand future financial stress. Evaluating these arrangements  requires detailed
knowledge and expertise. It is an area where industry experience is highly desirable.
Depending on the importance of the life insurance  business in a particular marketplace, more or
less emphasis may be placed on actuarial training for personnel. With such a large part of the life
insurance balance sheet consisting of actuarial reserves, a certain number of actuarial specialists
are required in the effective supervision of these companies. This is not only because of the
actuary's special training and knowledge, which is obviously important, but in our experience
also for credibility purposes in case of serious disputes. An inspector or other supervisory
official, highly knowledgeable in the field, may be at a disadvantage  when a serious
disagreement with a company arises, simply because they do not have formal accreditation as an
actuary.
It is important to note that the two key functions  mentioned above, inspection and financial
analysis, do not necessarily have to be carried out by different individuals. In many cases there
will simply not be sufficient resources to permit the existence of two separately trained groups.
With the growing sophistication of specialized software for financial analysis applications, it is
becoming more feasible to have the inspectors  also carry out the financial analysis work.
However, if resources permit, it is generally considered  desirable to use separate personnel for
each function, primarily because different skills and aptitudes tend to make each group more
effective in what they do.  (See also "Organizational Issues" below.)
We have not mentioned a separate category of "administrators"  but of course a certain number of
support personnel will be needed to round out the organization. And all inspectors and analysts
must have good administrative  abilities.
Clearly, as with all organizations, at the senior levels financial supervisory  staff must have
excellent general management skills and the ability to deal effectively with people, both in the
supervised companies, within their own organization and within the government as a whole.
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In addition to the need for sound training and appropriate  credentials, it is extremely important
for each functional group within the supervisory  organization  to communicate clearly and
frequently with each other. The identification  of higher risk companies, and the areas within
those companies that are the most likely to give rise to difficulties, is an activity akin to
completing a jigsaw puzzle. Each group uses its specific skills to obtain information  about the
companies and their operations. So each group may have a part of the picture, but the whole
picture will not be recognized until all the groups contribute  their particular pieces of the puzzle.
Too often, inspectors and analysts don't communicate  effectively, with each group seeming to
believe that they alone are in a position to identify the important problems. Of course this is a
further argument to support the idea of having one group of inspectors  who carry out both the on
site inspections and the financial analysis. On balance though, we think effective
communications between specialized groups will provide the best results overall
2.  The Impact of Technology
As mentioned above, one can take the view that the functions  and objectives of the financial
supervisor are analogous to those of an investment advisor. The ability to screen large volumes
of financial information, to analyse trends in ratios and to otherwise monitor large amounts of
financial data, can only occur in an effective and efficient way with the use of modem electronic
technology. Thirty years ago in developed countries, insurers filed detailed financial statements
which were reviewed by analysts armed with pencil and paper (not even calculators!), who
looked at a small number of ratios, most likely for the current year only.  This was the best that
could be expected with the resources available. (At the time it hadn't occurred to supervisors to
require the insurers to do the analysis as part of their filing.) Given the large amount of
information that was filed and the limited use to which it could be put, one might reasonably ask
why the companies had to file it. We suppose the answer would have been "it will be available
in case it is needed".
Today, with the help of computerized techniques, all of the data can be analysed in great detail
and many import:ant  insights can be gleaned from the filings.  As with every area of our lives,
computers have given rise to an incredible growth in our ability to analyse and screen
information.
A modem insurance supervisory office will typically receive electronically a well designed
package of financial data annually from the insurers, with supplemental  data on a quarterly basis.
In many countries there is specific software available to companies, which takes the place of the
"statutory form", The software used in Canada is probably representative of other countries,
containing literal]ly  hundreds of cross checks, so that if the company attempts to make an entry
which is inconsistent with something elsewhere in the financial statement, an error message will
be generated, along with an indication of what needs to be done to correct the problem. Thus
when the financial data is received by the financial supervisor it should be free of error. (Of
course this signifies nothing about the underlying accuracy of the information,  which is why
professional auditors retain their important  function.) As well, the software automatically takes
care of all the arithmetic operations, carries forward balances and performs the other routine
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functions associated with completion of the return, including calculation of a whole series of
early warning tests and other financial ratios.
The use of such software has not only been a boon for the companies in terms of completion
time, it has also been another way of freeing up of resources for the supervisor -- in the past the
task of checking arithmetic and other details of the filings represented a major expenditure of
supervisory resources.
Typically the data received from the insurers will be stored electronically  in a data base, so that
application software can carry out pre-programmed  routines such as the calculation of additional
ratios and indicators.
Also typically, there will be the ability to carry out ad hoc analysis and screening of information
in the data base.  This is an important plus, because it is always difficult to say in advance
exactly what types of situations might arise which will trigger a need for customized analysis.
For example, if a major, publicly traded corporation becomes insolvent, it would be useful to be
able to quickly find out which institutions have investments in that entity and whether any
investments are sufficiently large to imperil the financial position of an insurer. Or if the
supervisor believes there may be reason to be concerned about the financial experience being
generated by a particular type of insurance product, specific tests could be developed to test this
hypothesis against the companies' financial data.
Computer systems are also widely used in market conduct supervision. Systems are available
which allow supervisory personnel in a call centre to receive telephone complaints and enquiries
from the public, to enter information while the call is in progress, and to get instant feed back as
to similar types of complaints that may have been received with respect to the same company, or
different companies. As well, complaints  can be tracked and tabulated, so that useful
information can be generated  in connection  with trends and patterns of complaint activity. For
example, if there are an unusual number of complaints  about slowness in claims paying with
respect to a particular company, it may be an excellent indicator  of financial problems. Or if a
particular company is receiving more than its fair share of complaints in respect of a particular
product, the supervisor may want to look into the way the product is being advertised, its
characteristics and so on.
We are of course describing here the  potential of computerized systems. Most developing
countries have not had the financial resources to make the required investment,  nor are their
personnel trained in the use of such systems. The latter situation is not difficult to overcome, as
the move to so-called "GUI" or graphical user interface based systems (of which "Windows" is a
good example) has greatly improved user friendliness compared with even a few years ago.
Thus with a week or so of training and some hands on experience, the average person can reach a
level of reasonable utility. As well, the proliferation  and rapidly decreasing cost of personal
computers, which can be networked within an office, has had a tremendous impact on
accessibility to computerized systems.
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In some countriles  there are commercial  analytical packages, complete with data bases, which are
sold commercially to insurance and reinsurance brokers, insurance companies, consultants and
other parties who are interested in having the capability to analyse data pertaining  to the
insurance industry.  In Canada there are two such systems. One is actually the entire data base as
filed with the financial supervisors, complete  with a sophisticated  "browser" type software that
enables one to ]ook at the data from several different perspectives and then copy it to a
spreadsheet for analysis. The other commercially  available software includes a relatively large
number of ratios and other pre-formated analytical  routines, which can then, with a simple
"click", be sorted, ranked and so on.  Thus we can very quickly look at the perfornance of one
company or a group of companies over time, compared to the industry or another group. We can
look at the so-called "early warning indicators" (described in detail below) and many other ratios
and financial indicators as well, and in each case have the ability to sort on the basis of different
parameters, in ascending or descending order. We are currently exploring the feasibility of
having this system redesigned for use by the regulators in a developing country, using the data
base for the coumtry's  insurance industry. Early indications  are that it may be a very economical
way of proceeding, at least for a transitional period of a few years or so, which will enable the
supervisor's office to gradually build a somewhat more specialized and comprehensive system
for its own use.
3.  Staff Training  and Upgrading
We have already mentioned  that training is one of the areas where supervisory staffs in
developing countries are most in need. In developed countries the most basic training occurs
automatically, without much need for special courses or programs. Supervisory organizations in
these countries typically have well qualified, seasoned personnel on staff, so new employees are
learning on the job under the watchful eye of these experienced staff members. The new
employees will have already have the desirable technical and academic backgrounds, and most of
the specialized knowledge in the supervisory  area will be picked up on the job.  Additional skills
will be acquired by means of specialized seminars and other training.
In developing c;ountries  the situation is usually very different. Regardless of how long they have
been employed, the supervisory personnel have usually not had the opportunity of working with
well trained staff who are fully knowledgeable  about modem methods of financial supervision.
As a consequence it becomes a closed system: they have no one to leam from and so they do not
learn. This is by no means any reflection on their abilities. It is merely a situation where they
have no role models. In this circumstance,  training plays a crucial role in upgrading the
supervisory system.
There are several ways in which the knowledge base and job skills of supervisors can be
enhanced. One is by means of arranging to visit with other supervisory bodies in developed
countries. Much can be leamed by informal discussions with these supervisors, observing how
they carry out their responsibilities and possibly even accompanying  them on on-site inspections.
One difficulty is that, naturally enough, the developed country supervisors will have to put their
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own responsibilities first, and that may mean they will be able to accommodate a relatively small
number of such visitors in any given year.
However, in developed countries there are usually many courses and seminars taking place on a
commercial basis.  Often these will be very useful for developing country supervisors to attend,
provided they have first gained sufficient background  and have the requisite language skills to
ensure that they will benefit.
Supervisory organizations  themselves can get together to organize seminars, inviting speakers
from other countries to describe their supervisory techniques and approaches. The Comision
Nacional de Seguros y Fianzas of Mexico recently  hosted such a seminar in Mexico City for
members of the Association of Latin American Insurance Supervisors. The seminar took place
over five days, with speakers from the United States, Mexico, Canada and other countries.
In the United States there are organizations  such as the College of Insurance in New York City,
which puts on special courses for supervisory personnel, focusing on techniques utilized in the
United States.
Also, we would certainly not underestimate the usefulness of taking courses that are primarily
designed for industry personnel. A thorough understanding of the insurance industry, including
its technical aspects, is a vital component of good supervision. Sometimes supervisors in
developing countries seem reluctant to participate in such courses. In one country the industry
was so enthusiastic about seeing the supervisors learn more about the insurance business, that
they volunteered to run special sessions of their training courses for supervisory personnel only.
Regrettably in our view, the supervisory group declined to participate.
There is also a great deal of written material available (mostly in English however), produced by
various organizations that have education and training as one of their objectives. For example,
the Life Office Management Association, or LOMA, based in the United States, offers a huge
variety of written educational material to members, as well as seminars and other get togethers,
where excellent speakers provide good information. LOMA has recently established a Latin
American division and educational material is starting to be made available in Spanish. In the
United States on the property/casualty  front there is also the Insurance Accounting and Systems
Association (IASA). The Risk and Insurance Management  Society (RIMS) also holds well
attended educational meetings. LOMA, RIMS and IASA are also active in Canada. Also, most
countries have insurance institutes that produce booklets and other material that can be useful
sources of training for insurance supervisors.
A training approach we have found to be very effective is the use of case studies, based on actual
situations that have come to our attention during many years of supervisory work in Canada.
The case study approach is good because it encourages discussion, it can be presented
dynamically (for example, using different teams and role playing), and it is absolutely focused on
the real life issues that can arise for the supervisor. Many lessons can be leamed from the
experiences of others.
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Some of the foregoing may sound daunting, but great strides can be made by explicitly focusing
on the need to provide staff training. The process can be "jump started" by working closely with
external advisors and supervisory  mentors in other  jurisdictions.
In closing this section it is well to reiterate the previously mentioned caution with regard to
training. It is very important that the training take place at a point in the re-engineering  process
when staff members will be able to benefit from it.  If the training significantly precedes the
point in time when it can be applied on the job, much will have been forgotten by the time the
opportunity to use the training actually arises.
4.  Economiies  of Scale and Other Benefits of Working on a Regional Basis
An important problem in developing countries is the lack of financial resources that can be
dedicated to re-engineering the insurance supervisory  structure and process.
However, the needs in one country are likely the same as, or very similar to, those in
neighbouring coumtries. Therefore one can greatly improve value for money by sharing
resources and working together with countries in the same region.
Financial reporting is one of the most fundamental aspects of financial supervision. If a
particular region is comprised of a number of relatively small countries, and if each country has
different reporting and filing requirements,  it is enormously costly and inefficient for the insurers
that want to do business in that region. It is also inefficient for insurance supervisors  to maintain
the separate infrastructures needed to support their differing approaches.
Therefore harmonized reporting systems have advantages both to insurers and supervisors. The
benefits can actually be more broadly based than the supervisory system itself, flowing to the
entire country.  T  his is because insurers want to do business on a regional basis, but if there is no
harmonization of supervisory requirements  they will probably select the one country they are
most interested in and leave the others for the future. Or they may decide to bypass the region
altogether as it's not worth their time to bother with the different information requirements of
each supervisor.
Differing needs of different countries within a region can be met by adopting a consistent,
harmonized, but modular approach to financial reporting. The first step is to agree on commonly
acceptable accounting principles -- we think the best choice is usually international GAAP (or
local GAAP if it is reasonably close to international  standards). (For more discussion on basic
approaches to financial filing with the supervisors, see "Key Components: Financial Information
and Reporting" below.) With the basis of reporting agreed upon, the question becomes how
much information and exactly what information will be required by each supervisory group.
This is where the modular approach comes in. No doubt each country will want to receive a
basic balance sheet and income statement, as well as some type of solvency or minimum capital
calculation and a listing of investments (call these items Filing 1). The somewhat larger
countries will want to augment this by adding detailed exhibits by line of business (call this
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Filing 2). Finally, the largest countries in the region may wish to add to the package by
requesting various analytical exhibits with respect to the adequacy of reserves, details of
reinsurance arrangements,  historical summary of ratios and key indicators, etc. (call this Filing
3).
The benefit of this approach for the companies is that they only have to prepare one set of
financial statements for the entire region. Different countries within the region will be receiving
different parts of the entire package, i.e. some will receive Filing 1, some will receive Filings 1
and 2 and some will receive all three filings. But as long as they are all prepared on consistent
basis it will be an efficient approach for the insurers.
Another major benefit of this approach is that each country will have loss statistics on a
comparable basis, so that important regional trends can be analysed for economic purposes and
for assistance in government planning. In the Caribbean, for example, regional statistics with
respect to hurricane losses are difficult to prepare and interpret because each country tends to
require its insurers to file different information, much of which is prepared on a different basis
from one country to the next, with differently timed filings. The end result is that country to
country information cannot be added together. So not only does the modular approach benefit
insurers by avoiding the significant  cost of having to prepare information on a number of
different bases, but governments of the region also benefit by generating a larger pool of useful
economic and financial information. Likewise, when they can get more meaningful statistics on
regional loss experience, reinsurers may be able to better design their products to fit the needs of
the region and to appropriately  price those products.  (If the reinsurers don't have ready access to
data for pricing, they'll be hesitant to make their capacity available to local insurers. If they have
to carry out their own studies, there will be a cost to be borne by the local market.)
Insurance supervisors will also benefit in a number of important  ways. First, because the
financial information is being prepared for a wider audience  than one country, there is reason to
believe the companies will be inclined to devote more time and attention to its preparation,
thereby giving rise to more accurate and useful filings. Also, the auditing and accounting
professions will'become more knowledgeable  about the requirements, since they probably
operate on a regional basis, as do the insurers. Secondly,  we talked above about computerization
and the benefits that can be gained in that area. If financial information  is harmonized on a
regional basis, it becomes cost effective to design financial reporting and other software
corresponding  to that which is common in the developed countries. It will not be worthwhile for
software developers to design unique systems for use in each small country. But if there are five
or six countries that have agreed to a common financial filing on a modular basis, then it does
become cost effective to provide the specialized software for all the companies that are operating
within the region. Similarly for software to be used directly be the supervisors for analysis and
monitoring.  With the underlying information  on the same basis, and utilizing a common format
(albeit not every supervisor receiving the full package), we are now talking about the cost for one
software package as opposed to one for each country.
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A further benefit for insurance supervisors is that they will have a larger pool for purposes of
staff training.  Clearly it will be more cost effective for a group of countries to get together for a
training seminar than for each supervisory group to try to organize its own seminar.
In both the United States and Canada, the states and provinces,  respectively, have the authority to
stipulate their own form of financial filing. However, through the auspices of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners in the United States, and the Canadian Council of
Insurance Regulators in Canada, harmonized forms of reporting have been developed. In these
cases there is no "modular" reporting because each jurisdiction has the financial resources to
look at all the information, as well as a large enough group of companies to make it worthwhile
to do so. In Canada a number of provinces do have special information requirements,  and these
are simply handled by having a few additional pages "for completion only by companies licensed
in...".  The additional information continues to be on the sarne financial reporting basis, however.
It merely pertains to additional information  or calculations  that are specific to individual
provincial  jurisdictions.  On a world wide basis, the recent establishment of IAIS is, as
mentioned earlier, beginning to act as a point of reference for the harmonization of approaches in
insurance supervision. The interest of the Inter-American Development  Bank and the World
Bank in this area is also illustrated by sponsoring  this paper.
The concept of regional harmonization can also be applied to the area of professional support. If
auditors and actuaries are upgrading their professional standards in one country, there is much to
be gained by extending the process to other countries that may be candidates for participating in
a harmonized approach to supervision. If this is not done the scope of the harmonization process
will be limited due to the inability of professionals in other countries to take on the
responsibilities envisaged by the supervisors in the first country.
B.  Operational Considerations
1.  Key Component: Financial Information  and Reporting
A vital compone,nt  of every financial supervisory system is information about the supervised
companies. The information must be sufficiently detailed to enable the supervisor to obtain a
good understandiing  of what is happening in the companies. Also, the information  must be
sufficiently time].y  that it will still be representative of the current situation when it is filed with
the supervisor.
The information contained in the supervisory filing is usually on one of two bases: Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (or "GAAP") or Statutory Accounting Principles (or "SAP"). In
many countries the supervisor will stipulate the accounting  rules that are to be followed, i.e.
SAP. We have already indicated that we think international  GAAP is the best way to go, but we
describe the advantages and disadvantages of each approach below.
The principle underlying SAP is what is often referred to as a liquidation basis. The supervisor
is interested in seeing what the position of the company would be if it had to be closed down and
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liquidated. The idea is to write off assets that would not have any marketable value and to write
down all other assets to the values that could be realizable on liquidation. There will frequently
be specified rules for the determination  of maximum asset valuations and write downs. For
example, amounts due from agents will typically be disallowed if they have been outstanding for
more than a certain number of days, regardless of whether or not there is evidence that they will
be uncollectible. Similarly, amounts due from reinsurers that are not licensed in the jurisdiction
may be given a zero value, even though there may be no evidence that the amounts will not be
forthcoming.
On the liability side of the balance sheet there will usually be rules governing the setting up of
additional liabilities or provisions. For example, some classes of business require the
establishment of special reserves, even though it is recognized  that there is no actual liability for
these amounts.
In the income statement, statutory accounting  requires that expenses be written off as incurred
rather than being amortized over the period of time for which they are expected to provide
benefits. Under statutory rules, therefore, a life insurance company will typically show that it is
losing considerable sums of money as it builds its business in force because there are significant
amounts of acquisition cost. These will be written off immediately under SAP, even though the
business that has been placed on the books should produce  profits in the future. This means that
under SAP, life insurance profits will tend to be understated during a period of growth and
overstated when business levels out or declines. The overstatement  occurs because  all the
expenses will have been taken in earlier periods, so that the current periods have no acquisition
expense associated with them.
A perceived benefit of SAP is that the statements so produced are very conservative, which is in
keeping with the underlying objectives  of the supervisor.
However there are a number of disadvantages to the use of SAP. Their conservatism is in some
respects a two edged sword. If the supervisor wants to understand what is happening in the
companies and to make the best possible decisions, then one might argue that more accurate
information would be preferable to more conservative  information. In a sense the financial
statements provided to the supervisor are like gauges showing the performance  of a machine. It
is perhaps well to know that the gauges are reading on the conservative side, but one problem is
that the degree of conservatism will depend on who is calibrating the gauges, and it is usually the
companies because they prepare the statements. So while the supervisor will require a certain
minimum level of conservatism through the use of SAP, there may be considerable  variation in
the extent to which companies exceed that minimum. Deteriorating trends in financial
performance can be masked if a company is simultaneously  moving from an extremely
conservative position to the minimum required level of conservatism. Also we mentioned the
situation with life insurance. When a company is expanding its business it will probably be
showing losses on a SAP basis because of the cost of writing new business. But another
company that is exactly like the first, but which is writing no new business will probably show
significant profits because it will have little in the way of expense and is reaping the profits of
business sold in past periods.  However, is the second company really in a better position than
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the first? Most would suggest that writing no new business is not a healthy sign at all. The point
is that while SAP is conservative  it may not always be very accurate in terms of the information
being conveyed.
That brings us 1o  GAAP as a basis of reporting to the supervisors. A couple of key principles
under GAAP which differentiate  if from SAP (there are others as well) are the going concern
principle and the matching principle. The first is an assumption  that the company will continue
to operate indefinitely into the future (as opposed to being liquidated in the near future under
SAP). The second means that because the company will continue to exist, expenditures that will
generate revenues in future periods can be amortized over the periods in which the benefits will
be realized (as opposed to being written off in the period in which they were incurred as is the
case under SAFI).  Use of the going concern principle, the matching principle and other principles
underlying GAAP, produce more accurate statements  of income than does the SAP approach.
In the view of rnost Canadian regulators (to say nothing of the insurance industry) GAAP
reporting has brought a number of important advantages, summarized  below:
EXl  The accounting profession has greater resources than does the supervisor for research into
accounting issues. When a complex issue arises -- accounting  for financial reinsurance
transactions is a good example -- the supervisory group in a particular country generally cannot
allocate the finamcial  or staffing resources required for its proper consideration, whereas
significant  resources are available to the professional organizations.
IXJ  The corollary to this is that under GAAP, the supervisor is able to focus more on supervisory
and solvency issues, as opposed to accounting  issues. Sometimes there are heated debates
between the regulators and insurers when the regulators are setting the accounting rules, or for an
unusual transaction there may be considerable  uncertainty as to the accounting treatment that
should be followed under SAP. Once you adopt a GAAP basis however, these kind of arguments
largely disappear, because the supervisors  will make whatever adjustments they wish when they
are carrying out the statutory tests and other regulatory adjustments, but the company's income
statement will not affected by the adjustments.
I3  When there is a requirement for an independent audit of the filing submitted to the
supervisors, as is the case in most countries, the professional standards and practices stipulated
by the auditing profession for its members, will usually not apply if the form is not a GAAP
statement. Our experience in Canada was that the statutory financial filing tended to be regarded
by auditors as a "government form" rather than as a set of financial statements.  Things which
seemed to defy common sense were sometimes accepted by the auditor without comment. The
response from  :he  auditor might be "well we couldn't go along with that treatment under GAAP,
but this is not GAAP, and as far as we are aware, it is not contrary to any accounting rule that the
supervisors have stipulated as part of SAP."
*  Related to that point is that when one does have a GAAP statement, all of the accounting
principles and practices set out by the accounting  institute for its members do apply. Thus when
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the auditor signs the statement, indicating that it "presents fairly the financial position of the
company" (or whatever similar wording is used in the country in question) it means that he or
she is satisfied that it is within the rules laid down under GAAP. Failure to abide with these
rules may result in the auditor losing the right to use their designation as a professional
accountant or other sanctions from the professional  body. Also, not only is it the statement that
will be filed with the supervisors, but also the one which will reviewed by management,
circulated with the public, filed with stock exchanges and in short, used for all purposes of
financial reporting. For these reasons, a GAAP based filing tends to receive the full attention of
the professional auditor.
*  When the statutory filing is on a GAAP basis, the main income statement and financial
information  being reviewed by the supervisor is the same as is being used for decision making
purposes by company management, so everyone is on the same wave length.
*  A further benefit of the GAAP basis of reporting is that it maximizes public
understanding because there is only one set of numbers, prepared on a basis that is consistent
with other public companies.
One cannot move from a SAP regime to a GAAP regime overnight. For example, if SAP has
been in place, there may not be any specified rules under GAAP for insurance company
reporting. This was the case in Canada and two working groups were established by the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (the professional institute of accountants and
auditors in Canada), one in respect of life insurance reporting and the other in respect of
property/casualty reporting. These working groups included a number of professional
accountants and auditors who had considerable  experience in the insurance reporting area,
members of the insurance industry with financial reporting responsibilities,  as well as observers
from the supervisor's office.
In the case of property/casualty insurance it took a year or so of discussion for the working group
to spell out a detailed basis for reporting that would be in accordance with GAAP. This was
circulated to all members of the profession, there was a period of discussion and finally a
consensus was reached by the profession as to what would constitute GAAP for
property/casualty insurers. The next stage was to work with the insurance supervisors to devise a
method of reporting to them which would enable them to have the information they needed,
without compromising the GAAP approach.
The compromise was to require companies to file the basic financial statements on a GAAP
basis, but to have the statutory filing include a reconciling  page to pick up all the areas of
difference between GAAP and SAP. The net difference between the GAAP equity and what the
equity would be on a SAP basis, is then carried to the GAAP balance sheet and shown as an
appropriation of surplus. For example, if GAAP equity is $25 million and SAP equity would be
$5 million less, the GAAP balance sheet shows equity of $25 million, of which $5 million is
designated as a "Reserve Required by Regulator". The reader of the financial statements can
therefore see at a glance that although the company has equity of $25 million, from the
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perspective of the more conservative supervisory  approach, $5 million of that equity would, in
the opinion of the supervisor, not actually be available if the company had to be liquidated.
Since the company must also meet the various statutory financial requirements, the $5 million
amount is also not available to be paid out in the form of dividends.
In this way, supervisors can benefit from all of the GAAP advantages noted above, while also
maintaining the benefits (from their perspective)  of SAP. A further advantage is that readers of
the financial stal:ements  actually have more information  than would be provided by either GAAP
or SAP on its owvn.
The process in the life insurance field was much the same, but it took significantly longer to
develop a practicable approach, primarily because the actuarial reserves constitute such a large
portion of the life insurance company balance sheet. Thus in determining GAAP for life insurers
it was necessary to find a basis of actuarial reserving  which could be accepted by accountants as
being within the framework of GAAP. This was difficult to do because the actuarial profession,
somewhat like the insurance supervisors, had long followed a conservative  approach, as opposed
to one which necessarily matched up well with actual economic conditions.
The breakthrough came with the adoption of what is called the Policy Premium Method of
actuarial valuation. Essentially this basis of reserving uses assumptions which reasonably match
expected future interest rates, mortality, lapse rates and so on for other key parameters. There is
a relatively smal.l  amount allowed as an overall provision for adverse deviations in the
assumptions. Then the reserves are adjusted each year to reflect the extent to which actual
experience differs from that assumed in the actuarial reserves.
While GAAP reporting (ideally as close as possible to international GAAP) has broad
advantages, it provides for a goodly amount of professional  judgement on the part of its
practitioners.  A difficulty facing developing countries is that they may have a shortage of well
qualified auditors and actuaries having the high professional standards required in a GAAP
environment.
However, as wilh the corporate governance approach to financial supervision, we believe that
one should not be too quick to dismiss GAAP reporting  just because some initial conditions may
not currently be met. In many of these cases, there is relevance  to the saying "a journey of a
thousand miles begins with a single step". By starting  to lay the groundwork now, in terms of
working with the auditing and actuarial professions, supervisors in developing countries can
begin building towards a day when these professional groups can play a greatly expanded role in
the supervisory process. In the meantime, much can be done to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of the supervisory process. This may be especially true in the property/casualty
area, because in many developing countries the life insurance business is less significant than
property/casualty insurance. Therefore problems in rationalizing GAAP with actuarial reserving
should not be seen as a necessary impediment to at least moving ahead with property/casualty
insurers.
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2.  Building  the Supervisory  System
(i)  Financial Reporting
As we have mentioned, a crucial aspect of improving the supervisory system is improving the
quality, and often the quantity, of information received  by the supervisor. We believe it is
mandatory to have companies file financial statements  in a format agreed with the supervisor (as
explained above, we favour international GAAP). This is as opposed to merely filing a listing of
specified data items as occurs in some countries. Absent a balanced (and audited) set of financial
statements, there is no rigorous framework  for data definition  and the disciplines of accuracy and
consistency can be expected  to suffer accordingly.
As stated above, working on a regional basis in designing the supervisory filing is recommended
because of the significant economies of scale that are achievable. (See "Economies of Scale and
Other Benefits of Working on a Regional Basis".)
In short, the supervisor requires sufficient information to assess the financial positions of the
companies and to monitor trends in performance so as to judge where the company is likely to be
heading in the foreseeable future. This includes information  sufficient to compute a series of
financial indicators and ratios, as described below, plus much additional information  needed to
assess the financial health of the companies.
Some may argue that the completion of such supervisory filings represents  an expensive
undertaking for insurers, the cost of which must be passed along to policyholders. We do not
agree. A good test of a supervisory filing is to ask whether it contains any information that a
well informed management team would not require for purposes of managing and monitoring the
company's affairs. In other words, in this instance, as in many others, the interests of supervisors
and company management should be entirely consistent.
(ii)  Financial Analysis
Prior to the 1970's supervisors in Canada and the United States tended to have their "favourite"
ratios, which they believed were the best indicators of upcoming difficulties in financial
performance. However, there was no agreement as to which ratios were actually the most
efficient predictors of financial performance.
To shed some light on this question, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in
the United States undertook a major study in the early 1970's. The idea was to test literally
hundreds of ratios against actual data from companies which had become insolvent in previous
years, to see which would have been the most effective in predicting insolvencies. Because of
the large amount of data that was available it was possible to test the statistical significance of
the predictive abilities of these different ratios.
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It was found that a handful of ratios, perhaps between 12 and 15, would have collectively been
able to predict' 75% of insolvencies two years prior to insolvency, and at least 95% of the time
predict insolverncies  one year ahead of failure. (The basic ratio tests are listed in Appendix 2.)
Note that this is not the same thing as saying that 95% of the companies which are outside the
"normal" ranges for the ratios will become insolvent within one year. There will be companies
that move outside the threshold levels but which in fact do not become insolvent, but, of those
that ultimately dlo  become insolvent, 95% will have been outside the specified ranges on a
significant number of the tests.
These ratios carne to be known as "the early warning tests" or "IRIS" ratios, and variations of
them have now been adopted in many different  jurisdictions.
Some have suggested that because they were derived in the United States they will not
necessarily have application to the insurance companies in their countries. The fact is though,
that wherever they may happen to be located, these are insurance companies and basically the
same financial relationships exist between the different financial variables. In our view the early
warning tests provide highly useful, predictive information  in every jurisdiction.
That is not to suggest that in particular jurisdictions there may not be special factors that need to
be taken account of and separately monitored. For example, as we will discuss in more detail
below, in a high inflation environment it will be necessary  to devise additional monitoring
techniques. As well, it will likely be necessary  to "calibrate" the tests for the local market. If
90% of the companies are outside what is considered to be the "normal" range in North America,
the test will provide no assistance as an indicator of unusual risk within that marketplace.
Ranges can be established which will show up the highest risk insurers in the local market and
although the ranges may be high by international standards, it can be expected that they will be
able to be brought more in line with international  norms as the market stabilizes and matures.
Clearly as well, the ratios by themselves are not sacrosanct and may be fine tuned to take account
of differences in filing requirements and other jurisdictional differences. Supervisors  in different
jurisdictions may want to add a few ratios or indicators to the package, which they have found to
be particularly useful in their marketplace.
Studies in recent years have also shown that more sophisticated  statistical techniques can be
applied to insurance company financial data to increase the predictive ability provided by the
original IRIS ratios.
As useful as the early warning tests are in providing a "warning flag" to the supervisor, it is
important to stress that they are a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, other forms of
financial monitoring and tracking. For example, in the case of property/casualty insurers,
monitoring loss ratios by line of business over time, monitoring expense ratios, tracking growth
rates, profitability, investment activity and so on, are all important functions that should not be
curtailed merely because one has the results of the early warning tests.
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The ratios were originally developed for use with property/casualty insurers. Comparable ratios
for life insurers have been used in some jurisdictions, but their use is not without controversy.
This is because of the long term nature of life insurance business as well as the major import of
the actuarial reserves. On the first point, one may well ask "if a company is outside of a
particular test range now, how much significance  does that have in determining whether or not it
will be able to meet obligations (i.e. life insurance claims) that won't become due until many
years in the future?" The second point relates to the extreme complexity of the actuarial reserves
and raises the question as to whether a simple ratio of one or two numbers to one or two other
numbers can really provide a useful insight as to what is likely to happen in the future.
Our view is that for life insurers these are definite reasons for tempering the degree of
significance one attaches to the ratios. At the same time, however, we are again dealing with
certain fundamental variables and if, for example, the equity base of a company is becoming low
relative to its liabilities, and relative to the corresponding  ratio generally maintained by other
companies, it probably does indicate a situation that is worth investigating  and monitoring more
closely.
In all cases, we see the early warning tests as, in effect, "red warning lights" which suggest that
the level of financial risk is increasing and that close attention needs to be paid to developments.
"Red warning lights" can sometimes be false alarms, however, and so the ratio test results always
have to be accompanied by sound analysis and good judgement. Finally, the usefulness of the
ratio results is entirely dependent on the quality of the financial data, once again underlining the
need for appropriate accounting measures that reflect the economic values of assets and
liabilities.
(iii)  The Risk Profile
The supervisor has limited resources and therefore must focus those resources on the companies
where there is the greatest probability of financial difficulty. Ratio analysis, information gleaned
from on-site inspections, information picked up in general conversations with people in the
industry, articles in trade journals and the media, are all ways in which the supervisor is building
up a data base of knowledge which will be used to form an overall assessment as to the risk level
in each company. The last thing we want to do in an environment where resources are in scarce
supply is to allocate supervisory personnel to situations where there is little risk of financial
difficulty. Whatever the means, the supervisor should be attempting to discern the relative level
of financial risk, or riskprofile, of each company. This includes not only the level of risk for one
company relative to another, but also the areas of greatest risk within a particular company.
(iv)  The On-site Inspection
The only way the supervisor is able to find out what is really happening within a company is to
visit the company's head office to observe first hand. As useful as early warning tests and other
financial data may be, there is no substitute for having skilled personnel acting as "the eyes and
ears" of the supervisor. Financial information is always dated, may be inaccurate and cannot
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provide insights comparable to the on-site inspection in terms of understanding  management's
approach to running the company.
The on-site inspection has five main objectives:
1.  Understand the insurer and its business environment;
2.  Detect solvency problems;
3.  Detect non-compliance with legislation;
4.  Resolve detected problems early; and
5.  Obtain information on system-wide  issues.
The latter point refers to issues the supervisor  has observed in the company being inspected, but
which will likely have implications for other companies as well. These are generally emerging
issues where thought and planning is required to formulate a consistent government policy.
Some recent examples include the use of derivative instruments by insurers and the outsourcing
of core business functions.
The on-site exarnination  has four main phases: planning, on-site investigation, reporting and
follow-up.
The planning phase utilizes knowledge of the companies' risk profiles to determine inspection
priorities on a company by company basis. Once it has been established which companies
represent the greatest level of concern, one can consider the particular areas within those
companies which pose the most significant  threat to continued financial health. For example, if
the company in question has been highly reliant on reinsurance, and its financial position has
recently been deteriorating, one will certainly want to look closely at the reinsurance
arrangements to be satisfied that if necessary, the reinsurers will be in place and able to discharge
their obligations. If this same company has a history of conservatively investing its funds and
has a low level of risk in that area, there will probably be little to be gained by spending much
time reviewing the investment department. The whole idea is to use the information at one's
disposal to establish inspection priorities, both in terms of identifying individual companies for
visits and the functional areas within those companies for attention.
An important part of the planning process is to select the team members and to put together a
detailed work plan as to what is to be reviewed in the company's offices, including expected time
horizons.  One supervisor attaches a notional billing rate to the time consumed in the inspection,
comparable to that which would be charged by professional consultants. This tends to reinforce
the importance of getting value for money and also provides a frame of reference when thinking
about what was achieved by the inspection. For example, if an on-site inspection runs up a
notional "cost" of $100,000, does the cost seem reasonable when balanced against the
information obtained? (We repeat, this is not a real cost that has to be paid by the company or
the supervisor. It is merely a way of assigning a kind of commercial value to the supervisory
process for the purposes of internal management control and evaluation.)
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In the on-site phase the inspectors are gathering information  which is adding to the accuracy of
the company's risk profile. As more information  becomes available the supervisor should be
constantly questioning whether it changes the risk profile. If so, and the change is in the
direction of greater risk, the supervisor may very well decide that additional work is required.
The inspectors should also be on the look out for any issues that could have wider implications
for insurance supervision (i.e. system wide issues).
It is very important for inspectors to keep in constant communication  with company management
as they carry out their examination tasks. Inspectors have sometimes thought they had stumbled
upon something quite disturbing, and have "confronted" management at the conclusion of the
visit, only to find that they didn't have the full story and that the situation was different than they
had assumed. This type of thing is not only embarrassing  to the supervisory  group, but will give
rise to bad feelings and a reluctance by management to fully cooperate with supervisory staff.
As a matter of philosophy, we have always found that much more information can be obtained
by a friendly and outgoing group of inspectors  than by personnel who are over zealous, overly
authoritarian or who plainly show by their demeanour that they suspect management of the
worst. Inspectors should accept all information with enthusiasm, saving the real analysis and
comment for back at the office.
The best source of information is discussion with company management. An inspector who is
capable of engaging management in discussion as to current business problems, management's
strategy for approaching the marketplace and so on, can usually find out much more in a short
time than is likely to be divulged by reviewing documents and financial data.
When the on-site work comes to a close it is important to formally meet with senior management
to give them an overview of the inspection's findings. There should be no surprises if the lines
of communication have been properly open during the course of the inspection. It is appropriate
to provide the management group with a formal agenda prior to the meeting so they can give
thought ahead of time to the points they'll wish to raise. While it will not always be possible to
agree fully on what needs to be done, there should be agreement as to the facts of the case.
Discussion at the meeting should be limited to important issues that pertain to the long term
viability of the company. The bringing forward of a myriad of relatively less important issues
merely detracts from the underlying purpose of the inspection -- i.e. to assess the risk profile of
the company and to modify that profile if necessary. Items of significance are those which do
fundamentally change the company's risk profile, or if it is already considered to be a high risk
situation, which serve to confirm that assessment.
The exit meeting should be followed  up by a formal letter or report to management detailing the
results of the inspection. This should document the reliance that has been placed on outside
parties such as the auditors and actuary, describe the areas that were actually reviewed, set out
the findings and observations,  make any recommendations  considered appropriate and, finally,
request management for its plans for addressing the issues.
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In our experience a powerful tool for dealing with problems is to request management to put
together a formal business plan for presentation  to the supervisor. Most of the time management
and the supervisor will agree on the nature of the problems. The onus is then on the company,
not the supervisor, to come up with a reasonable plan for correcting  the problems.
The use of a business plan has several significant  benefits. First it enables the supervisor to get a
sense as to the ability of the management team to recognize and address the problems. If  the
plan seems unrealistic and unlikely to succeed, it tells the supervisor a great deal about the
management team and the likelihood of long term success for the company. However, most
often it marks the beginning of an iterative and ongoing process of working with the company to
correct the problems. The supervisor will generally have a great deal of experience in seeing
how financial problems develop and how they have been successfully  overcome. Offering
constructive suggestions to management and working closely with management to help them
come up with a business plan that is likely to have a higher chance of success, not only provides
a real service to the company, it also builds credibility for the supervisor and leads to the
probability of even greater co-operation  in the future.
The inspection process can then be seen as a continuing and connected cycle consisting of
planning for the inspection, carrying out the inspection, reporting on the findings, working with
management to see that identified problems are corrected, continuing to add to the knowledge of
the company's risk profile through financial analysis and other means, beginning to plan for the
next inspection, and so on into the future.
(v)  Minimum Capital and Surplus Requirements and the Trend Towards Risk Based
Capital
Many jurisdictions have a minimum capital requirement for companies that wish to obtain a
licence to do business. This means that before being granted a licence a company will have to be
able to show that it has the requisite amount on hand, free and clear of any liens or other
encumbrances.
While such a requirement is clearly a necessary  precondition for the commencement of business,
it does not do anything towards ensuring that adequate amounts of capital will be maintained as
the company grows, increasing its liabilities  to the public.
To take care of this requirement most jurisdictions also have an ongoing minimum capital
requirement that is a function of a number of operational  factors, as a minimum utilizing the
liability base of the company.
An appropriately established ongoing minimum capital requirement will provide the supervisor
with enough tinne  to see to it that management is taking action to correct the problems that are
leading to the shortfall of capital. If operational  measures seem not to be sufficient to remedy the
problem, then the supervisor will likely put pressure on the shareholders  to inject additional
capital into the company.
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For property/casualty insurers in Canada, the minimum  requirement used to be capital at least
equal to 15% of total unearned premiums and outstanding claims. This worked reasonably well,
and usually gave the supervisor sufficient lead time to work with the company to correct
problems before they became irreversible. Inevitably, however, a few situations arose where this
simple requirement wasn't up to the task.  For example, if a company is growing rapidly its
outstanding claims will lag behind the issuance of policies, even assuming that the reserves are
not being deliberately understated. Theoretically the unearned premium should be enough to pay
the claims and other expenses that will be generated  under the policies in force, so the 15%
margin should still be sufficient. In practice, however, one may find that the business is quite
unprofitable, especially when there is rapid growth, so that the unearned premiums will give rise
to a level of claims that will eat into the company's capital base and which the 15% margin will
not be adequate to cover.
Accordingly it was necessary to adopt a more refined test. The one that was adopted was based
on the test in the European Common Market countries. For Canada the minimum capital
requirement is a function of three variables. There are actually three separate tests, the applicable
one being the one that gives rise to the highest capital requirement. One requirement is like the
original test, based on a margin of 15% of policyholder liabilities. The second test is based on
net premiums written over the past 12 months and the third is based on average annual claims
incurred over the past three years.
The effect is that if a company is relatively stable and not unduly unprofitable,  the most stringent
requirement will usually be determined by the 15% margin on policyholder liabilities. If the
company is growing very rapidly the margin required under the premium test will usually require
the highest capital amount and hence will become the governing condition as to minimum
capital. If claims experience is very poor, the claims test will give rise to the highest capital ratio
and will become the operative test.
Until quite recently in Canada there was no formal minimum capital requirement for life
insurers. The actuarial reserves were calculated on conservative  bases and it was felt that no
additional margins were necessary.  Unofficially  the supervisors expected  all life insurers to
have a capital base at least equal to 5% of liabilities, with the liabilities being established in
accordance with the conservative  actuarial principles.
As discussed earlier, with the movement to GAAP and the adoption of the Policy Premium
Method of actuarial reserving, much of the built in conservatism was removed. At that point a
more formal minimum capital test was called for.
During this period much work was being done by international  financial supervisors in
developing a risk based approach to minimum capital requirements  for deposit taking
institutions. The rules, formulated through the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), took
account not only of risks on the liability side of the balance sheet, but also of asset risks in terms
of the probability of asset default and so on. This was a natural thing to do because most bank
failures were due to problems on the asset side, in terms of overvalued assets, under performing
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loans, and so on, rather than stemming from understatement of liabilities, which is typical of
what one is likely to see with property/casualty  insurers.
It was felt that a similar approach to the BIS rules for banks should be applicable to life insurers
because here we also frequently have problems with the asset side of the balance sheet.
Under the BIS approach there is a system of risk weightings, with the capital coverage for each
grouping being dependent on the perceived risk. For life insurers in Canada there are four main
risk categories: asset default risk, mortality/morbidity  risk, interest margin pricing risk and
change in interest environment  risk.  Looking at asset risk, for example, when we consider the
risk of default, a government bond may be considered to have zero risk and therefore the base
level of capital is required in respect of the bond. On the other hand, a corporate bond rated only
BB, would be considered to have a higher probability of default and therefore a higher capital
requirement would apply in respect of this asset.  Similar approaches are taken for the other
components of risk categories.
Still in Canada, the capital base is considered  to be in two tiers, being core capital and
supplementary capital. The actual classification of "core" / "non-core" is based on three factors:
the permanence of the capital, the existence of fixed charges against eamings and the
subordinated legal position of the capital relative to rights of policyholders and creditors.
Supplementary capital that is not permanent is credited towards required capital based on years
to maturity, ranging from 100% credit with 5 or more years to maturity, to 0% credit with less
than 1 year to maturity.
The derivation of risk based capital can become very complex -- for example,  just the
instructions for its calculation from the Canadian supervisor  run to some 55 pages. While risk
based capital is almost seen as "the way to go", in many developing countries the actuarial and
systems resources are not currently available to carry out this complex task.  In that event, more
simplified approaches will have to be developed for use until such time as the required resources
become available.
(vi)  The Role of Corporate Governance
In the "Legal Framework" section of this paper we describe the corporate governance regime that
exists in Canada and the benefits it seems to have brought to the supervisory process.
In the developing country context we think the corporate governance approach holds the prospect
for a reduction in the amount of supervisory  resources that will ultimately be required as the
insurance industry grows and matures. The management and board of directors are in charge of a
company, and it makes good sense for the supervisory system to highlight that reality. When this
is not done, insurance company managers may begin to see the situation as one of "catch me if
you can".  In other words, the onus falls on the supervisors  to find the problems and to raise them
with the company. If the supervisory authorities do not ask exactly the right question, they may
not find out what they need to know.
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A solid system of corporate governance clearly establishes in law the responsibility of the board
of directors and senior management to ensure that the institution is operated in accordance with
standards of sound business and financial practice. It also ensures that the directors and
management will be exposed to personal liability in the event that the company is not operated in
this fashion. Other penalties can be specified but personal liability will be seen by board
members as a compelling reason to take their responsibilities  seriously.
Professional auditors and actuaries have an important  role to play in this type of system, and
while the necessary infrastructure may not currently exist in many developing countries, steps
can be taken now to begin moving in that direction. In the meantime the groundwork can be laid
by requiring a greater degree of independence  from boards of directors, moving to reduce the
extent to which non-arm's length investments and loans can occur, putting greater responsibility
on the board and senior management for conducting business in accordance with sound business
and financial practices, requiring that the board appoint the auditor and actuary, and many other
steps as well. With regard to the framework  of sound business and financial practices mentioned
in conjunction with the Canadian situation (see below, "The Role of Corporate Governance: The
Canadian Model), we think that most can be adapted to the developing country environment.
(vii)  Supervision of the Investment Function
Almost all countries specify certain rules with regard to the investment  of company assets. In the
United States and Canada many detailed rules have been dropped in favour of an approach that
places the onus on the board of directors for investing the company's funds in an appropriate
manner, in keeping with the nature of the company's fiduciary responsibilities  (the "prudent
portfolio" approach).
Even in these jurisdictions, however, certain broad investment limitations are retained for certain
categories of investments that are seen as posing higher than average risk, for example real estate
and common shares. Also, in both developed and developing countries, related party
investments have played a significant  role in many financial institution insolvencies. When there
are related party transactions, lacking the test of arm's length decision making, it becomes very
difficult to determine whether or not a particular transaction  is in the interests of the financial
institution. In Canada such transactions have been largely prohibited, and for those that are not
prohibited, a special committee of the board must first satisfy itself that the transaction is in the
interests of the institution and that it is taking place at normal market rates.
There are several reasons why many of the detailed investment  rules have been dropped.  In the
Canadian case, the prudent portfolio approach fits very well with the corporate governance
regime and so is a natural course to adopt. There are other important reasons for its adoption,
however, and we expect those are more relevant in the United States where the corporate
governance philosophy has not be utilized to the same extent as in Canada. The main arguments
in support of prudent portfolio are as follows:
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I[  Modem portfolio theory demonstrates that investment  risk is a function of the portfolio in the
aggregate rather than being the sum of the risks attached to each holding considered in isolation.
Therefore, a system which focuses on individual investments, as is the case with detailed
investment rules contained in regulation, does not appropriately reflect the overall risk of the
portfolio.
Mx  New investment vehicles have appeared with considerable  regularity over the past 20 years or
so.  Rules set out in regulation tend to be slow to change, with the result that some excellent
investment categories may be denied to insurers, placing them at a competitive disadvantage with
other institutions and raising the cost of insurance  to policyholders.
[E] Lastly, by using dormant corporations and other techniques, detailed rules can be
circumvented, so the end result can be that the investment function is basically unregulated for
those insurers that are inclined to work around the rules.
In many developing countries, however, supervisors  may feel that corporate responsibility is not
yet at a point where the investment function can be left to the board of directors and senior
management. At the same time, overly stringent supervision can seriously hamper the financial
health of insurers and, if they are in a marketplace  with foreign insurers, can give rise to
difficulties in terms of being able to fairly compete with companies that are subject to more
liberal investmernt  rules.
In these circumstances there are several possibilities that can be considered. One is to merely
ensure that the investment regulations are reviewed on a regular basis so that sound investment
options are not ruled out merely because they have not been referenced in the "supervisory
listing".  It may also be possible to provide for additional flexibility by including what we would
refer to in Canada as a "basket clause". This is a provision which states that notwithstanding the
detailed rules, companies can invest a specified portion of their assets, or capital base, in any way
in which they choose.  For many years in Canada there was a basket clause provision which
enabled companies to invest up to 7% of their assets in investments that did not otherwise
qualify.  Generally the basket clause would be deemed not to enlarge the companies' authority to
invest in categories of assets that were subject to overriding investment limits. For example, if
non-arm's length investments are subject to certain prohibitions, those prohibitions would not be
affected by a basket clause. Similarly, if the government wants to make certain that insurers will
be subject to certain limitations in the field of real estate investment, then a basket clause
provision can include a stipulation to make it clear that the real estate limitations will not be
overridden by the basket clause.
Investments in securities issued by foreign governments  and corporations is also an area where a
basket clause can bring some relief.  In many countries, domestic securities markets will just not
have the depth and liquidity to permit medium to large financial institutions to fully invest their
funds. To insist that this be done can force the institutions to invest in lower quality or less
marketable assets than is really desirable, because there is not sufficient investment
diversification available in the local marketplace. A basket clause can contain a provision
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enabling insurers to invest a specified portion of assets in foreign markets, subject to quality
standards if desired. Of course one has to be mindful in such cases of the need to maintain a
proper matching of assets and liabilities from a currency perspective.
In any case, the basket clause approach can give considerably more flexibility to companies by
enabling them to invest in vehicles where there is no inherent reason why they should not do so.
The question of location of investments can also be a matter for discussion. If branch insurers
are permitted to operate within a jurisdiction it seems logical to this observer that these insurers
should be agreeable to either maintaining sufficient assets in the jurisdiction to cover their
liabilities within that jurisdiction (including any capital margins that may be required), or to
making other arrangements that will provide the supervisors  in the jurisdiction with an
acceptable degrec.of comfort that the assets will be provided as and when necessary. For
example, if a branch is able to show that assets are lodged in trust with a bank in the home
jurisdiction, and if the bank is licensed in the supervisory  jurisdiction, and if the bank will give a
statement tV'  the supervisor indicating that it will deliver the subject investments to the supervisor
when requestVd  to do so, the supervisors  may be agreeable  to permitting the investments to be
held outside t'ie;country. (For more discussion on the supervision of foreign insurers, see "Issues
Relating to the Supervision of Foreign Companies" in the "Legal Framework" section below.)
In this case, the supervisors should probably be prepared to extend the same accommodation  to
domestic insurers. There would be no justification for a domestic insurer to have the bulk of its
assets outside the country. It may be reasonable, however, to permit it to hold a portion of its
assets outside the country if those assets are held subject to, for example, a broadened basket
clause as noted above and if they are not required to meet capital requirements in the home
jurisdiction.
3.  The Regulatory Ladder
A problem for all supervisory  jurisdictions is to ensure consistency of approach from one insurer
to another, one situation to another and over time. This is probably even more difficult for
developing country supervisors because they will often be chronically short of well trained staff
and staff turnover may be high.
The regulatory ladder is an approach which will (1) permit supervisory staff to feel comfortable
that their recommendations and actions are reasonably consistent over time and from one
situation to another, (2) give the supervisor and government confidence  that the supervisor's
actions will be in accordance with government policy and (3) enable companies to know the
strength of the supervisory response that can be expected in various situations and to govern
themselves accordingly (i.e. no "surprises" from the supervisor). As is suggested by the latter
point, the regulatory ladder should normally be made available to the insurers so that they can
benefit from the information.
The regulatory ladder is merely a matrix approach, which for each institution identifies several
levels of company risk across a number of different risk assessment categories, such as on-site
inspections, financial analysis, reinsurance, capital adequacy, market intelligence and so on.  In
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keeping with our earlier terminology, these risk levels constitute  the broad categories of risk
profiles we have said that we want to be able to identify for each company.
An example of the regulatory ladder approach is attached as Appendix 3.
For the purpose of illustration, let us assume that we will have 4 levels of risk, ranging from
Level 1, which is very low risk, to Level 4, which is extremely high risk, probably reserved for
companies which are virtually insolvent. For a typical Level 1 company, looking at the financial
analysis area, one might expect to see not more than 1 early warning test outside the normal
range. As well, there would probably have been profitable operations for the past several years, a
stable pattern of reasonable growth and virtually all other financial indicators in the "healthy"
range. The on-site inspectors would report that the company has highly competent management,
that the financial controls are well thought out and adhered to, that products are well designed
and properly priced, that investment strategies are sound, and so on. There would be no
informnation  from other sources to suggest one is dealing with anything other than a very sound
institution.
At Level 2 one begins to see the emergence of issues that could give rise to serious problems if
they are not dealt with.  From a financial analysis perspective one might expect to see, perhaps a
company that is outside the normal range on, say, between 2 and 5 early warning tests. The
supervisor's financial analysts may also be noticing that some of the trends in basic financial
variables are showing adverse development. The on-site inspectors may be reporting problems
in the internal control systems, which they consider sufficiently important to be raising with the
company. The company may be showing a worrisome trend in its loss and/or expense ratio or
some investments may be questioned by the inspectors  with regard to their appropriateness for
the company, and so on.  So while there are no loud alarm bells going off, neither is the company
free from supervisory concerns.
At Level 3 one begins to see commensurately more ratios moving out of line, more serious
profitability concerns and so on. But by now the concerns have become quite significant. The
supervisors believie  that if no action is taken, the company could move to Level 4 -- that is, it
could face insolvency -- within the next year or less. Therefore at Level 3 strong supervisory
measures will be required to deal with the impending problems.
The point is that ifor  each risk level, the supervisors  can describe very specifically the symptoms
they would expect to find.
The next step is to lay out in a similar fashion what general options would be considered by the
supervisors when confronted by a company having a particular risk level. For example, for a
Level 2 company, one response might be to write to the company requesting it to outline its plan
for dealing with the problems that have been noted. Another option might be to have the
company file some additional financial information so as to keep the supervisor fully informed as
to developments. A third option might be to schedule the company for a somewhat earlier
inspection than would otherwise be the case. For a Level 3 company the supervisor may want to
indicate such optilons  as meeting with the board of directors to explain the seriousness of the
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problem, limiting the amount of business the company is allowed to write or introducing other
restrictions on its operations, receiving a detailed business plan setting out a strategy and time
lines for dealing with the problems, including close oversight by the supervisor, and so on.
The text accompanying the regulatory ladder should make it clear that the supervisor's hands are
not tied by the supervisory responses listed therein, since circumstances could conceivably arise
where some other option, not listed with the regulatory ladder options, could become the option
of choice. This should be a rare occurrence,  however, if the regulatory ladder options have been
carefully spelled out.  The text should also make it clear that the supervisors may, depending on
the circumstances, avail themselves of some, all or any combination of the options listed for a
particular risk level. As with the early warning tests, general indicators are extremely useful, but
each situation needs to be evaluated on its own merits.
The regulatory ladder allows the whole process of risk level consideration and the choice of
appropriate supervisory responses, to take place in an atmosphere of careful consideration and
discussion, which of course is not something that will occur to the same extent in an emergency
situation with an insurer.
The various components of the matrix in the regulatory ladder can be made as detailed as the
supervisor wishes in terms of spelling out the symptoms of problems and the supervisory
responses that will be invoked. It may be that for distribution to the companies a relatively high
level format would be used, but that for internal purposes the ladder would be more detailed and
precise.
The regulatory ladder can, if the supervisor wishes, serve as a focus for virtually all supervisory
procedures. In some countries this is the approach that has been taken. In other countries the
regulatory ladder is not developed to the same degree of detail and is considered to be more of a
general guideline for the information of regulated companies. In all cases, however, it serves to
ensure that there is a consistent approach in dealing with company problems.
4.  Property/Casualty  Insurance:  Specific  Supervisory  Issues
In the previous sections we have dealt at a level of generality with a number of key supervisory
issues. Not surprisingly, however, there are specific issues that are unique to property/casualty
insurance, and these are covered in this section.
Minimum capital and surplus requirements, whether  risk based or otherwise,  will differ between
P/C insurers and life companies because of the differing nature of their balance sheets and
operations. We have described these differing requirements  in the previous section headed
"Minimum Capital and Surplus Requirements and the Trend Towards Risk Based Capital".
Another significant area of difference,  however, is in the nature of the reserves. Actually, in the
case of P/C insurers, the use of the term "reserves", commonly applied, is a misnomer. A reserve
is not a true liability in the sense of being owned to someone. A life insurance company has
reserves because it is accruing amounts which ultimately are expected to become payable. But
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for a P/C insurer the "loss reserves" are true liabilities: contractual amounts owing to those who
have had claims, both known and unknown at the time of drawing up the balance sheet.
One of the areas that makes P/C insurance so interesting is that a very large percentage of
liabilities are comprised of these "loss reserves". Until the claims are actually paid and settled,
the P/C insurer can only estimate the amount of liability. For some classes of business, such as
property insurance, this does not pose any great difficulty since the insurer will know with
considerable certainty what it will cost to replace, say, a house or an automobile. Much more
problematic is the situation for what is generally  termed "long tail" business such as general
liability, pollution liability, product liability, some forms of sickness insurance and so on.  The
term refers to the length of time that is required to settle these claims and so to finally determine
the actual amount of the liability. For some of these types of policies, court hearings and other
procedures may extend for years, with the insurer still not discovering what will ultimately have
to be paid out to settle the claim.
The great problem from a supervisory standpoint is of course that in this type of situation it is
easy for an insurer to systematically understate its liabilities, and so to overstate its profitability,
capital margins and general financial health.  Sometimes companies can engage in such
understatement rmore  from a sense of wishful thinking than through a deliberate effort to deceive.
The impact will be the same, regardless of the company's motivation, of course.
To provide a safeguard against this type of situation, it is vital for the supervisors, and
companies, to track the run-off of claims so that payments and outstanding reserves in respect of
a given year of c laims incurred, can be compared over time with the original provisions that were
set up to cover those claims. It is only in this way that one will obtain a clear picture as to the
adequacy of historical reserving practices.
For example, suppose that a company had reserves of $10 million at the end of 1995 for claims
incurred in 199S,  and we see that in 1996  the company paid $6 million in respect of those same
claims.  We also note that at the end of 1996 the company still had reserves, in respect of the
1995 claims incurred, equal to $6 million. In total then, the company has paid $6 million and has
reserves of $6 million, so its actual liability at the end of 1995 for the 1995 incurred claims, must
have been at least $12 million, not $10 million as reported. We can continue to track the run-off
of the 1995 claims in future years to see if the amount of the deficiency in the reserves increases
as more claims are settled. For purposes of simplicity the foregoing ignores the time value of
money, but that can be incorporated  into the analysis if necessary.
In order to carry out this tracking function, P/C insurers must be required to track their claims
both from the perspective of calendar year and also on a year of occurrence,  or accident year,
basis.  In some jurisdictions this is not done.  This leaves both supervisors and, extremely
importantly, company management, with a large blind spot in terms of the actual financial
positions of P/C insurers.
Attached as Appendix 4 is an example of the type of form that can be made part of the standard
reporting package for property/casualty insurers and which facilitates the monitoring of the loss
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run off data.  As described above, the exhibit tracks loss payments and reserves by year of
occurrence, comparing actual figures with the originally reserved amounts. For example, for
Royal Insurance Company of Canada (the first page of the Appendix), we can see that for 1991
and prior years the company had established a liability for unpaid claims and adjustment
expenses (UCAE) of $563,866, and for the same group of claims, had set up a liability for
incurred but not reported claims (IBNR) of $235,786 (first two rows of the first column of
figures).  This means that at the end of 1991, for 1991 and prior years claims, the company had
established a total claims liability of $799,652 (i.e. the sum of $563,866 and $235,786). Moving
down the column we can see that during 1992  the company paid out $225,569 in respect of these
same claims, incurred in 1991 and prior years. At the end of 1992 there was UCAE of $412,629
and IBNR of $152,688, giving a total liability still outstanding for these claims of $565,317.
Thus we can see that by the end of 1992 the company had paid $225,569 and still had reserves
totalling $565,317, so that to that point in time, total liability attributable to the 1991 and prior
years claims appeared to be $790,886 (i.e. $225,569 plus $565,317). This compares very
favourably with the company's original estimate of $799,652, with the original reserve being
1.1% greater than actually required to discharge the claims (at least on the basis of the run-off to
the end of 1992).
We can continue on down the column to the bottom most row, from which we can see that based
on all the history to date, the original estimate of the claims liability (i.e. the $799,652 amount
referred to above) was 5.23% greater than appears to have actually been required. In other
words, the company was conservative in its statement of the claims liability and its reported net
income in 1991 year would have been slightly understated based on the run-off of claims to date.
The figures for Jevco Insurance Company (page 2 of Appendix 4) show a very different pattern
however.  Here we see that at the end of 1991 the company showed total claims liabilities of
$16,219 (Column 1, UCAE of $10,266 plus IBNR of $5,953). During 1992 the company paid
out $8,610 in respect of those claims. But at the end of the year it was still showing a total
liability in respect of those claims equal to $8,775 (i.e. UCAE of $4,262 and IBNR of $4,513).
This means that after only one year the company had paid out $8,610 on the claims in question
plus still had reserves of $8,775, so that the claims which were reserved at $16,219 only one year
earlier, have already given rise to liabilities of $17,385. Thus we can see that at the end of 1991
the company was under reserved on its 1991 and prior years claims by $1.166 million. In other
words, based on only one year of development, it appears that the company was under reserved
on this portion of its total reserves by 7.19%. Frequently when we see this amount of under
reserving in only one year, the worst is yet to come because there remains a large component of
the total outstanding claims that have yet to run off. In keeping with this pattern, we can see
from the last figure in Column 1 that by the end of 1996, Jevco could be seen to have under
reserved its 1991 and prior years claims by 54.25%.
Without this run-off information the true liability positions of the companies cannot be
accurately estimated. Professional actuaries  can use this information,  and more detailed break
downs of the data by line of business, to assist with much more rigorous analysis of the claims
for use in estimating a company's current position. As well, it is possible to use the data to go
back and show what the loss ratios would have been on the basis of claim occurrence year rather
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than reporting year. (In other words, adjusting the reported loss ratio by year to take account of
the run-off by year of occurrence as shown in the Appendix.) The differences between reporting
year loss ratio and occurrence  year loss ratio give the supervisor a quick means of establishing
the impact of claims run off performance. In some countries both of these loss ratio figures over
the previous five years are part of the supervisory reporting package, where all such calculations
can be carried out as part of a software filing package.
In many  jurisdictions companies won't have been recording the required information and
therefore will not be in a position to complete an exhibit such as the one shown in Appendix 4.
This is a regrettable situation since the lack of these schedules makes the task of establishing
adequate reserves very difficult with the result that the level of confidence in the claim reserve
amounts is very low. However, starting with the current year the insurers can begin maintaining
the required data, and each year they can add one more column to the filing. At the end of five
years, and from then on, they will be in a position to file this information,  which will enable the
supervisor to monitor the accuracy with which reserves have been established.
We cannot over emphasize the importance of this information  in assessing the financial condition
and performance of a property/casualty insurer.
5.  Life  Insurance:  Specific  Supervisory  Aspects
Life insurers have several areas which give rise to particular issues for supervisors. On the
liability side of the balance sheet the most significant item is the actuarial reserves. In terms of
assessing the financial health of the company, much will therefore depend on the adequacy of
these reserves to cover future obligations. On the asset side, asset quality can often be a major
concern. We have referred to asset quality and the importance of actuarial reserving in the
preceding sections.
For life insurers.,  asset/liability cash flow matching is of special importance because the products
are typically long term in nature. A mismatch between cash inflows on the asset side and cash
flow requirements on the liability side can give rise to serious liquidity problems for a life
insurer.  A liquidity crunch can quickly become a solvency problem as an inability to fund
current cash needs may give rise to a "run on the bank", with the life insurer facing high levels of
surrenders and redemptions. The need to rapidly liquidate assets at what may be "fire sale"
prices may generate losses that exceed the book value of the company's net worth, i.e. leaving it
insolvent.
It is therefore viial for the supervisor to monitor cash flow projections on an ongoing basis in
order to be satisf  ied that proper matching is taking place. In developing countries, which may
not have great depth in their financial markets, it can sometimes be difficult for life insurers to
find investments that will adequately match liability cash flow requirements. At the same time,
for products such as annuities where the main feature is the future stream of cash flows, it is
extremely important to be properly matched. The need to utilize investment  vehicles which will
47Re-Engineering  Insurance  Supervision
facilitate matching may be a reason to permit life insurers to have at least partial access to foreign
markets offering a broader range of investment possibilities than is available domestically.
Today actuaries and economists using sophisticated  software can structure investment portfolios
in such a way that the insurer is not only properly matched but in fact immunized against the
potentially adverse affects of changes in interest rates.
Another area where the impact of powerful personal computers and software is showing up is in
company modelling. "Off the shelf' software is beginning to become available which, while still
requiring input from highly qualified actuaries,  is able to provide very precise corporate models
which can be used to analyse various "what if'  scenarios  for life insurers. Life insurance
companies are particularly good prospects for the use of computerized models because the
business in force can be considered almost as though it were a type of security. Each of the
products in force will give rise to reasonably predictable cash flows over time; and mortality,
surrender and lapse rates are estimable with reasonable certainty. When a company has a
computer model of its business in force it can also construct models for different scenarios in
terms of new business. Also, the computer model can be used to foresee the impact on solvency
of changes in key business parameters such as interest rates, mortality, lapse rates, expenses and
so on.
In fact, such models have become so widely used in Canada that insurance supervisors have
placed a requirement in the insurance act which requires each company's actuary to examine the
impact of changing economic scenarios on the company's solvency and to report on the findings
to the company's board of directors and to the Superintendent. This technique is referred to as
Dynamic Capital Adequacy Testing and it is proving to be an excellent tool. A number of
situations have been revealed to date where companies were found to be vulnerable to certain
combinations of changes in interest rates and lapse rates, for example, which were then able to be
satisfactorily addressed. Without Dynamic Capital Adequacy  Testing the companies may very
well not have realized that they were exposed until it was too late to do anything about it.
(Because of the less predictable nature of property/casualty  insurance, the so-called DCAT
technique is not mandatory for property/casualty  insurers in Canada but the Superintendent  can
require a P/C insurer to obtain a DCAT report when he or she believes it to be in the public
interest.)
Another area where these models are being used to great advantage is in the field known as
Economic Value Added. Over the last twenty five years or so the usual approach to evaluating
alternate business decisions has been to consider the internal rate of return expected to be
generated on capital employed and to compare that to an established threshold rate which is
related to the company's cost of capital. However, if a company has possession of a very
accurate corporate model, it can actually use the model to calculate  the present value of its
business in force and the present value of business to be written -- the latter under differing
product/market assumptions. The decision rule will be to choose the new products and/or the
combination of products which serves to maximize the economic value of the firm.
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Successful use of these types of modelling techniques may be another area in which some
upgrading of actuarial resources may be required prior to considering the possibility of
implementing the approach in developing countries. On the other hand, a less rigorous approach
-- simply requesting the actuary to specifically consider, based on their actuarial knowledge,
various future scenarios, may still be quite worthwhile from the perspective of both insurance
supervisors and boards of directors. As actuarial standards are upgraded over time the modelling
approach may become the accepted norm, but in the meantime there may be something to gain,
and little to lose, by introduction of the concept.
6.  Role  and Importance  of a Guarantee  Plan
No matter how solid the supervisory framework,  some companies will fail. This need not be a
reflection on the supervisory system itself, because there will always be a certain number of
events which could not have been predicted and/or could not have been altered. Needless to say,
if someone could write a rule book (which is essentially  what a supervisory system is)
guaranteeing  that companies would not go out of business, it would have been done long ago.
However, as lonig  as governments see fit to prescribe financial oversight for insurers -- and we
certainly believe-  that the benefits of such rules far outweigh any disadvantages they may have --
then when an insurer does become insolvent there will always be a hue and cry by affected
citizens that they should be "rescued" by the government.
There are many arguments for and against the establishment of guarantee  plans.  The most
common arguments against the plans are that they take away the incentive for the public to deal
with financially strong, well run companies; and they reduce the incentive for owners and
managers to make sound business decisions since there will be someone else "to pick up the
pieces".  On the other side of the coin it can probably be said that few consumers are in a
position to assess the financial strength of their insurance companies and that owners and
managers still stand to lose their capital and their livelihoods respectively if their institutions fail.
It may be that a system of coinsurance and deductibles can be designed which will ensure that
consumers and company people still have an interest in dealing with healthy, soundly operated
companies, while providing consumers with some protection  from the sort of devastating
financial loss that can result from the insolvency  of an insurer.
If a guarantee plan is to be established, it must be within a supervisory regime which combines
an appropriate legal framework with a properly enforced, fairly administered system of insurance
regulation. Otherwise the plan will have to take care of an undue number of failures, and if the
plan is directly or indirectly funded by the industry, as is generally the case, then a "domino
effect" may be seen, where stronger companies are brought down because of the cost of too
many failures.
49Re-Engineering  Insurance  Supervision
C.  Organizational  Issues
1.  Organization Within the Insurance Supervisory  Group
In this section we focus in greater detail on organizational considerations in respect of solvency
supervision. We do not specifically address marketplace  supervision, partly to keep this paper
within manageable proportions, partly because many of the considerations will be similar, and
partly because in most developing countries, although marketplace supervision is seen as
important, the highest current priority has to do with the financial health of institutions.
When thinking about possible organizational  arrangements for the solvency supervisor, an
important parameter is the size of the group involved.  As we have mentioned  earlier (see
"Resource Requirements of the Supervisor" in Part II, "Regulatory Infrastructure Issues"), where
there a large number of insurers, and a significant staff of say, at least 50 to 100 employees, we
think it is usually beneficial to have Financial  Analysis and Inspection as two separate divisions
within the organization. This corresponds  to the typical banking supervisory structure comprised
of off-site bank inspectors and on-site inspectors.
The primary reason for our preference in this regard has to do with the attributes considered most
desirable for each type of work. As mentioned earlier, in addition to an appropriate  blend of
academic and on the job training, we want our inspectors  to be a group of individuals who enjoy
meeting with company officials and whose keen understanding of financial affairs, combined
with an outgoing manner and natural inquisitiveness, enable them to  effectively assess
developments within the companies. For the financial analysis work, on the other hand, it is an
analytical mind, excellent skills in reading financial statements and seeing relationships between
numbers that will be the most desirable qualities. It is uncommon that one individual will be
both a superior inspector and a superior financial analyst.
One difficulty with having separate groups carry out these tasks is that to be effective, excellent
communications are required. The inspectors will not benefit from the keen insights of the
financial analysts if the analysts do not keep them in the picture as to their findings. Similarly, if
the inspectors do not convey their conclusions  to the financial analysts, the latter group will have
no reason to place any special analytical focus on one company more than another. Therefore a
vital component of any system which separates analysts and inspectors for purposes of
specialization, is an ongoing strategy for ensuring a constant and effective flow of information
between the two groups.
One way of facilitating this is to assign responsibility for specific insurers to specific individuals
in each part of the organization. Then you will have a team consisting of one or more inspectors,
financial analysts and others, cutting across organizational  lines, but sharing a common
supervisory interest in a particular insurer. Most of the time it will be the higher risk profile
insurers (see the section of this paper headed "Regulatory Ladder") that are assigned to teams in
this way, rather than all insurers. Such a team can meet on a regular basis (say, once per month)
so that each member can update the others on what has transpired from their perspective since
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the last meeting. From a strategic viewpoint, a consensus can be reached as to the team's goals
for the upcoming month, with each member agreeing as to the tasks they will be carrying out
over the period.
Some countries further subdivide their inspection groups into financial inspectors and technical
or actuarial inspectors. In a large supervisory  organization with, say, more than 100 employees,
such a structure may well be useful. This would tend to be in countries where the life insurance
business represents a reasonable share of the insurance marketplace, because it is in reviewing
the calculation of actuarial reserves and monitoring the reasonableness  of underlying actuarial
assumptions that such technical specialization  will be justified.
Another possible operational area is reinsurance analysis. In some markets reinsurance plays an
especially crucial role and in these cases it can be worthwhile to have one or two persons -- often
retired but highly qualified and experienced  executives from reinsurance companies -- who can
provide a resource for supervisory personnel, especially the inspectors.
In some cases it will be logical to have a specialized group to take care of new licence
applications, the making of recommendations  in connection  therewith and the processing of other
corporate changes such as amalgamations  and changes of name.  Sometimes this function can
also be handled by the financial analysts without the need for a separate group. The parameters
that will mainly impact the choice of approach will be the number of new applications and
corporate changes expected to be received and the complexity of the legal and supervisory
processes that will be applicable. In most developed countries, licensing criteria are detailed and
often there is a considerable amount of discussion with regard to the proposed business plans for
new entities, so it is common to have a special organizational  division to handle corporate
licensing and other corporate changes.
It should be emphasized, that with the creation of additional operational divisions, more attention
must be given to ensuring that there will be effective communication  within the organization.
Otherwise the supervisory  body will tend to become a number of separate entities, each working
independently. This leads to duplication of effort, inefficiency and ineffectiveness because
assessing the financial condition of an insurer is much like putting together a jigsaw puzzle.  The
more pieces that are available, the sooner one is able to recognize patterns and assemble the
whole picture. Similarly, supervisory  personnel such as technical inspectors, financial inspectors
and financial analysts each have a certain perspective  and are collecting pieces from a certain
part of the whole picture. If they do not get together to share their insights, they risk the
possibility that a serious problem is looming but that no one area has a sufficiently broad
perspective to recognize what is really happening. In addition, lack of communication  between
the operational Idivisions  will certainly give rise to frustration  for insurers that find themselves
having to deal vith a number of different people who are all asking the same questions.  Such a
situation will not help the supervisory group build credibility with the supervised companies.
Of course the supervisory organization will require other types of expertise as well. For
example, there should be access to legal advice. Again depending on the size of the organization,
there may be one or more lawyers housed within the organization,  or there may be lawyers
within the Ministry who specialize in insurance supervision. A reliable and knowledgeable
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source of legal advice is important because the field is complex and presents a number of unique
legal considerations. A situation where lawyers are assigned from some larger government pool
on an ad hoc basis should be avoided, because lacking continuity and an understanding of the
issues, even good lawyers will almost certainly be providing sub optimal advice.
The importance of the information technology area will be covered in more detail below, but
clearly in today's world the supervisory organization  requires access to competent technological
assistance. This doesn't necessarily have to be part of the organizational structure, but those
providing assistance should have a good understanding of the work being carried out by the
insurance supervisors.
In some jurisdictions the supervisory body will also include an insolvency division. It is
important to ensure that such a group is also included in supervisory  updates and
communications relating to company solvency.
In the above discussion we have not made reference  to the possibility of organizing around
company type. If the marketplace and the supervisory organization are sufficiently large, it can
sometimes be beneficial to organize around type of insurer, i.e. life and property/casualty, with
each area having specialized personnel in Life Insurance -Inspection, Life Insurance - Financial
Analysis, Life Insurance -Licensing, Property and Casualty -Inspection, and so on.  Some may
feel that such a structure will lead to duplication, but the number of staff allocated to each group
will be roughly proportional to the market share of each of these two main sectors of insurance.
Therefore in the aggregate, the required resources should not exceed what would be required on a
combined basis.
The main benefit of such a structure is that all operational  matters will tend to fall to one group
or the other. The head of the Life Insurance  area will be fully responsible for all matters having
to do with life insurance, and will have the resources to deal with all the issues that arise in that
area, and similarly for the head of the Property/Casualty  Insurance area. Another benefit is that
if the marketplace consists of a large number of companies, a single structure, comprised of one
group of inspectors, one group of financial analysts and so on, will mean that a few of the more
senior people will have to keep track of a large number of issues relating to different companies.
Subdividing the work between Life and Property/Casualty  will keep the number of companies
per senior executive to a more manageable number.
Of course in many countries business is underwritten by composite insurers that transact both life
and property/casualty insurance. In these cases organization by area of industry specialization
may not be practical.
Market conduct is an area that will typically be organized as a separate division within the
supervisory group -- assuming that it is not housed within a separate organization as mentioned
above -- as the issues to be addressed are very different from those relating to solvency. As a
part of market conduct activity, it is generally agreed that agents and brokers should be licensed
in order to ensure a certain level of knowledge in dealing with the public and also to foster
ethical conduct. This is one of the areas where even a relatively low level of technology can give
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rise to major improvements in efficiency in terms of tracking agent/broker complaints, issuing
licences and licence renewals and so on. In most countries there will be many more
intermediaries than insurance companies, so while a manual system of insurance company
licensing may give rise to no particular problems,  the issuance, renewal and tracking of a much
larger number of agents and brokers can soon become a major user of human resources,
particularly given that the law may require the insurance  company affiliations of each
intermediary also to be tracked as part of the licensing process.
Again depending on the market size, a separate unit may be needed to handle insurance company
and intermediary complaints from the public. The value of frequency of complaints as an
indicator of increasing financial risk should not be overlooked,  so complaints should be carefully
logged and the number of complaints  by company monitored. It is usual to consider the ratio of
complaints to market share as an indicator, so if an insurer with a 10% market share is generating
20% of all complaints received from the public, it is a signal that some investigation is required.
Of course for such indicators to be effective, there has to be a sufficiently large number of
companies and complaints to make the figures meaningful. Channels of communication  should
be put in place to ensure that inspectors, financial analysts and other interested supervisory
personnel are kept informed of the complaint indicators,  just as with more traditional financial
indicators.
Additional discussion on staffing and organizational  structures  for solvency regulation may be
found in Appendix 5.
2.  Relationship of Marketplace Supervision to Solvency Supervision
A fundamental question is whether solvency supervision and marketplace supervision should be
contained within the same organizational  structure. In the United States a one organization
model has certainly been the norm, with each state insurance commission being responsible for
both solvency and market conduct. A different approach has been followed in the United
Kingdom, Australia and Canada.
Australia recently considered the issue explicitly as part of the major review of its supervisory
structure. Taking account of the particular circumstances in Australia, the commission of inquiry
recommended that market conduct and product disclosure supervision, for all types of financial
products, should by carried out by a single body, with solvency  supervision for all members of
the system resting with a second organization. The commission has further recommended  that
"strong mechanisms should be established to ensure appropriate  co-ordination and co-operation
between the two agencies".
In the U.K. there has been considerable  debate over the past few years regarding the organization
of the supervisory system. As with Australia, the current model is for marketplace supervision
and solvency supervision through separate organizations.
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In Canada the "twin peaks" or separate structures  model for marketplace and solvency
supervision has, at least roughly speaking, been the case as well. Unfortunately in Canada it
might be better to refer to it as the "many peaks" model because marketplace supervision has
constitutionally rested with the provincial governments  (of which there are ten), while solvency
matters in respect of federally chartered institutions has been within the bailiwick of the federal
government. Many within the Canadian insurance industry would probably suggest that the
various provincial governments, and where applicable, the federal government as well, have not
harmonized their supervisory activities to the extent that might be seen as optimal (although the
level of harmonization seems to have been increasing in recent years -- a positive development).
In making a decision in this area much will depend on organizational  and jurisdictional
considerations for the country as whole. In general, single supervisor models offer ease of
communication  between the two policy making areas and should result in a high degree of
consistency of approach. On the other hand, some may suggest that the interests of consumers,
as represented by marketplace supervisors,  may not always align perfectly with the interests of
solvency supervisors, and that the best results will come when there is co-ordination, but a
degree of independence, between the two areas.
3.  Insurance and Banking Supervision  Within Same Organization
There are several common organizational  structures  utilized by insurance supervisory
organizations. The particular arrangement  will usually be a function of the specific situation in
the country concerned.
There is often a question first of all as to whether the insurance supervisory group should be
organizationally included with the banking supervisors. In some countries banking supervision
is under the aegis of the central bank, in other countries bank supervision rests with a separate
organization.
There can be important advantages to including the insurance group with banking. Over the past
ten to fifteen years, we have seen a global trend for life insurers to develop products that are in
many ways similar to banking products. Most would agree that similar financial products should
be subject to similar supervisory policies, irrespective of the type of institution that issued the
financial instrument. However, when the supervisory organizations  for banks and insurers are
completely separate there is a tendency for them to each move in their own direction in terms of
policy, with the result that supervisory approaches  and supporting rules can become markedly
different.  Combining both banking and insurance supervision within a single supervisory entity
will tend to ensure consistency of approach.
Another benefit of this approach, at least from an insurance perspective, is that it can tend to
encourage reasonable parity in the allocation of supervisory resources. In virtually every
country, the government recognizes that the role of the banking system is vital to the exercise of
government monetary policy, so that bank supervision is given high priority. Banking
supervisors tend to be well trained, well equipped  technologically and generally  provided with
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the tools to do their jobs.  The role of insurance supervision is more subtle -- we argue that it is
also extremely important in building the financial infrastructure  of the country -- but because of
its lower profile, insurance supervisors  sometimes find that they do not have access to the same
array of resources. Including both groups within the same organization tends to ensure that
access to resources will more truly reflect the important role of each group.
The arguments against combining bank and insurance supervision within one entity tend to be
less compelling',  in our view.  Some will suggest that if insurance is included with bank
supervision, the insurance aspect will simply be overwhelmed by the banking side.  This can
happen, but it should not be too difficult to arrange the organization in such a way that it will not
occur. Others may suggest that banking and insurance are still very different industries and that
a high degree of specialization continues to be warranted at the supervisory  level.  We think
fewer and fewer observers are of that view.
On balance, we tend to the view that in most circumstances  it will probably make the most sense
to combine both types of supervision within one supervisory group.  There may be particular
circumstances in individual countries where other arrangements  will be more efficient or
effective, but in general, the trend seems more and more to be towards consolidated supervision
by banking and.  insurance supervisors.
Appendix 5 contains more information  regarding staffing and organization.
D.  The Legal  Framework
1.  Corporate Existence
An initial question arises in connection with the legal framework  under which insurance
companies will have their corporate existence. In some jurisdictions, insurers, like most other
types of corporations, have all of the powers of a natural person, which means that they are only
restricted in their activities to the extent specified by law. In these  jurisdictions therefore, the
laws governing the powers, responsibilities  and activities of insurers will be framed in terms of
what they are not permitted to do or in terms of limitations to powers which would otherwise be
unfettered.
Other jurisdictions use what in common law countries is known as the "special act" approach. In
this case, insurers only have the powers that are set out in the law. Anything that is not
specifically permitted, is prohibited.
The latter approach will obviously make for a more constrained operating regime than will the
former. It is also easier to administer and poses fewer problems from a supervisory perspective
because companies can do only those things which the legislators have specifically contemplated
as being appropriate and desirable.
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The downside of this approach is that the world is rapidly becoming a more complex place, and
company activities and ways of doing business are constantly evolving. Many of these changes
will be ruled out under a special act regime, at least until the legislators can consider and approve
specific changes in the law. There are many other matters competing for the legislators' time,
with the result that changes can often be long delayed, leaving insurers unable to compete
effectively with other types of financial institutions or with insurers domiciled in jurisdictions
having more flexible supervisory environments.
This is the strength of the natural person regime: companies have the freedom to change their
activities and ways of doing business as they deem necessary in a competitive marketplace. It is
the supervisors and lawmakers who have to think about introducing new legislation if they wish
to subject certain activities to limitation.
The choice of legal framework  may therefore depend on the rapidity with which one expects the
operating environment to change and the extent to which controls may be necessary. If there is
concern about the possibility of companies changing too quickly, and perhaps without sufficient
prudence and responsibility to safeguard the public interest, then the special act approach may be
the most desirable route. Otherwise the natural person philosophy will probably be the best
approach.
2.  Entrance Requirements
Here we are talking about the criteria for permitting companies to get into the business of
insurance. In most countries the law will set out a number of minimum requirements that will
have to be met by any company wishing to transact the business of insurance. The most
common of these are summarized below:
r0  Minimum Initial Capital: This will depend to some extent on the scope of economic
activity envisaged for new insurers. However, unless the marketplace is extremely small, with
correspondingly low policy amounts, we find it difficult to foresee a minimum capital threshold
of less than US$1 million, and probably US$3 million is more realistic. One has to keep in mind
that the only commodity being sold by an insurance company is the financial security provided
by its capital base.  Any insurance company having capital of less than US$1 million does not
have much to sell. If some existing companies have a capital base which is below the selected
threshold, we suggest that they be given a period of time, say one or two years, to reach the
newly required minimum level. (Note: We refer here to the capital required to be on hand prior
to the issuance of a licence to commence business. In Section 4, below, we deal with the need to
prescribe an ongoing minimum capital requirement  which will be a function of the company's
liabilities and, in the case of risk based capital, assets as well.)
0  Financial Statements: To gauge the financial capacity and experience of the owners, copies
of audited financial statements of corporations that will be shareholders  in the new insurer,
covering a period of the last five years.  If the shareholders  will be individuals, then they should
file statements setting out their personal financial positions. If the applicant is an existing
insurance company from another  jurisdiction, then copies of the supervisory filings for the past
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five years should be provided. If the applicants are corporations  that are subsidiaries of other
corporations, and where it could be presumed that these other corporations would provide the
real source of capital for the new venture, then five years of financial statements should also be
filed in respect oi these other corporations.
rx  Ownership Structure: A detailed organizational  chart should be provided showing the
direct and beneficial ownership of the proposed company and all affiliates.
Ix  Business Plan: Prospective new entrants should provide a detailed business plan acceptable
to the supervisor, illustrating a good familiarity  with the insurance marketplace, including the
marketplace in the country to which application is being made. The business plan is a critical
aspect of the information to be provided by the new entrant. It should include the following:
/  biographies of individuals acting as sponsors of the new entity as well as those who will
become directors and officers of the company;
-$  proposed ownership structure and initial financing arrangement;
V  statement of investment policy that will be followed by the new entity;
V/  a three year financial forecast including balance sheets and income statements prepared in
accordance with the accounting requirements  of the jurisdiction of application, showing
projected solvency test results and other ratios required by the supervisor, underwriting results by
major class of business and all underlying assumptions;
V'  classes of insurance to be underwritten and a description of the products to be sold, the
marketing strategy to be followed, the geographical dispersion of the business, the distribution
methods, the reinsurance arrangements,  key management personnel, the computer systems and
software to be ut:ilized  and the means of providing policyholder  service.
*  Managernent: Officers and directors accepted by the supervisor as "fit and proper"
persons to manage an insurance company, and also able to demonstrate  that they have an
appropriate level of insurance industry experience;
*  Good Conduct: In any case where the applicant or sponsors are not known to the
supervisor, enquiries should be made to ensure that they do not have a record of undesirable
conduct elsewhere.
*  Name:  T  he name of the proposed entity should not be the same as nor so similar to the
name of another corporation as to cause confusion to the public;
*  Records: If the applicants are from outside the jurisdiction, and if the insurance act is
not already clear on the point, they should give an undertaking as to the records they will
maintain in the jurisdiction and which will be available on an ongoing basis for inspection by the
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Superintendent.
*  Foreign Applicants: Where the applicant is an existing insurer from another country,
the supervisor should expect to see a reasonable period of profitable operation in the home
jurisdiction (from 3 to 5 years) writing the same lines of business as are being requested from the
supervisor, a significant asset base in the home country, information satisfactory to the
supervisor that the company is complying with regulatory requirements  in the home jurisdiction,
that the regulatory regime itself is sound and well respected and that the home country of the
applicant insurer has market entry rules that are reasonably comparable to those described above.
All of the foregoing must be carefully considered  with a view to satisfying  the supervisors that
the applicants have a viable plan, that they have the financial resources to support the plan and
that they have the experience and sound reputations necessary to provide the public with a high
level of insurance expertise.
3.  Composite Companies
We encourage countries not to permit the use of composite insurers. In cases where this has
traditionally been done, we favour not approving  any new applications for composite company
authority, with supervisory encouragement  for companies over time to gradually spin off their
life and nonlife businesses into separate corporate entities, which can still be under common
ownership.
We make this suggestion because we believe the fundamental  nature of life business and
property/casualty business is very different. Life insurance is a long term vehicle where asset
matching is very important. Property/casualty  insurance is of short term duration with liquidity
being of critical importance. Probably most importantly,  the life insurance business is, more and
more and in most countries, concerned with the sale of investment and saving type products,
which are more similar to many banking products than to traditional life insurance.
Property/casualty insurance, on the other hand, is a vehicle for spreading risk and providing for
the protection of assets, not for savings or investment. Accordingly, the management
perspectives required of executives in each industry are very different, as are the underlying
investment strategies and other areas of expertise required in the two facets of the business.
Placing the two business types within a single corporate structure, give rise in our view to greater
management challenges for corporate executives,  to say nothing of supervisory personnel.
4.  Minimum Capital Requirements
Above we have described criteria with regard to getting into the business of insurance. Here we
consider the financial requirements  for being permitted to stay in the business.
We have mentioned a minimum initial capital requirement,  but it will be clear that as the new
entity grows, the liability base will grow also, so that even if the absolute amount of capital
remains undiminished (and in fact it is likely to be reduced as a result of unprofitability in the
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start up phase of operation), it will be shrinking relative to the company's total liabilities. The
larger the company becomes, the greater is the monetary exposure due to the occurrence of large
claims, estimation problems, declines in asset values and so on. Therefore it is almost
universally agreed that after start up, an appropriate degree of security to policyholders will only
be maintained on a going forward basis if the capital base is maintained above some minimum
amount which is a function of the company's exposure to risk.
One of the simplest ways to accomplish this is to stipulate a minimum capital formula as a
function of the company's liability base, especially  for property/casualty  insurance where the
liability base tencls  to reasonably reflect the risk exposure.
In the European Common Market countries and others which have adopted similar approaches, a
three component requirement is used for property/casualty insurers, with the capital requirement
being based on the greater of (subject to various adjustments and refinements):
15% of policyholder liabilities (i.e. outstanding claims and unearned premiums);
i  15% of gross premiums written during the previous 12 months, subject to a reduction to
take account of reinsurance; and
*  22% of average annual gross claims incurred over the previous 36 months, again subject
to a reduction for reinsurance.
The reduction for reinsurance is based on the percent of liabilities ceded, but in many
jurisdictions the rnaximum reinsurance credit is fixed at 50%. The rationale for this is that if a
company is holding itself out to the public as an insurer, it should have sufficient capital to
support at least 50% of its gross obligations to the public without relying on reinsurance support.
If it wishes to utilize a higher amount of reinsurance there would be nothing to prevent it from
doing so, but it would not obtain any relief from the minimum capital test by reinsuring more
than 50% of its business.
The situation for life insurance companies is more complex because the liability base is primarily
comprised of actuarially calculated amounts. In this case much will depend on the actuarial
approach. If the actuarial reserves are conservatively stated then it is possible that no
additional capital margins will be required. On the other hand, if the actuarial reserves have been
established on the basis of less conservative assumptions, additional capital margins may be
necessary.
The Bank for International Settlements  has established a framework for bank capital
requirements which takes into account risks inherent on both the asset and liability sides of the
balance sheet, known as "risk based capital requirements". Using these same principles,
supervisors in the United States, Canada and other countries, have devised minimum capital
requirements for life insurers. Unfortunately the risk based approaches  require a good deal of
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actuarial expertise for implementation, and this level of professional support is not available in
many countries.
A very simple approach for life insurers, although likely to be far less effective, is to stipulate a
capital requirement which is a fixed percentage of the company's total liabilities. In Canada
before the advent of risk based capital requirements,  a rule of thumb was that the capital base of a
life insurer should be at least equal to 5% of its liabilities. At that point in time, however, the
actuarial reserves were stated on quite a conservative  basis.  If a simple percentage of liabilities
approach is to be used, the supervisors will have to select a threshold level which takes account
of the reserving conventions in their country and with which they feel comfortable.
In the case of composite companies the total capital requirement would be determined
independently for the life insurance and property/casualty insurance business and then
aggregated for the company as a whole.
Whatever on going capital requirements are established, they should clearly be spelled out as part
of the legal framework.
In recent years, rating agencies have become much more pervasive in terms of the number of
companies which receive ratings. This has made it increasingly  feasible to incorporate the rating
agencies' output into the system of solvency supervision. For example, because of the ever
present danger of earthquake in the Mexican marketplace, catastrophe  reinsurance is a necessity
for every insurer in that country. Capacity considerations suggest that for the most part, this
coverage will have to be provided by international  reinsurers. However, it is very difficult for
supervisors concerned with entry requirements,  to assess the financial positions of reinsurers
from all over the world, having different financial reporting regimes and so on. Accordingly, it
was decided that a graded reserving system would be established, and that reinsurers having the
highest ratings from recognized international  rating agencies would have unfettered access to the
market. For reinsurers having slightly lower ratings, ceding companies would have to establish a
reserve in respect of ceded liabilities, with the amount of the required reserve increasing as the
rating agency grading of the reinsurer becomes lower. This is an example of how the work of the
rating agencies can be incorporated into the supervisory process.
Rating agencies use the same methods described in this paper to assess the viability of insurers:
meetings with management and discussion of their business plans, review and analysis of
financial information. Rating agencies do not have the force of law to back up their requests for
information, however, nor do they provide ratings for any but the largest insurers where it is
commercially worthwhile for them to do so. Nevertheless the Mexican example shows that there
can be situations where the output of rating agencies can provide a worthwhile supplement to the
traditional supervisory process.
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5.  The Rolle  of Corporate Governance: The Canadian Model
Events in recenL  years have led Canadian policy makers to place increasing emphasis on
corporate governance as a pillar of the supervisory system. By "corporate governance" we mean
a system of laws and regulations which places primary responsibility for ensuring that an
institution remains viable, on the board of directors and senior management of the institution.
This is done by laying out a broad framework  that is intended to ensure that the board of
directors will have access to the information required for proper decision making. Checks and
balances are established to provide a degree of independence  to the board and to make sure that
actions are in line with the best interests of the institution (as opposed to the interests of the
shareholders, for example). As well, a system of sanctions are in place so that boards will be
able to be held accountable if their actions are not consistent with "standards of sound business
and financial practice".
The new approach evolved as a result of events in Canada, but we have found the underlying
principles to be of keen interest to supervisors  elsewhere. A particularly desirable attribute in the
developing country context is that it tends to reduce the amount of direct supervision required by
government personnel, thereby freeing up scarce resources for use in other areas. In fact, the
corporate governance approach is in a sense, a limited form of self-regulation in the realm of
solvency supervision.
In any case, in the event that it may be helpful to supervisors in other countries, we have included
in Appendix 1 an outline describing some of the reasons for the growing emphasis on corporate
governance by Canadian supervisors, as well as a description of the framework currently in
place.
6.  Supervisory Tools
In the section above, and more particularly in Appendix 1, we have talked about ways in which
the companies, iheir auditors and actuaries can play a key role in the supervisory process. The
legal framework must also include specific supervisory tools that will be available to the
Superintendent. By "supervisory tools" we mean the practices, procedures and courses of action
that the supervisor will be authorized to utilize in seeing to it that insurers comply with the laws,
are financially sound and dealing fairly with the public. Such provisions are subject to the ability
of the company concerned to have a hearing with the Minister or other appropriate government
representative, to ensure fairness in the system. The actions described below should not, in our
view, be appealable to the courts, as this enables financially troubled companies to effectively
stall any supervisory action until there is no money left in the company. To ensure due process
the legislation should provide the affected company with the opportunity for a hearing by the
Minister or an impartial tribunal, within a stipulated period of time.
Set out below is a listing of some of the tools with which we are familiar and which we think can
be effective in pretty much any country:
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0M  Special Audits: In addition to the normal staff inspections, where the supervisor believes
that it would be in the public interest, he should be able to require the independent public auditor
to extend the scope of the audit or to carry out a special audit, focusing on areas indicated by the
Superintendent. In Canada, the Insurance  Companies Act empowers the Superintendent  to
require the auditor of a company to make a special audit pertaining to "the adequacy of
procedures adopted by the company for the safety of its creditors, shareholders and
policyholders, or any other examination as, in the Superintendent's  opinion, the public interest
may require". At the discretion of the Superintendent,  the cost of such a special audit may be
charged to the company.
0  Imposition of Conditions: The Superintendent  should have the power to impose conditions
upon a company's ability to operate. For example,  the Superintendent  should be able to order a
company not to exceed a certain volume of business over a specified period of time (e.g. not
more than $20 million in gross premiums and not more than $10 million in net premiums over
the next 12 months), or not to write more than a certain volume of business relative to its capital
and surplus (e.g. net premiums written in next 12 months not to exceed 3 times current level of
surplus), or to impose geographical limitations (e.g. no business outside the country). Another
form of limitation is to prescribe a date on which the company's authority to transact business
will expire, which may be different from the normal expiration date of the licence, unless the
company has been able to meet certain conditions (e.g. increase its capital level such that it
complies with the minimum capital requirements  set out in the insurance act). In short, the
Superintendent should be able to impose any condition whatsoever with regard to a company's
ability to transact business, subject to the company having the right to a hearing in front of the
Minister.
[El Letter of Direction: The Superintendent  should be able to serve a company with written
.notice that it must change its practices in specific ways described by the Superintendent or take
steps which in the opinion of the Superintendent  are necessary to deal with financial or
operational problems.
0M Power to Take Control of the Insurer:  While it is preferable  to cause a company to
correct deficiencies before such drastic action is required by the supervisor, there may come a
time when direct intervention is necessary  to stop the bleeding.  Such a provision would
normally require Ministerial approval, with the Minister having to be satisfied that such action is
in the public interest. There would also usually be some type of appeal mechanism, although any
such process must be stipulated beforehand and in such a way that it will not effectively thwart
the ability of the supervisor to take control.
These are powerful provisions. Normally the interests of the supervisors  and company
management will coincide, as both want to see the company financially sound and profitable.
Therefore it is usually possible for the supervisory staff to work closely with company
management to see to it that the company's business strategy is modified in ways that will
strengthen the company. The supervisory powers outlined above would only be resorted to in
cases when more co-operative approaches  have not proven practicable. Taken together they
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provide the supervisor with a wide range of potential actions to head off solvency related
problems.
Within the context of the corporate governance  approach, the single most important incentive to
properly manage the institution may be the prospect of personal liability on directors. If directors
authorize actions which are outside the realm of sound business and financial practices, and
which ultimately lead to insolvency, then policyholders and creditors would be able to institute
legal proceedings in an effort to recover their losses. It would be up to the courts to decide
whether or not individual directors had in fact done everything reasonably possible to ensure that
the company was soundly managed.
7.  Ensuring a Competitive Marketplace
To ensure a competitive marketplace  we see the following as basic necessities:
I.  A sufficient number of companies to ensure a reasonable range of consumer choice.
2.  Technically competent personnel within the industry who are able to knowledgeably
select and price  insurance  risks.
3.  An infonned public with access to information  about insurance products.
4.  A sufficiently large pool of claims statistics so that each company has access to credible
data for purposes,  of product pricing.
1.  We talk elsewvhere  in this paper about the role of market conduct within the supervisory area.
Appropriate market conduct supervision also helps to ensure a competitive marketplace by
discouraging cornpanies  or intermediaries from adopting business practices which unfairly
discriminate agaiinst  consumers and which would thereby place them at a competitive advantage
over others.
Another factor that will help to encourage a competitive  marketplace is a system of insurance
supervision which is not subject to political interference. If companies can simply approach the
Minister to have the supervisor overruled on a particular issue, the industry will quickly
recognize that the name of the game is to influence the Minister rather than to concern oneself
with the actual regulations. When this occurs, market competition is replaced by a system where
business advantage is accrued by means of political favouritism rather than the support of
consumers. Clearly, political interference can be a major obstruction to a truly competitive
market.
We have mentioned above that the number of companies carrying on business is also a
determinant of the level of competition in the marketplace. In this regard, we tend to favour a
market that is open to foreign insurer participation, although there are two schools of thought as
to whether this will be of benefit to the marketplace. On the one hand, some will argue that the
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presence of foreign insurers will tend to bring with it a certain level of experience and insurance
acumen from which the entire market can benefit. As well, these foreign insurers have expertise
in the determination of premiums, so they should be able to establish premium levels which are
actuarially sound and also sufficient to generate reasonable levels of profit, thus serving as a
model for the local insurers. Others will say, however, that because the local market is apt to be
such a small business area for a foreign insurer, the insurer may under price the local companies
just to get the business, without regard for profitability. Probably both scenarios occur at
different times and in different places.
8.  Issues Relating to the Supervision of Foreign Companies
In many countries, foreign interests can partake in the domestic insurance market in either of two
ways:  (1) they can incorporate a domestic subsidiary company which will be wholly owned by
the foreign insurer or (2) they may operate as a branch within the jurisdiction.
A branch presents several advantages and disadvantages  from a public policy perspective. Some
of the advantages are:
0M  Domestic policyholders are protected by the full financial resources of the company as a
whole.  In other words, the world wide capital and surplus of the company is available to deal
with the claims of domestic policyholders. Reinsurers often operate on a branch basis, because if
they were to set up subsidiary companies wherever they operate, their capital and surplus would
be locked into the many different corporate entities in different countries. In that event they
would not be able to mobilize their full financial resources to respond to a major catastrophe in
any one country.
0  The entrance criteria should ensure that the only branches which are admitted are those which
are highly solvent, well experienced,  having excellent reputations and solid management.  The
calibre of financial supervision in the home  jurisdiction can also be taken into account when
considering an application for entry. (See "Entrance Requirements"  under "The Legal
Framework", above.)
On the other hand, there are also potential disadvantages with branch operations:
0M  If financial difficulties do develop in the home  jurisdiction, assets may be withdrawn from
the branch jurisdiction so as to provide a higher degree of protection for domestic policyholders.
01  In order to achieve economies of operation, a branch may find it beneficial to process most of
its business in its home jurisdiction or elsewhere,  where there are existing computer and other
systems. This can leave the branch  jurisdiction with little ability to carry out meaningful
inspections. Also, if the company were to actually become insolvent, there may not exist in the
branch jurisdiction sufficient information regarding policies and claims to successfully liquidate
the company's affairs. This is a highly unsatisfactory situation, since neither the insurance
supervisors nor the courts in the branch  jurisdiction will have any authority in the home
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jurisdiction.  Policyholders in the branch  jurisdiction may then find themselves at the end of the
line with other general creditors when it comes to gaining access to the estate of the insolvent
insurer.
There are ways in which these disadvantages can be dealt with, however.
First, in order to ensure adequate financial protection for domestic policyholders, it is common to
require that branches maintain assets in trust within the country, in amounts that correspond to
the minimum assets that would be required by a domestic company having the same
asset/liability position. In other words, the foreign branch is usually required to meet the same
minimum capital requirement as a domestic company, with the difference that the branch's
investments and securities are required to be maintained under the control of an independent
third party trustee so as to ensure their availability if required. Normally the foreign branch
would maintain other bank accounts in the country, under management's control, to deal with
day to day business. If the branch wishes to dispose of certain investments in its trust account it
would have to replace them with others, ensuring that at all times the amount in the trust account
is at least equal to the minimum required amount.
On the question of record keeping, the insurance act may require branches to keep sufficient
information in the country to permit the annual audit by the outside auditors and to enable the
supervisors to carry out a satisfactory inspection.
The area of access to records is a difficult one because in this age of  "virtual" companies, one
doesn't want to interfere  with logical and reasonable attempts to operate on an efficient basis.
In some cases it may be possible to address supervisory concerns by electronic means. For
example, if the head office of the company keeps a complete electronic copy of the data base for
the branch, updated daily, in the country where the branch is located, then the supervisors could
be sure that there will always be a complete record of the branch's financial records within the
country.
It will likely not be satisfactory to have electronic access to branch financial information via the
main data base at the company's head offices. This is because if there are financial problems and
a receiver is appointed in the home  jurisdiction, the foreign  jurisdiction will probably lose its
ability to access the records at head office. By contrast, if there is an up to date electronic copy
of the branch records in the branch  jurisdiction, then the supervisors in the branch  jurisdiction
can take control of that data base and have the information required to sort out the branch's
obligations in their country.
Related to the question of access to records, another important requirement when dealing with
branch operations is to ensure that one person is in charge of the branch's operations in the
country, that they have a permanent place of business there and that they are normally resident in
the country. If this is not done and financial problems arise, the supervisor can discover that
there is no one in the country who actually has an understanding of what the branch was doing
from a business perspective. In Canada, every branch has to appoint an official agent who will
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be responsible for service of legal notices and other official documents and who will have legal
responsibility for the branch's operations in the country. If the branch is a relatively large one, it
will have officers such as a general manager or a president of the Canadian division, and one of
these officers would normally also be appointed as official representative of the branch.
Recent developments at an international  level, such as the establishment of the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors,  are facilitating co-operation  and co-ordination  between
supervisors in different countries. This is making it somewhat less difficult for supervisors to
assess the financial positions of companies from other jurisdictions and to make judgements
regarding the licensing of foreign insurers.
Apart from the points mentioned above, we believe the requirements for branches should be the
same as for domestic insurers.
9.  Winding Up
When a significant number of insurers are operating in today's volatile business and economic
climate, is almost certain that a few will not survive, even if the calibre of supervision is very
high.  As mentioned earlier, excellent supervision will significantly  reduce the number of
insurers that would otherwise fail, but risk can only be managed, not eliminated. In some
countries a major portion of the supervisor's overall workload is related to the liquidation of
insolvent insurers.
Probably the most basic objective of the supervisory system is to protect policyholders from loss.
When a company fails there will almost certainly be losses, but even here, a certain amount of
forethought can mitigate losses to the public.
There are two principal points to take into account. First, when an insurer reaches the point that
its liabilities exceed its assets, the supervisor must take steps to close the doors. Unfortunately it
is all too easy to accept the inevitable pleas from the shareholders  to the effect that all will be
well, as long as more time is made available by the supervisor. And it is surprising how long a
company can continue to operate, running down its resources to the point where there is virtually
nothing left for policyholders having outstanding claims, so that these unfortunate individuals are
left with virtually nothing to cover their claims. The point to remember  is that an insolvent
insurer is like a plane with failing engines. As long as the insurer is allowed to continue
operating, the supervisor is permitting more passengers to get on the plane, even though there is
ample evidence that the craft is no longer air worthy. This is something the supervisor should
never permit.
The second point is to make sure there are mechanisms in place to provide for company
liquidation on a basis which provides a reasonable degree of protection to the remaining asset
base of the company. In some countries this is accomplished  by providing in the law that the
expenses of liquidation are to be assessed against the remaining companies in the industry on the
basis of their individual market shares. In this way the assets of the insolvent company are
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preserved and available for discharging insurance obligations rather than being consumed in the
expenses of the liquidation.
Another mechanism that helps to protect claimants when an insolvency has occurred is to spell
out in the legislation the priority of claimants. Insurance claimants (i.e. persons having unpaid
claims under policies and those who are entitled to refunds of unearned premium) can be given
preference over other business creditors. And for property/casualty  insurers, unpaid claim
amounts can be given preference  over unearned  premiums. Unearned  premiums due to
individual policyholders are usually quite small amounts, although in the aggregate they typically
constitute a significant proportion of total liabilities. By comparison, unpaid claims tend to be
much larger amounts on an individual basis, but with many fewer cases. Consequently, if a
person having an unpaid claim suffers a shortfall of, say, 20%, that 20% may represent a heavy
financial burden. On the other hand, for a person who is due an unearned premium, a loss of
20% is probably quite a small loss in absolute terms.
The heavy financial loss that can arise for those with unpaid claims will be greatly reduced if
unpaid claims are given priority in liquidation  over the refund of unearned premiums. If the
asset shortfall is 20%, and the average unearned premium is $1,000, then the average unearned
premium claimant will loose $200, which is not likely to be a crippling blow. If the average
unpaid claim is $50,000 a 20%  loss amounts to $10,000. But having in mind that in total the
unearned premium amounts likely represent a significant proportion of the liabilities of the
insurer, it may be possible to pay 100% of unpaid claims by increasing the average loss of the
unearned premium claimants to, say, $400, which is still not a devastatingly large loss. Thus by
ranking unpaid claims ahead of unearned premiums, those with significant monetary losses
receive a much higher level of protection that would otherwise  be the case, albeit at the expense
of those who have paid their premiums but who have had no claims. The  justification for this
approach is thai the fundamental  purpose of the insurance policy is to compensate for what
would otherwise be a crippling financial loss. Uneamed premium claimants have not suffered
such a loss and therefore their premium is considered to be "fully earned" in the insolvent
insurer.
E.  The Tirne  Horizon: Developing a Supervisory  Strategy
In the foregoing pages we have discussed at some length, various models and approaches to
insurance supervision. It is essential to recognize, however, that one cannot move overnight
from a system where there has been little or no supervision to one which is highly sophisticated.
As with any business or organizational endeavours,  it will be necessary for us to decide first of
all, what kind of system we ultimately want to have. In other words, taking account of the
particular issues and circumstances facing our jurisdiction, what system do we currently believe
(things tend to change over time, so we may modify our view in the future) will best provide for
the public interest in terms of solvency and marketplace  supervision of our insurance industry?
This will no do  ubt require a good deal of thought and consultation  with the interested parties.
Once the vision,  of the end state is determined, one can think about what will have to be done and
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how much time will reasonably be required to do it. Here one has to bear in mind the reality of
time delays inherent in obtaining changes in legislation, working with a varied population of
companies and so on.  One also has to plan out in detail what changes will have to take place and
how long each can be expected to take. It is often helpful to sketch out the various stages and
steps diagramatically, attaching time lines to the key activities.
For purposes of discussion, let's suppose that our best estimate is that it will take seven years to
reach the point that we currently view as being a kind of ideal supervisory system. In our
experience, it is usually possible to think of quite a number of things that can actually be
accomplished fairly quickly, because they are within the power of the supervisor to control.
Items falling into this category generally include:
0x  staff training to familiarize employees with various supervisory models and strategies for
working with insurers to overcome financial and other types of problems;
Ixl changes in supervisory work practices such as implementing  a form of early warning test
ratios;
IXJ  putting in place a regulatory ladder;
0x improving the efficiency and effectiveness  of other work procedures within the supervisory
organization, including general financial analysis and on site inspections; and
El  generally making the supervisory process more effective and efficient by increasing the
amount of assistance provided by computerization  and systems.
Matters such as modernizing the financial reporting regime will require more time  because here
consultation and discussion with the industry will be necessary. Also in this category may be
organizational changes within the Superintendent's office, as these usually cannot be carried out
without various discussions and approvals from within the government.
Depending on the legislative timetable for the particular country, more time consuming changes
are usually those requiring new legislation. Areas which may require new legislation could
include revised minimum capital requirements,  revised rules pertaining to companies' investment
powers, new powers for the Superintendent  and new requirements  for foreign branches.
The longest term changes are those which require not only new legislation but also changes in
the external business environment. For example, if the intention is to move over time to an
environment where corporate governance will play a more significant role, it may be necessary
first of all to work with the professional organizations  representing the country's accountants,
auditors and actuaries. The supervisor will have to be satisfied that the members of these
organizations have the requisite levels of skill and knowledge, through their professional training
programs, to take on some of the work that may historically have been carried out by the
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supervisor. Chan,ges  in the legislation will also be required to set out new responsibilities for the
board of directors, auditors and actuaries. In a plan envisioned  to take place over a period of
seven years, carving out a meaningful  corporate governance  regime may take the full seven
years, depending on the starting point of course.
The key is to establish goals, determine realistic time frames for achieving  the various
components of what you expect to be the final system, monitor your progress over time and be
prepared to revise your plan as new information  becomes available, circumstances change and
unforeseen situations arise. Having in mind the speed with which the financial services
businesses are evolving world wide, it is almost certain that over time it will be necessary to
modify your original plan.
Overall we are confident that within one to two years most supervisory  organizations will be able
to make the transition to the new paradigm of insurance supervision, at least in the majority of
areas. Areas which the supervisor can influence, but not directly control, such as raising the
standards of auditors and actuaries, and moving to a GAAP based reporting system, will
doubtless take somewhat longer.
F.  Finding the Right Balance
Some of the parameters we have discussed include technology,  the role of corporate governance,
self-regulation, staff training, professional support, data gathering and interpretation, solvency
and market conduct of companies.
It is necessary to blend all of these parameters in such a way that the end result will address the
issues facing the particular  jurisdiction. Clearly the first step in deciding how that blending
process should be effected, is to think about the issues currently facing the country. Are there
special situations resulting from unusual economic  circumstances, political conditions, the
business environment? When one is endeavouring to upgrade and modernize an insurance
supervisory system, one of the first steps is to gain an overview of the whole system. What
problems are giving rise to the greatest concerns  for the supervisors? What do industry leaders
think about these problems? Do they see different issues as being key to industry and
supervisory progress? What is the financial health of the industry? Is it generally  profitable?
Have there been an unusual number of insolvencies over the past few years? If so, did the causes
tend to be asset based, such as depressed real estate values or defaulting  bond issues? Or were
insolvencies mcre often related to operational matters such as under pricing of products, poor
product design, unsatisfactory reinsurance arrangements,  etc.
The answers to these questions will help determine where to place the emphasis in the
supervisory re-engineering work. For example,  if industry solvency  problems have tended to be
asset and investment based as opposed to operationally based, then the initial supervisory
rebuilding would probably be directed towards improved financial reporting, (especially the
reporting of investments, including the possibility of more timely and detailed information
regarding investment activity), the development of investment guidelines (pending the
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supervisor's ability to initiate desired new investment legislation)  and the development of better
rules and procedures for the valuation of real estate and other assets.
If investments are seen as a problem area one would probably not put the highest initial priority
on, for example, increasing the efficiency of the on-site inspections, because the on-site
inspections will in most cases not reveal a great deal about investment activity which cannot be
obtained more easily and efficiently by means of company filings. What one may want to do in
the inspection area would be to have some of the inspectors  participate in specialized training in
the investment area and/or design a special type of on site inspection for companies having more
serious issues in the investment realm. In the latter case the inspectors could meet with the
portfolio management people of the insurer to talk to them about supervisory concerns, to better
understand the company's investment policies and objectives  and to help to build a relationship
with the personnel involved so as to encourage future dialogue and discussion.
Generally speaking, staff training, especially in techniques of financial analysis and on site
inspection, is an area that can give rise to important gains in productivity and effectiveness at an
early stage in the supervisory re-engineering  process. This is doubly beneficial because not only
is the quality of the work improved, but also the staff has greater confidence, leading to higher
morale and job satisfaction and also to an ability to more easily understand  the other supervisory
changes in the offing.
It is also important to retain the assistance of someone with experience in these areas. No two
organizations are the same, no two countries have exactly the same circumstances and the issues
facing the insurance industry in each marketplace will be somewhat  different. A consultant
cannot do your work for you, but working together with a consultant who has an in depth
understanding of the issues, who is sensitive to supervisory concerns, approaches and realities,
will place you in a much better position to plan and implement the changes that need to be made.
IV.  Issues in Marketplace  Supervision
A.  Introduction
Most of this paper has been concerned with solvency supervision, which is typically the most
significant concern of insurance supervisors  and governments  in smaller and developing
countries. On the other hand, the public's experience as users of the insurance/financial  system
is also an important determinant of the confidence they will have in that system. If consumers'
experience is that they will not be treated fairly by insurers, it will undermine their confidence in
the system just as surely as insolvencies and other financial issues. International assessments of
the country's insurance system may initially focus on the financial health and solidity of the
industry, but domestic opinion will quickly be impacted by the realities of the marketplace. In
turn, domestic views as to the credibility of the insurance industry will influence the views of
foreign investors when they seriously investigate  business conditions in the country.
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In this section oi the paper we describe a number of mechanisms that have been used in other
countries to help establish a level playing field between insurers and consumers and to add to the
stability of the insurance marketplace.
B.  Level Playing Field and Consumer Disclosure
The starting point must be consumer knowledge. Insurance is a complex business and it
sometimes appears that vendors of insurance products, and those who design them, have a vested
interest in complexity. And so they do, in the sense that as long as consumers don't have a good
understanding of the products they are buying, the salesperson will be at an advantage. We are
talking here primarily about the products of life insurers. This is first, because life insurance
products are increasingly regarded as investment  vehicles, where there is great competition for
the consumer dollar.  Second, life insurance  products tend to have higher commission rates than
is typical for property/casualty products, so there can be quite an incentive for the seller to
"push" certain products. And third, property and casualty insurance tends to be pretty much of a
commodity in every country, so that the needs tend to be well understood by the consumer even
though, in actual fact, few consumers take an interest in the details of coverage until there is a
claim.
The issue of knowledge really has two dimensions: we need to make sure the sales person has it
in sufficient degree, and we have to make sure that an adequate amount of information, relevant
to the consumeir's  personal situation, is conveyed by the salesperson to the consumer.
Insurance salespeople generally do require licensing by the government, and most governments
establish standards of knowledge  that must be attained, usually demonstrated  by requiring the
successful completion of an examination to qualify for licensing. Therefore we can generally
assume that in fact the salespeople do have a certain level of knowledge. Even in so-called
developed countries, however, the level of knowledge and understanding can be surprisingly
low.  Thus a gradual increase in the examination standards for licence qualification may very
well be a valid means of improving the situation for consumers.
However, for thne  purposes of discussion here, let us assume that the salespeople do possess
enough knowledge to understand the products and their uses.
The problem we will focus on is how to ensure that the agent or broker actually communicates an
appropriate arnount of relevant information  to the consumer, such that the consumer's product
choice will be an informed decision. There are a number of approaches that can be implemented:
0  Plain Language: Rather than having the terms of all contacts expressed in legal jargon,
experts in plain language writing can express the terns  in language that will be sufficiently
precise to hold.  up in a court of law, while at the same time being much more straightforward and
easy for the lay person to understand  than is typically the case with an insurance contract.
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Ix  Salespersons' Code of Ethics: A code of ethics can be designed, either as part of the
supervisory regime or as part of a self-regulatory  program undertaken by the agents and brokers
themselves, which will require each salesperson to disclose certain key information to the
prospective policyholder. Such information can include the fact that the person is a licensed life
insurance sales representative -- because consumers are often given the impression that they are
dealing with an "investment advisor" or similarly titled individual. In some provinces of Canada
the sales person must also reveal that they are reimbursed on a commission basis, although they
are not required to reveal the amount of the commission. In some countries even the amount of
commission must be disclosed. Another item to be disclosed is basic product information. Each
salesperson can be required to provide a description of the product being purchased, written in
plain language, and setting out the main benefits and risks associated with the product. Due to its
nature and the possibility of misinterpretation,  this would usually be provided by way of a
brochure designed by the life insurer in respect of each of its products. The consumer can be
asked to acknowledge receipt of the brochure by signing or initialling a receipt which is retained
by the salesperson.
1X1  Needs Analysis:  Having a proper understanding  of the products being sold and the
situations in which each would typically be utilized to meet client needs, the salesperson is in a
position to inquire into the needs of the prospective buyer to find out what factors are motivating
the consideration of an insurance product. The sales person should then be able to match the
product characteristics with the consumer need to ensure that there is a good fit. If the need does
not match with the product characteristics,  a dissatisfied consumer is an almost certain outcome.
The salesperson may be required to briefly document the discussion on client needs/product
characteristics, and to provide a copy of same to the prospective client, so there will be a record,
accepted by the consumer, as to why the particular product was recommended by the
salesperson. Such a discussion puts consumers in a much better position than otherwise because
they will have a basic understanding as to the main benefits of the product. They can then also
have at least a reasonable degree of confidence  that such benefits are in line with their own
needs. A requirement for a needs analysis can be included in a Salespersons' Code of Ethics.
Ix  Cooling Off Period: It is always a good idea to provide consumers with a statutory right to
change their minds. During discussion with an amiable and highly motivated salesperson, the
contract purchase can seem like a good idea, but later, when there is time to consider the
purchase in more detail, the consumer  may feel that they have made a mistake. A cooling off
period of ten days or two weeks gives the consumer  time a reasonable time in which to rethink
the situation. If the consumer wishes to opt out of the contact during the specified cooling off
period they are entitled to do so without penalty.
[El Other Sources of Insurance Information:  While salespeople are clearly the primary
channel for the provision of information, other approaches can also be helpful. For example, the
government can prepare useful brochures concerning special aspects of insurance, such as the
coverage typically provided by an automobile policy, how to go about filing a claim with your
insurance company, how to compare the main features of the basic types of life insurance, the
responsibilities of insurance salespeople in their dealings with consumers, and so on. In some
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countries such brochures are distributed free of charge by placing them in information displays in
shopping malls and other public places for easy access by consumers. More specialized
brochures can also be distributed by more targeted means. For example, in one jurisdiction a
brochure entitled "How to file a claim for auto insurance benefits" is provided to police officers
for distribution at the scene of car accidents. Similarly,  "Making a claim for disability insurance
benefits" is displayed in hospital emergency  waiting rooms.
Steps such as those enumerated above can help to put the salesperson and the consumer on a
more equal footing. Well informed consumers are much more likely to purchase products that
meet their needs, and when needs are being met there will be many fewer complaints. Over time
this will increase confidence in the insurance system and facilitate foreign investment.
C.  Consumer Recourse and Complaint Monitoring
There will always be some situations in which the salesperson  has not acted responsibly or the
consumer has nolt  fully understood the information that has been provided. Thus there needs to
be a vehicle for hiandling  these situations, both in order to clear up misunderstandings on the part
of the consumer and also to bring to light any salespersons who may be acting unscrupulously.
In some jurisdictions there is actually an insurance ombudsman  -- a government appointed
official whose  job it is to investigate consumer complaints in the insurance area and to raise
concerns directly'  with the insurers and the government. More commonly such complaints are
investigated by the insurance supervisor's office.
We have already mentioned the supervisory benefits of this work in terms of highlighting
possible financial or managerial problems in insurers which receive a disproportionate  number of
complaints.
There is also a benefit to be gained from a public perspective by investigating such complaints
and putting the onus on the company involved to take steps to deal with any systemic problems.
The experience in Canada with salesperson complaints in the life insurance business was that
typically when a complaint was justified and the agent or broker had been found to have been
misleading the public, the insurer disavowed all knowledge  of what had been happening, but
agreed to terminate the agent as its representative. This was not very satisfactory from a public
perspective because in some cases there was no doubt that the insurer had been aware of what
was happening, but it was in the insurer's interest to "turn a blind eye" to the unsavoury
activities. Other unscrupulous sales people could then be recruited to replace those whom they
were forced to terminate. At the same time, the insurance supervisor  had no legal recourse
through which the insurers could be subjected to fines or other forms of penalty.
In Ontario, Canada's most populous province, the rules were therefore changed so that "every
insurer ... shall establish and maintain a system that is reasonably designed to ensure that each
agent complies -with  the Act and the regulations", that said system will "screen each agent for
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suitability to carry on business", and that "an insurer shall report to the Superintendent  if it has
reasonable grounds to believe that an agent who acts on behalf of the insurer is not suitable to
carry on business as an agent". In this way the insurers are also made to shoulder a significant
part of the responsibility for ensuring that consumers are not exposed to unscrupulous
salespeople. This approach is in keeping with the corporate governance philosophy favoured in
Canada and described earlier in this paper.
The monitoring of complaints by the supervisor enables the authorities to verify that insurers are
doing their part in maintaining a healthy insurance marketplace,  and if they are not, to take steps
to deal with problem situations.
D.  Monitoring Marketplace  Activities
The tracking of written and telephoned complaints as referred to above will give the supervisor a
good idea as to the sources of complaints. In larger jurisdictions it is not uncommon to have a
group within the supervisor's office responsible for carrying out a specialized form of on site
market conduct inspection. The objective of such an inspection is to review insurer practices in
dealing with consumers, both at the level of claims handling and also in terms of proper
disclosure and sales practices by agents. If there are actual statutory requirements in place as to
insurers' responsibilities in this area, as is the case for Ontario mentioned above, then
supervisory staff will be in a position to apply specific criteria. For example, does the insurer
have "reasonable systems in place" to monitor the sales practices of its representatives? Are
those systems actually applied in a consistent manner.
Most insurance companies say that they are interested  in providing consumer service and
meeting consumer needs. One way in which they can improve their ability to do this is to ensure
that all complaints are centrally logged and investigated. If an abnormally large number of
complaints are received about a certain product, or a certain agent or a certain insurance agency,
it is almost certainly a sign that something is not working as it should. From a business
perspective it is very much in the interests of the insurer to find out what is going wrong and to
rectify the situation.
Many companies have found that by sending out well designed follow up material to consumers
after a purchase, they can determine whether the sales experience  has been satisfactory from the
consumer's perspective. They can also double check that their agents are providing the required
information to consumers. Most insurers who follow this practice also find that consumer
loyalty is increased because consumers appreciate a company taking the trouble to follow up in
this way.
Thus not only does proper investigation of complaints,  combined with pro active steps to head
them off, protect the insurer against possible difficulties with the insurance supervisor, it is also
good business because it leads to the design of better products, helps to build a more effective
sales force and increases product and company loyalty.
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E.  Role of Dispute Resolution
In some countries a formal system of dispute resolution has also helped to increase confidence in
the insurance system.  While recourse to the courts is usually an option, it is often not a very
satisfactory solution for the resolution of many types of insurance problems. Disputes over
coverage, including claims, are often too minor to be efficiently dealt with through what is
typically a somewhat ponderous and over loaded court system.
A system of dispute resolution is usually designed in two stages. The first stage is mediation,
which consists of having the parties meet with a trained mediator, knowledgeable  with regard to
insurance contracts and coverages. The mediator discusses the contentions of each party with a
view to bringing them together.  Quite often there have been misunderstandings  between the
parties, and the mediator can be successful in resolving  the differences, either by means of a
compromise or by assisting one of the parties to understand why their position is not valid.
The second stage of the dispute resolution process is usually binding arbitration, which can only
be proceeded with after the mediation process has been completed. The arbitrators are often
lawyers with specialized knowledge of insurance and contract law, but they may also have other
backgrounds, with additional training in arbitration techniques and insurance.
The main advantage of the dispute resolution process is that lengthy and expensive court battles
are avoided, which not only saves time and money for the parties to the dispute, and so for the
insurance system as a whole, but it also avoids even greater pressures being placed on the court
system. In a number of countries, automobile insurance claims virtually always go to court,
often with years passing before the actions are heard. Such approaches undermine the efficacy of
the entire insurance system, with predictable impact on both the credibility of the insurance
industry and the country's reputation as a financial and business centre. Foreign investors will
certainly not be attracted by a business environment where even what seem to be straight forward
insurance disputes take years to settle through a hugely over burdened court system, if they are
ever heard at all.
Therefore dispute resolution helps to increase the efficiency with which the insurance system can
meet its objective as a mechanism for spreading  risk on a fair and even basis over large numbers
of policyholders. Dispute resolution systems are sometimes formally established by the
government, in which case they may be organized as a part of the insurance supervisor's
department. In other cases dispute resolution systems have been established apart from
government, by an enlightened insurance industry which understands that fair and speedy
settlement of insurance disputes is very much in the interests of the industry.
F.  Rate Regulation
In some jurisdictions insurance premiums have become insupportably low, so that even when
combined with investment income there is not sufficient revenue to pay claims and cover
expenses, leading to insurance company insolvencies. This phenomenon of untenably low
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premiums can occur when there is no industry pooling of rating and claims statistics, so that
individual insurers, unless they are very large, do not have credible data which can be used for
premium setting purposes. And unlike most other businesses,  property/casualty insurers don't
know the ultimate cost of the product they are selling until long after it has been sold.
Accordingly, pricing must be based on actuarial predictions as to the expected frequency and
severity of losses. In practice, this factor also gives rise to a certain "elasticity"  in pricing -- for
large commercial risks, for example, there may be a tendency to bid down the price in order to
get the account, hoping against hope that no major loss will occur while your company is
carrying the risk, or that the premium can gradually be increased in future years. In the absence
of a credible data base, insurance company managers can all too easily fall prey to this type of
"wishful thinking underwriting", which can lead to substantial losses.
High rates of inflation can also lead to premiums being insufficient  to cover claims because
premium rates are based on the claims experience  of prior periods, but are applicable to future
periods.  If tomorrow's claims have to be paid with what in fact are yesterday's dollars, and the
latter have only a fraction of their earlier value, then the premium will have been understated,
possibly very significantly depending on the rate of inflation. Another factor which can
contribute to insufficient premiums is under reserving for claims, either purposeful or
inadvertent, so that the true cost of claims is not fully recognized, sometimes for an extended
period of time.
Theoretically premium rates could also be unnecessarily high, resulting in additional cost to
consumers and returns to shareholders  which are higher than warranted to compensate for the
risk of investing their capital. In practice, we must say we have never actually encountered such
a situation, presumably because in the absence of price fixing, competitive pressures will tend to
push rates down. Also, in smaller and developing countries, when insurance is perceived by the
populace to be too expensive, it tends to be foregone, again tending to push down the price.
In many jurisdictions governments require premium rates to be filed with the supervisor for
approval. This is most often the case for auto insurance premiums in jurisdictions where there is
compulsory auto insurance, although in some countries rate approval applies to all classes of
insurance business. As an example from the auto insurance area, in the province of Ontario,
Canada, the Insurance Act indicates that no company  may charge a rate for auto insurance which
is greater than is reasonably required to make an acceptable  return on the shareholders' equity
required to support the business, nor may it charge a premium which is so low as to imperil the
company's solvency. In other words, premiums to be neither too high nor too low. These are the
criteria that guide the supervisor when considering  applications for auto insurance rate approvals.
When premium rates are filed with the supervisor  they are supported by actuarial analyses,
supposedly demonstrating  that the two criteria  just mentioned have been met.  The supervisor
also has actuaries who specialize in auto insurance pricing. If they disagree with the filing
company's actuaries they can withhold approval and a debate will take place with regard to the
appropriateness of the rates. Whether or not the rates are entirely appropriate, the process almost
certainly increases the discipline  underlying the insurance pricing process. The process need not
be unduly bureaucratic because a "file and use" system will permit the company to begin using
the new rates if the supervisor does not object within a certain period of time.
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A difficulty with direct government involvement  in the establishing of premium rates is that
there can be a temptation on governments, for political reasons, to keep rates artificially low. If
claims experience is poor, then the costs must be passed along to the insuring public in the form
of higher premiums -- that is the concept of insurance. So to be effective, premium regulation
must be carried out in an environment  of objectivity, with rate reviews strictly based on actuarial
criteria. Another important factor is to ensure that the process is not subject to undue delay.  If
an insurer needs a rate increase of 10% and has direct premiums of $100 million per year, a six
month delay in approving the increase means a $5 million shortfall in the company's ability to
cover its claims and expenses.
One can argue about the virtues or otherwise of direct government intervention in the rate setting
process. But if inordinately low premium rates are an important contributing factor in a high
insolvency environmnent,  government intervention will occur in any event during the liquidation
process.  If it significantly reduces the number of insolvencies, it may be preferable to take action
more directly by way of a premium approval process.
G.  Unlicensed Insurers and Intermediaries
Unfortunately there are fraudulent insurers who specialize in coming into a country, selling
products which will never provide any benefits, and then disappearing along with the premium
income.  Of course the premiums charged by such "insurers" can be very low, given that they
will not be paying any claims.
Unsuspecting consumers may be sold these fictitious policies, and when a claim occurs the
results can be disastrous. The business owner who insures his plant and equipment, experiences
a serious fire, arnd  then discovers that his insurer does not actually exist, is in a terrible situation.
Normally it is hoped that the insurance supervisor  will be able to avert this type of situation
through the requirements for company licensing, minimum capital and the other requirements
whose purpose is to make sure that only licensed companies do business, and that all licensed
companies are solvent.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to prevent unauthorized  insurers and intermediaries from entering the
marketplace, at least until they have sold enough policies that their activities come to the
attention of the supervisor. A complicating factor is that in most jurisdictions consumers are not
prevented from buying insurance from insurers outside the country, because there will likely be
specialized coverages required from time to time which will just not be available within the
country. Normally, however, unlicensed insurers would not be permitted to actively solicit
business within the country if they are not licensed there.
When fraudulent insurance is sold it is often through licensed intermediaries, since they are the
ones who are in contact with persons who need insurance. Of course in most instances they will
claim that they did not know that the insurer was not legitimate.
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While there are no guaranteed  means by which the public can be protected from fraudulent
unlicensed insurers, there are a number of deterrents used in different  jurisdictions.  A menu of
these are set out below:
El  "Special broker's licence" required to sell any policy issued by an insurer that is not
licensed. The Special Broker's Licence requires the posting of a bond or deposit with the
supervisor (in case of problems) and also is issued only to large, well established and reputable
brokerage concerns, since their staff can be expected to have sufficient expertise to verify the
credentials of any unlicensed insurer with whom they put consumers in contact. Other brokers
cannot claim that they were "tricked" into representing a fraudulent insurer because they will
know that the Special Licence is required in order to put any client in touch with an insurer that
is not licensed.
El  Excise tax on premiums charged by insurers not licensed in your country, payable by the
policyholder, unless the coverage is not available within the country. This discourages
consumers from shopping abroad for insurance, which may expose them to fraudulent or
unregulated insurers that are not solvent. The excise tax has to be collected by the broker and
remitted to the government. A problem with this approach is that it is difficult for the
government to know whether the proper amounts of tax are being remitted by the brokers.
El  Disclosure form provided by broker and signed off by policyholder. With this approach the
broker is required to provide any consumer who, for whatever reason, decides to purchase
insurance from an unlicensed insurer, with a detailed disclosure form indicating that the
unlicensed company is not subject to the solvency requirements  applicable to licensed insurers,
may not have funds in the country to facilitate the payment of claims and that neither the
government nor the supervisor will be able to be of assistance if there are problems obtaining
payment. The form is required to be signed by the consumer, with one copy for the consumer
and the other retained by the broker for his or her records.
0x Liability of agent or broker. The law can make the intermediary  who sells the policy of the
unlicensed insurer, liable for any legitimate claims that are not paid by the unlicensed insurer, if
the broker has been negligent in looking into the credentials of the unlicensed insurer. In other
words, if the broker has been fooled by a clever unlicensed insurer, he or she might not be held
liable in the event of non payment of claims. On the other hand, if the broker has scarcely
bothered to check into the situation (and having in mind that the broker is supposed to have some
expertise in these areas, or so it is being represented  to the consumer) then the broker could be
found liable for claims not paid by the unlicensed insurer.
0  Cease and desist orders.  The supervisor can be authorized to issue a cease and desist order
in respect of any insurer, or person unlawfully representing an insurer, that does not hold a valid
licence. This can be quite effective in rooting out an unscrupulous  unlicensed insurer and/or
their representatives if they are setting up shop in your country. It would be rare that a fraudulent
insurer would try to defend a cease and desist order in court. They will generally find if easier
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just to go to other jurisdictions where the supervisor does not have such authority.
Depending on the particular circumstances  within a jurisdiction, any combination of the above
deterrents may be effective in keeping the country free of these fraudulent operations. Probably
the best deterrent of all is to ensure that the local insurance market remains competitive and
efficient so there is little incentive for the public to seek out cut rate operators.
H.  Marketlplace  Supervision: Conclusion
The monitoring of marketplace activities by both the insurance supervisor and by individual
insurers, the presence of dispute resolution facilities where there is a need for them, the licensing
of key individuals in the insurance cycle, the protection of consumers from fraudulent insurers
and sometimes even direct intervention in the price setting process, can all help to provide a
more stable insurance market. Perhaps the most important  constituent of a stable marketplace is
a well inforned insurance consumer, who almost by definition, will also be a more satisfied
consumer.
All of these things have the potential to increase public confidence in the system of insurance and
the system of financial supervision generally within the country. This in turn will help to inspire
confidence on an international scale.
V.  Special  Problems  for  Smaller  Countries
A.  The Question of Resources
Small countries having very limited budgets face a number of difficult challenges in their efforts
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the insurance supervisory system. For example, it
is usually hard to attract and retain personnel who have the qualifications referred to above (see
"Supervisory Infrastructure Issues"). In addition, budgets for computer equipment and systems
will probably be less than what is required to do a proper job.
There are ways in which economies can be realized, however.
We have already discussed the benefits that can be obtained by working on a regional basis.  The
regional basis of supervision offers the potential of great benefits to the industry as well as to the
supervisors and ltheir  governments, so it can truly be a "win-win" situation. For a group of
reasonably contiguous countries sharing the same language, harmonized  supervisory
requirements, including financial filings, will mean less difficulty in attracting staff, because
there will be a larger number of opportunities for advancement  and a larger pool within which
one's expertise can be applied. Economies will also be realizable in staff training because
several countries will be able to share the staff training costs. There could also be important
savings in terms of computer hardware by obtaining volume discounts on orders. Even more
pronounced will be savings on the development of computer software. Specialized software can
be extremely expensive, and if a number of countries having identical requirements can reach
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consensus on software design, the savings can be enormous. Finally, the supervisory system in
each of the individual countries will tend to be more effective when there can be a sharing of
information and experience in the administration of what is essentially the same legal framework.
Another point to keep in mind is that the supervisory approaches  and techniques we have talked
about in the preceding sections, are almost certainly more efficient than many of the techniques
currently being employed. In these cases, even if the current budget is frozen, one should be able
to do a more effective job for the same amount of money that is currently available.
We have also spoken about the value of staff training. In the case of the smallest countries the
benefits are even more marked. With a small staff a high degree of specialization is usually out
of the question. Staff members are often forced to be generalists, so that, for example, one group
of employees carries out the on site inspections  and is also responsible for all of the financial
analysis work. Training programs can be designed for the specific purpose of cross training
individuals so as to provide greater flexibility in the deployment of staff.
In general, the best training approach when limited budgets are a factor, is what is known as
"train the trainers". As the name implies, the idea is to select a few key personnel in each area
and undertake to have them well trained. Then as part of their job specifications,  these
employees can be put in charge of training other employees within the supervisory agency.
While it is true that some training programs can be expensive, we have found that international
agencies such as the Inter-American Development  Bank, the World Bank and so on, will often be
inclined to provide financial support to such efforts.
Training is also available in some cases directly with supervisory agencies in developed
countries. This type of training is free, except for the costs of travel, accommodation and food
while visiting with the developed country supervisors.
Another area of assistance that may be particularly relevant in smaller countries is the industry
association in the country concerned. In most cases the industry association, recognizing that its
members will also benefit from a more skilled group of supervisory employees, will be pleased
to assist with the basic training of the supervisory staff in respect of fundamentals  of the
insurance business. In Canada, supervisory staff regularly attend seminars and training sessions
which are primarily designed for industry employees. In addition to the training advantages of
such sessions, it is an opportunity for supervisory staff to make contacts with people in the
industry, which we believe is generally  beneficial as well.
Many of the areas for upgrading the supervisory system do not actually require any budget, and
these are the areas to focus on initially in cases when monetary resources are a serious problem.
For example, redesigning the financial filing so that it provides all of the information needed to
calculate the Early Warning Tests and other key financial indicators will often be within the
capabilities of the supervisory staff.
The supervisor should also bear in mind that the insurers themselves are also a resource in that
many of the ratios and other necessary information can be computed by the insurers and filed in a
80Re-Engineering  Insurance  Supervision
form that is exactly as the supervisor designates. This has the double benefit of making sure the
supervised companies are also well aware of the ratios, trend analyses and so on that are being
reviewed by supervisory staff.  Our experience in Canada has been that by requiring insurers to
file, not just financial data, but information,  including five year trends in key ratios and
indicators as well as other financial and operational  information, all set out in a way that makes
for easy interpretation, insurers have become much more interested  in the exhibits and use them
themselves for rneasuring  and tracking their performance. In short, if the required filing consists
of a well designed package of information it will not only be useful to the s.?ervisor, it will also
become an important management tool for the insurers.
As with improvements in the financial analysis area, a large budget is not required to carry out
the inspection procedures in a way that will provide maximum value for effort. As we have
already discussed, three straightforward  concepts are involved: (1) identify companies having
higher than normal levels of financial risk, (2) identify the functional areas within those
companies where these risks are most likely to be evidenced,  and (3) focus the inspection efforts
in those areas.
By contrast, cornputerization  is an area where large amounts of money can be required to
develop specialiized  systems. Sometimes such systems will be worth the major investment  that is
required. On the other hand, smaller countries should be aware that "off the shelf'  software is
available in the developed countries for analysing the financial positions of insurance companies,
including in many cases a comprehensive  data base comprised of virtually all the information
filed with the supervisors. In Canada there are two such commercial  software systems available,
both of which are frequently utilized by interested  parties to carry out various analyses of
Canadian insurers and reinsurers as well as industry trends.  Such software can often be
redesigned for relatively little cost to meet the needs of insurance supervisors  in developing
countries. Whi'le  such software may not have all the features of "customized" software, we think
most supervisors will find it quite powerful.
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing, smaller countries must also ensure that pay levels and
public service job levels for insurance supervisory staff are commensurate with the
responsibilities being undertaken. We have met individuals in a number of countries who are
truly dedicated, in the sense that they continue to do their best in a situation where they are
significantly under compensated,  even by the standards in their own country, and where they
could receive far greater monetary rewards by taking a position in the insurance industry. While
this type of dedication is admirable, it should not be necessary. Countries  that do not reasonably
compensate their insurance supervisory personnel will experience high levels of turnover and
will tend to have staff who are not of the calibre required to implement the challenging  reforms
discussed in this paper.
While smaller countries do have special problems, there are ways in which these problems can be
addressed. Admittedly there will be challenges,  but we believe that even for the smallest of
countries, modernized insurance supervision can be a reality.
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B.  Importance of Support From the Ministerial Level
It is of course true in every country, no matter what its size or state of economic development,
but in smaller countries the full support of the responsible  Minister is absolutely crucial to the
success of any re-engineering of the insurance supervisory  system.
Here are some reasons why the Minister may agree that a carefully thought out package of
initiatives will be extremely worthwhile:
0  The country's own citizens, international  investors and other governments  must have full
confidence in the financial infrastructure of the country if the country is to maximize trade,
encourage tourism and generally participate in the global economy.
0  While the banking structure and bank supervision are vital to achieving this goal, the
insurance industry is also a major generator of financial cash flows and the supervisory regimes
must be comparable.
0  In the public mind, including at an international level, financial problems in the insurance
sector will be interpreted as instability in the financial system generally,  which will have serious
adverse effects in terms of achieving the goal of international  recognition and acceptance of the
country's financial system.
0x An approach which emphasizes the importance of corporate governance will, over time, help
to avert a need to constantly add to the number of supervisory  personnel required to do the job.
It will also build a corporate infrastructure  within the country which will be more responsible and
accountable to the public, government and shareholders.
0  Funding assistance is available from international  agencies because they recognize the
importance of building sound financial institutions as a base for a developing economy.
0M  Additional assistance can generally  be arranged  through the participation  of supervisory
agencies in developed countries.
When the re-engineering work is underway it will also be vital to keep the Minister and his or her
staff updated as to the progress being made. We suggest that status reports be prepared on a
regular basis for circulation to those concerned, including the Minister. As well, it is usually
helpful to meet with this group from time to time so that information can be provided in a more
personal way and to give those attending an opportunity to ask questions and to engage in
discussion. If outside consultants are involved in the project it is generally helpful to arrange for
them to participate in these meetings.
The insurance industry also has a vital interest in the proceedings and we suggest that any
industry organizations be provided with status reports from time to time. As we have mentioned
earlier in this paper, industry input is crucial when the project is being planned because industry
82Re-Engineering  Insurance  Supervision
personnel are in a position to make a worthwhile contribution,  particularly in terms of dove-
tailing supervisory requirements,  to the extent possible, with existing company practices, thereby
contributing to the greater efficiency and effectiveness  of the system as a whole. Similar
comments apply to the country's organizations  of professional accountants  and actuaries,
especially in terrns of financial reporting requirements,  audit requirements, solvency test design
and other technical matters.
Once the project has been designed and approved by the Ministry, we suggest that for the most
part communications with the industry and professional  organizations  be more in the nature of
updates. You will probably not want to give the impression  that you are looking for a never
ending series of suggestions and ideas for discussion.
C.  Building Professional Support for the Supervisory System
Throughout this paper we have emphasized  the benefits to be attained by gradually increasing the
role of corporate governance in the supervisory system.
An important aspect of this approach is the function of professional advisors such as auditors and
actuaries in providing reasonably unbiased advice, reporting results and information to boards of
directors and to the supervisor. In smaller countries this can present a difficult problem as the
network of professional advisors is often very limited. As well, there may be little in the way of
formal standards with regard to professional  qualification. A third common difficulty is that
standards as to the procedures and practices that will be followed by the professional  advisors are
not specified. T  herefore significant inconsistencies  may occur in the treatment of similar
situations within companies, depending on the personal view of the professional advisor.
Needless to say, the possibility of major inconsistencies  will make it difficult to allocate the
auditors and actuaries an important role in the supervisory  process.
One way in which the situation can be improved is by taking a regional approach as we have
suggested in conjunction  with some other issues discussed  earlier. Professional organizations of
auditors and actuaries, no matter how disparate their professional situations may currently be,
can see the advamtages  of playing a more central role in the supervisory/corporate  governance
process. They therefore have an incentive to raise the standards to a level with which the
supervisor and the government can be satisfied. (In doing so, they will of course not only
provide benefits to the supervisory system, but they will also provide an important benefit to the
country as a whole. International businesses and investors want to locate where there is a system
of sound and reliable professional advisors who can assist them with local and regional business
issues.)
By working with their professional colleagues in nearby countries they can often move more
quickly to establish satisfactory standards,  especially if one or more of the neighbouring
countries actually have standards in place that are closer to what is being sought.
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A similar strategy is to actually "borrow" the standards from another country. For example, we
understand that in the country of Barbados, the accounting  profession has adopted the Handbook
of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. In this way a smaller country that would not
have the resources available to an organization such as the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants, is able to benefit from the larger organization's research and professional
developments.
Of course it is likely that international  firms of auditors and actuaries will be represented in the
country. These firms, with their international  connections,  will often be in a position to provide
particular assistance in dealing with these issues.
Whichever specific options are followed, discussions between the supervisors and the
professional advisors will be vital to making progress. If the decision is made to develop
domestic standards which will meet the needs of supervisors, business people and the
professional groups themselves, it will be necessary to work with those groups over a period of
time.  We have earlier referred to the need to set up working groups comprised of members from
the office of the supervisor, the professional  advisors and the industry in order to develop
standards and reporting protocols that will meet the requirements  of each group. This is not an
easy task, and will often have to take place over a period of several years. (For more discussion
on this, please see "The role of Professional Standards in the Auditing, Accounting and Actuarial
Areas.")
VI.  Special  Supervisory  Requirements  in the High Inflation Environment
In our previous discussions regarding Early Warning Tests and the monitoring of other financial
variables, we did not consider the special problems that will arise in a high inflation environment.
When inflation is at a rate such that the time value of money becomes a significant source of
distortion from one reporting period to the next, all variables will have to be deflated to provide
meaningful period to period comparisons. For example, when looking at growth rates and rates
of change one should be comparing real rates of change rather than absolute rates of change.
Therefore every numerical period to period comparison  must be on the basis of inflation adjusted
numbers rather than inflated numbers. When comparing two variables from the same period,
such as the ratio of net premiums written to capital and surplus, it will not be necessary to make
any adjustment as both variables will have been subject to the same degree of inflation.
Financial filings can be modified to require the use of deflated comparative figures, as long as the
index of inflation is specified to ensure consistency.
Real estate is an area that raises serious supervisory  issues in a high inflation environment. With
other, more liquid types of investments the market values will be impacted by inflation, but they
should be able to be sold at their inflated prices. With real estate the impact of inflation can be
substantial, but it is often far from clear that the true market values of the properties concerned
are growing at the general rate of inflation in the economy. If real estate is routinely written up
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to take account of inflation, the supervisors  may be deluding themselves as to the real financial
positions of companies with significant  real estate holdings. If the rate of inflation is quite high,
it will not be a very long time before a considerable  portion of companies' surpluses are
comprised of the write up of property values. If the properties are not readily marketable at these
prices, then a large part of surplus will be represented by a non realizable asset. Financial
supervisors will generally not give credit for non realizable assets when they calculate minimum
solvency requirements and other financial ratios that are dependent on a company's equity base.
Therefore it may be necessary  to apply a factor to the equity base to take account of the non
realizable portion of real estate write ups when making these crucial solvency calculations.
Ratios involving net income or other income statement measures, may likewise be impacted by
real estate write ulps  if the accounting  treatment is to pass such adjustments through the income
statement. Again, supervisory adjustments may be in order.
As we have mentioned previously, retired bankers are often a good source of advice for the
supervisor in looking at real estate values and making  judgements about the treatments that might
be appropriate. It is often possible to retain, on a contract  basis for a specified period of time,
individuals having a vast amount of hands on experience in dealing with and evaluating real
estate transactions. Such individuals can provide invaluable assistance to the supervisor in
situations where unusual supervisory issues arise because of high rates of inflation.
VII.  Conclusion
Throughout this paper we have tried to stress the co-operative  nature of the supervisory process.
Boards of directors and management of companies have by far the greatest amount of knowledge
about their companies' operations. Thus it will be to the benefit of both the financial system
supervisors and lhe supervised institutions themselves if these corporate personnel formally
assume responsibility for ensuring that their organizations  operate in accordance with sound
business and financial practices. We have also emphasized how the substantial resources of
auditing and actuarial firms, and their professional  institutes, can be aligned with the interests of
financial supervisors,  boards of directors and company management, to support a system of
supervision that fosters the development of dynamic, financially sound and profitable financial
institutions. Other resources such as industry associations  can also play a helpful role in the
supervisory process.  Self regulation can be an area for further exploration,  especially in the
supervision of the activities of sales intermediaries. It can be argued that the entire corporate
governance approach is a form of evolutionary  move towards industry self regulation, although
even in the developed countries this is far from the present reality.
Developing countries have much work to do in the area of supervisory  upgrading, but at the same
time we are optimistic that they can build on the experiences  of the developed countries, profiting
from the leaming experiences of those countries in terms of approaches that have worked and
those which have not.  Where special techniques are required in the developing country
environment  -- and we think those situations are fewer than might first be supposed  -- they  can
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usually  be framed  as modifications  of tried  and  true approaches  from  developed  countries  rather
than having  to be considered  as entirely  new  procedures.
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Appendix 1: Corporate Governance as a Key Supervisory  Approach
1.  Background
A number of the writer's approaches to supervisory  upgrading in developing countries are
influenced by the system of financial supervision as it has evolved in Canada, which emphasizes
the role of corporate governance. Accordingly, it may be useful to provide an overview of this
system and some of the factors that have led to its design.
In the mid-  1960's, new employees at Canada's insurance supervisory agency (such as the writer)
were proudly told by old timers that Canada hadn't had an insurer insolvency since the late
1920's, and no Canadian life insurance  policyholder had ever suffered a loss as a result of an
insolvency. The reasons for this outstanding record were considered to be obvious: Canada had
high supervisory standards with high calibre supervisory  personnel to match.
Unfortunately we can now report, with the benefit of hindsight, that this confidence was
misplaced. While the supervisory system may have be comparable to that found in other
developed countries, what we had actually witnessed was probably more the result of an
unprecedented period of prosperity and economic growth after 1945. In fact it was probably this
prosperity which was responsible for the excellent supervisory record -- a case of a rising tide
raising all the ships.
In the early 1980's, Canada's economy began to run into rougher waters, with greater volatility
in interest rates and inflation than we had seen previously. The rate of inflation actually reached
an annualized level of close to 20% in 1982, driving interest rates above that level. This was
relatively tame compared to what has had to be faced by some other countries, but it posed
difficult problems for many financial institutions that had not anticipated  the possibility of such
conditions. As well, we saw the appearance  of "stagflation", or inflation and economic
stagnation impacting the economy at the same time. These factors had particular impact on
insurers because, as in other countries, insurers had increasingly  come to rely on investment
income as their main source of profit.
Coinciding with the emergence of this more difficult macro economic environment, a more
entrepreneurial group of manager/shareholders  was taking an interest in the financial sector.
Until then in Canada, financial institution ownership and boards of directors had tended to be the
domain of long established banking and insurance groups. These traditional institutions seemed
to have an awareness of the importance of their fiduciary responsibilities  and were conservative
in their risk taking. In contrast, some of the new entrants to the financial institution business
viewed trust companies, insurance companies and even banks as just another vehicle for
generating returns for the owners. Moneys brought in by way of premiums or deposits were not
regarded any differently than revenues from their other businesses. Canada's financial
supervisors had been much more used to dealing with the former group than the latter.
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Insolvencies are complex matters, making it difficult  to generalize, but most would probably
agree that greater economic variability combined with less conservative  institutional
management ancl  boards of directors, were significant  factors in the insolvency of a number of
small banks, majror  trust companies, property/casualty  insurers, and most recently, several life
insurers. In 199:3,  Confederation  Life, one of the country's largest life insurers with total assets
of approximately US$20 billion, was closed by the supervisors.
2.  Recent Developments
The institutional failures were reviewed by various government committees and a number of
important changes in the supervisory structure were made as a result. Some of the most
significant of these were (1) the placement of tight restraints on the ability of institutions to enter
into transactions with affiliated corporations or persons, (2) greater power to the regulators in
terms of being able to order companies to change their business practices, (3) some restraints on
the utilization of reinsurance, and (4) changes in the investment  powers of companies, including
changes in the rules regarding investments in real property and mortgages.
However, after the spectacular failure of Confederation  Life, government policy makers seemed
to conclude that continuing to "beef up" the supervisory regime, by giving the regulators more
powers, continuing to add to the complexity of supervision and so on, was a no win game.
Another approach was needed.
There were two basic facts supporting this conclusion. First of all, in a number of cases the
insolvencies had been anticipated by the regulators well before the actual event. The problem,
however, tended to be twofold: (1) they could not take action until able to effectively "prove"
that the institution was insolvent, by which time it was too late to do otherwise  than wind up the
company and (2) concerns expressed by the regulators had not been adequately dealt with by
management and boards of directors. Some felt that the key was to empower the regulators to
move at an earlier stage, as an institution's financial position was deteriorating. However, the
government was reluctant to empower regulators to move much sooner because what if the
regulators were wrong? Supposing the company will be able to overcome its difficulties and
return to financial health -- as management and the shareholders  will usually argue is the case.
This is by no means an academic concern, because while it is true to say that the regulators were
almost always of the view before an insolvency that a company was headed for failure, it may
very well also be true that they had the same feeling about other institutions which actually were
able to overcome their problems and regain their financial health. This should not be surprising,
because just as ani  investment dealer or mutual fund may be able to boast that it had
recommended the best performing stock of the year to its clients, the institution probably also
recommended many other stocks having very different levels of performance. Also, as any
supervisor will surely admit, regulators, like other members of the human species, are certainly
not immune from making incorrect  judgements. In this situation, a wrong decision can
irreparably damage those who have invested their capital in the institution, as well as possibly
take away the livelihood of many employees. Therefore there must be a high probability that
errors are not made.
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The other major factor that, we believe, led the government away from a "more of the same"
approach to insurance supervision, is that when one looked at the problems that had arisen in the
failed institutions, they often involved decisions and strategies adopted by the companies, which,
after the fact, one could sometimes criticize as being misguided, but which usually could not be
characterized as being illegal or contrary to the insurance act. Like all businesses, insurers enter
into contracts, develop new products, enter new markets, make investment decisions and so on,
and any one, or more, of these can turn out to be the wrong course of action, leading to financial
difficulties. Clearly, legislative action cannot preclude the possibility of such situations from
occurring.
The main change, and in our view, the most important change in the Canadian supervisory
regime over the past many years, was to turn away from a view that the supervisory system by
itself can prevent insolvencies.
3.  Corporate  Governance Requirements
The government moved down a new road by supplementing  the more traditional approach with a
series of requirements intended to ensure that the board of directors will be fully responsible for
the overall direction of the institution and for seeing that it operates in accordance with
"standards of sound business and financial practice". Both general and specific responsibilities
are placed on the directors, and the provisions of the law are intended to make sure they will have
the tools needed to carry out these responsibilities. The main features of the corporate
governance model are outlined below:
*  Board has duty of care, to manage the company in accordance with standards of sound
business and financial practice.
a  Board must establish an audit committee, consisting of at least three directors, a majority of
whom are totally independent of the shareholders  and none of whom are members of
management, to review the annual financial statements  before approval by directors, review other
returns specified by the Superintendent,  ensure appropriate internal control procedures are in
place, review such investments and transactions that could adversely affect the well being of the
company as the auditor or any officer of the company may specify, meet with the auditor to
discuss the annual or other returns and transactions, meet with the actuary of the company to
discuss the parts of the returns completed by the actuary, meet with the internal auditor or other
appropriate officer and the management of the company to discuss the effectiveness  of internal
control procedures.
a  Board must establish a conduct review committee, consisting of at least three directors, with
membership requirements identical to the finance committee,  to establish procedures for the
review of any transactions with related parties. (Most transactions with related parties are
prohibited by law but the conduct review committee is responsible for reviewing and approving,
prior to the transaction, any non-prohibited transaction  between the insurance company and a
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related party). The main criteria for approval are that the transaction occurs at prevailing market
rates and the that the transaction  not be prejudicial to the interests of the insurer.
a  Board must establish procedures, to resolve conflicts of interest, to restrict the use of
confidential information and to designate a committee to monitor these procedures.
*  Board must establish written investment and lending policies, standards and procedures, to
ensure that the company follows "investment  and lending policies, standards and procedures that
a reasonable and prudent person would apply in respect of a portfolio of investments and loans to
avoid undue risk of loss and obtain a reasonable return".
e  Board must appoint a CEO, who is ordinarily resident in Canada.
*  Board comptosition,  is to consist of at least 7 directors, at least 75% of whom must be
Canadian residents, and of whom at least one third are fully independent  of the company and its
shareholders.
*  Board appointments, include responsibility for the independent  auditor and the actuary who
will carry out the valuation of the company's liabilities.
a  The companjy  mustfollow accounting principles that are in accordance with the Handbook
of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (Canadian Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles).
*  The companj must be audited each year by a qualified firm of Canadian Chartered
Accountants, led by a partner of the firm who has at least five years of experience in carrying out
financial institution audits.
*  The company must obtain an actuarial valuation of its actuarial and other policy liabilities
each year from an actuary who is a Fellow of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries, in accordance
with Canadian Generally Accepted Actuarial Practice.
0  The auditor  and actuary have to report to the board and the Superintendent if either
becomes aware of a situation which they believe could materially affect the well being of the
company.
I  In the event of the termination of the auditing or actuarial relationship with the company,
the auditor or actuary have to put the reasons for the change, to the best of their knowledge, in
writing to the Superintendent  with a copies to the board and the newly appointed auditor or
actuary.
*  Board members can be indemnified against liability only if they have "acted honestly and in
good faith with a view to the best interests of the company" and "had reasonable grounds for
believing that the impugned conduct was lawful".
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4.  Standards of Sound Business and Financial Practice
The foregoing changes mainly became effective in 1992. Since that time there has been a
further progression, with the life insurance and property/casualty insurance industries developing
draft "Standards of Sound Business and Financial Practice", which are intended to provide a
framework for boards of directors in terms of the higher risk areas where they should be
focusing their oversight activities. The generic Standards currently being developed indicate the
areas in which the board should be developing specific policies for management to follow.  Each
company's board will develop operating policies to govern their activities in the areas covered
by the Standards. It is anticipated that over the course of the next several years these guidelines
will be formally incorporated into regulations.
For  life insurers, the current draft Standards cover the following areas:
*  Capital Management
*  Credit Risk Management
*  Foreign Exchange Risk Management
*  Securities Portfolio Management
*  Real Estate Appraisals
*  Interest Risk Management
*  Liquidity Management
*  Internal Controls
*  Product Design & Pricing Management
*  Underwriting & Liability Management
Due to the different risk profile of property/casualty insurers, several of the above categories are
considered unnecessary, but some other business areas take on a higher degree of importance.
For property/casualty insurers the Standards are still in a preliminary stage, but it is anticipated
that they will include the life areas plus several additional areas that have greater importance for
property/casualty insurers, such as reinsurance and possibly "Earthquake Risk Management".
By placing additional responsibilities on boards of directors, governments should be able to
reduce future demands for additional supervisory  resource. Even so, as the regulated industry
becomes larger and more sophisticated, supervisors  will understandably find that they need
additional manpower, computers, more complex legislation and so on.
While we would argue that current realities are such that every supervisory agency requires a
certain minimum resource base (see "Resource Requirements  of the Supervisor"),  the corporate
governance model at least opens the door to the minimization of such a process. A relatively
small but skilled and well equipped group of supervisors can be highly effective when their
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efforts are supplemented by a much larger group of boards of directors who have, or should
have, intimate knowledge of their organization's activities. With the directors in turn backed up
by professional actuaries and auditors, we have, in effect, vastly increased the scope of
supervision, but without the need for any similar increase in government resources.
A further advantage is that to the companies, the involvement  of boards of directors and
professional advisors will not be seen as, and will not be, intrusive forms of supervision.
In making these comments we hasten to add that we are by no means suggesting that the type of
framework just described is in fact the system that should be adopted universally. In fact, as we
have noted in the body of this paper, in many (perhaps most) developing countries, the
prerequisites of such a system are not presently in place.  One major element is a reliable, well
trained cadre of professional advisors in the form of auditors and actuaries. As we point out, in
most developing countries the development  of such groups is an issue that must be addressed as
part of the supervisory re-engineering  process.
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Appendix 2:  Early Warning Ratios for P/C Insurers
The table below summarizes the series of ratios that are typically used to "flag" potentially
higher risk companies on the basis of their current balance sheets and financial results.
Unusual Values  Unusual Values
Test No.  Ratio  Over  Equal to or Under
1  Gross premiums written to equity  9
IA  Net premiums written to equity  3
2  Year over year % change in net writings  33  -33
3  Percent surplus aid to surplus  15
4  Two year overall operating ratio (%)  100
5  Investment yield  based on market  based on market
6  Year over year percent change in equity  50  -10
7  Liabilities to liquid assets (%)  105
8  Amounts due from agents to equity (%)  40
9  One year reserve development  to equity (%)  20
10  Two year reserve development  to equity (%)  20
11  Estimated current reserve deficiency to  25
equity (%)
These tests are often adapted by local supervisors  to take account of market conditions in their
own country. The "unusual ranges" shown above are more or less for companies operating
within the North American environment. For some of the ratios, and in some countries, little
adjustment of the normal range will be required. In other countries more significant adjustments
will be needed. We would usually expect to see roughly ten percent of the companies outside the
normal range on a given test. If there are market conditions that affect a particular group of test
parameters it might be reasonable to have a higher percentage of the companies outside the range
for that test.  For example, in a newly developing market where capacity is still quite limited, the
unusual value for test 3, which measures a company's dependency on reinsurance commissions
for profitability, might be somewhat higher than the 15% shown in the table, which is generally
accepted as a yardstick in more mature markets. For similar reasons, in a developing market we
would normally expect test 2, net premiums written to capital and surplus, to have a higher value
on average than we would see in a developed market.
In a normal year (a year with a large drop in the stock market, or a year in which there is a
catastrophic event such as a severe earthquake,  for example, might not be a "normal" year) about
15% of the companies will be outside the normal range on 4 or more tests.
In each country the supervisors will want to run the tests to see what results are yielded. Then
the "unusual ranges" can be calibrated to take account of local conditions.
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There are many sources for the details as to how these ratios and variations thereon, are
calculated. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners  in the United States can
provide significant amounts of information  on the use of the ratios to interested supervisory
groups. Similarly, insurance supervisors  in developed countries such as Canada, Australia, the
countries of the European Union and so on, will without exception be able to provide
information on exactly which ratios they use, their prescribed normal ranges and other useful
information.
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The Regulatory  Ladder
-Ifk  Examples of Observed Risks  E:  61
Levell
Resp
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Level  4  Capital  and  urplw  senior  mwngement  and  Unable  to  sign  financil  Media  npemlation  that  Institute  procedur  forre
eve  on real  value  basis  dirctors unable  to retie  sutatments  or acturial  company  won't survive  hbabilittin or liquidation.
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sharply  from industry  expenses,  acuaridal  noted  by aeditor  ad  public  over  slow payment  of  provide  acceptable  buwinem  plm to
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viability  in  infonmation.  valies overstated,  concen with regulator  on  die  company's  position  within  a
serious  Analysts  ae seeing  especially  real  esatke  "offtN  taecrd  bass  apedfiedtime  frame Limitaons  an
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doubt  with  affiliated  investment  portlio  poor.  ation
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financial  ~~~~~~~~management  responses  to  methods  and  assmpimpeon fmancnial  expressed  concems  e.  mtn
viability of  Deficiencies  in procedures.
Growing concern  by
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normnl range.  pper  to have  well though  expresd  in manement
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98The above has been provided  to several  jurisdictions in Latin America as a schem-..ic  example
of the regulatory ladder concept. Each cell of the matrix can be expanded into considerably
more detail. An additional risk level could also be added to provide a somewhat  higher level of
detail. If the supervisory organization has other divisions such as Reinsurance Analysis and
Actuarial, colurnns could be added for those functions as well.
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1991  and  1992  and  1993  and
Prior  Years  1992  Prior  Years  1993  Prior  Years  1994
1991 UCAE,  end of year  563,866
IBNR,  end of year  235,786
1992 Paid during  year  225,569  245,144  470,713
UCAE,  end of year  412,629  163,950  576,579
IBNR,  end of year  152,688  99,904  252,592
%Ratio:  excess  (deficiency)  1.10
1993 Paid  during  year  125,043  101,511  226,554  244,078  470,632
UCAE,  end of year  322,111  97,913  420,024  176,734  596,758
IBNR,  end of year  95,392  68,160  163,552  111,901  275,453
%Ratio:  excess  (deficiency)  3.94  2.30
1994 Paid during  year  81,815  15,744  97,559  80,180  177,739  282,73
UCAE,  end of year  243,151  93,745  336,896  108,301  445,197  217,29
IBNR,  end of year  76,695  45,880  122,575  79,177  201,752  114,41
Ratio:  excess  (deficiency)  5.92  5.50  5.45
1995 Paid during  year  84,643  35,796  120,439  38,039  158,478  127,64
UCAE,  end of year  168,196  71,779  239,975  90,481  330,456  119,37
IBNR,  end of year  57,784  29,231  87,015  44,159  131,174  77,69
%Ratio:  excess  (deficiency)  7.08  6.95  8.53
1996 Paid  during  year  55,962  20,703  76,665  30,554  107,219  34,46
UCAE,  end of year  135,631  54,941  190,572  76,594  267,166  102,60
IBNR,  end of year  49,171  18,028  67,199  29,097  96,296  44,07
%Ratio:  excess  (deficiency)  5.23  6.49  6.05  11.84  7.49  6.9




1991  and  1992  and  1993  and
Prior  Years  1992  Prior  Years  1993  Prior  Years  1994
1991 UCAE,  end of year  10,266
IBNR,  end of year  5,953
1992 Paid during  year  8,610  10,487  19,097
UCAE,  end of year  4,262  2,444  6,706
IBNR,  end of year  4,513  1,478  5,991
%Ratio:  excess  (deficiency)  -7.19
1993 Paid  during  year  4,667  3,218  7,885  10,832  18,717
UCAE,  end of year  3,764  1,201  4,965  4,142  9,107
IBNR,  end of year  1,794  37  1,831  2,333  4,164
%Ratio:  excess  (deficiency)  -16.13  -15.63
1994 Paid  during  year  4,716  1,260  5,976  4,428  10,404  7,76
UCAE,  end of year  1,776  776  2,552  1,115  3,667  2,22
IBNR,  end of year  975  1,157  2,132  1,893  4,025  1,43
Ratio:  excess  (deficiency)  -27.90  -46.06  -36.36
1995 Paid  during  year  2,079  1,133  3,212  2,639  5,851  2,79
UCAE,  end of year  1,780  291  2,071  246  2,317  62
IBNR, end of year  1,042  288  1,330  756  2,086  1,28
%Ratio:  excess  (deliciency)  -41.16  -61.25  -55.66
1996 Paid  during  year  3,183  564  3,747  1,166  4,913  1,19
UCAE,  end of year  1,480  963  2,443  991  3,434  87
IBNR,  end of year  282  60  342  245  587  65
%Ratio:  excess  (del  iciency)  -54.25  -83.53  -85.91  -46.24  -89.80  -50.9
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Appendix  5: Staffing  Requirements  and  Organizational  Structures  for Solvency
Supervision
In this Appendix we set out as a guide, staffing complements and organizational  structures that
might typically be found in the solvency supervision area of supervisory organizations. We
emphasize that the information contained herein is only a guide and actual requirements will be
highly dependent on the particular requirements  and circumstances  of the jurisdiction.
A. Staffing
In the paragraphs that follow we outline a two stage approach for estimating staffing levels: (1)
consider the inspection area to be the core functional  area and estimate staff levels for that area,
and (2) consider staff levels required for other areas to be a function of the number of inspectors.
As a "rule of thumb", our experience is that for inspection work, and with a reasonable base of
companies to supervise (say at least 50 insurers), one would normally expect an insurer to
inspector ratio somewhere  in the range of from 10 to I at the low end to 5 to 1 at the higher end.
For example, for a jurisdiction with 100 insurers, we would might expect to see an inspection
staff of between 1  0 and 20 persons.
As the number of supervised insurers drops below 50, the decline in the required number of
inspectors will not be directly proportionaf to the reduction in the number of insurers, and
probably a minimum base level for any inspection group is about 3 inspectors. For example, for
a population of 25 supervised insurers we would think one would have to plan on an inspection
group of from 4 to 7 (rather than 2.5 to 5 as would be predicted from the ratio range mentioned
above).
We must emphasize, however, that much will depend on two variables: the current financial
environment in the industry and the current state of the supervisory  system. The latter variable is
in turn a function of several other variables, the main ones being: (1) the degree of reliance that
may be placed on outside parties such as the independent  auditors and actuaries and (2) the
extent to which technology is available to assist the inspectors with their work.
Clearly if the industry is in a state of financial crisis or there are an abnormal number of
companies experiencing solvency problems, then more resources will be required, other things
being equal. Independently of this, if the supervisory system is relatively sophisticated,  and the
inspectors are able to focus at a high level of company operations rather than having to be
preoccupied with issues relating to the accuracy and completeness of the financial statements,
then correspondingly less supervisory effort will naturally be needed. Similarly, if the inspectors
are using computers with large amounts of supervisory information  available on-line, including
historical data on the companies, previous inspection reports and so on, and if the calculating
requirements of the analytical work are carried out by computer, then the efficiency of the
supervisory office will be increased and fewer personnel will be required. In general we believe
that the financial health of the supervised companies will be at least as important a determinant
of staffing requirements as will the degree of computerization  available to inspectors.
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On the above basis, we would expect that in a jurisdiction where companies are experiencing
many solvency problems, and where the supervisory system (including the role of professional
advisors and ust' of technology) is not very advanced, then a base of 100 insurers may call for a
staff of 20 or so inspectors. At the other end of the spectrum, in a country like Canada, where the
industry is relatively stable, where the infrastructure of professional  advisors is such that
considerable reliance may be placed upon their work, and where computer support is routinely
provided, then a supervisory work load of 100 companies should probably require no more than
10 inspectors.
For financial analysts, we would say that normally one would target a ratio of 1 financial analyst
to every 2 inspectors, using the guidelines mentioned above to determine the required number of
inspectors. If the inspectors are also going to be doing the financial analysis, then we might use
the same framewvork  to determine the additional number of inspectors that may be needed. For
example, if, based on the number of companies, condition of the industry and degree of
computerization, we conclude that an inspection staff of 20 is going to be needed for the actual
inspection work, then we would think an additional 10 inspectors may be necessary if they are
also going to be responsible for the analytical  work. In other words, if the financial analysis is
going to be done by the inspectors, then we would consider it necessary to augment the
inspection staff by about 50%. Combining the financial analysis and inspection activities within
one organizational unit may give rise to a slight saving in staff because of reduced time for inter-
divisional communications. Overall, however, we wouldn't consider the impact of this to be
very significant. In the example mentioned above it may be reasonable to add 9 inspectors rather
than 10.
To provide support to the inspectors and financial analysts one would usually expect to see
actuarial and other technical specialists on staff. In the United States and Canada, there are
different designations for life actuaries and casualty actuaries and so the insurance supervisory
organization would generally contain representatives  of each group, with numbers depending on
the size of the life insurance and property/casualty  insurance industries respectively.
As mentioned in the body of this paper, in the property/casualty area one or more reinsurance
specialist positions can also provide a beneficial level of support. This will be especially
important in markets that are exposed to contingencies such as hurricanes and earthquakes. The
reinsurance specialist will serve as a resource person to assist the inspectors with the assessment
of reinsurance arrangements  and to review particular agreements having unusually complex or
unique features. The actuarial staff should be able to provide some assistance in this area as well,
and in many cases the reinsurance may in fact be an actuary.
Sometimes the technical/actuarial  inspectors will be classified as inspectors and will visit the
insurers as a member of the inspection team. In other jurisdictions technical support personnel
work mostly from the supervisory office, providing advice and support to the inspectors in the
field, with only occasional visits to the companies' offices. We suspect that the latter method of
deployment may be more efficient since the specialized expertise should always be focused in
areas where it is really needed, whereas the inclusion of specialists on the inspection team may
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sometimes result in their visiting companies that do not require their full attention. On the other
hand circumstances differ from place to and we suggest that supervisors decide their approach
based on what they think will work best in their own situation.
With regard to the number of technical support persons who may be required, again much will of
course depend on the circumstances within the jurisdiction. In general however, we would
venture to say that technical support (actuaries, reinsurance specialists, etc.) will range from 1 to
2 per 10 inspectors. Therefore a 20 inspector division might be complemented  by from 2 to 4
technical specialists, with, ideally, a minimum of 1 actuary even if the inspection group is at the
minimum level of 3 or so inspectors. In some jurisdictions trained actuaries are in short supply
and so the actual number of actuarial positions may be less than the ideal.
When the supervisory group has adopted a fairly high level of technology -- for example, all
inspectors and financial analysts are using personal computers in their day to day work -- there
will be a need for at least one information  technology support person. Inevitably staff will have
problems and questions on an on-going basis, there will be configuration  problems with software
and hardware, there is the need to avoid viruses and so on, so that at least one specialist will be
required in this area. (We have not included Information Technology support positions in the
sample organizational  charts below because we consider them to be similar to other support
functions such as Human Relations.)
Most larger supervisory organizations  will have a stand alone policy group which will be
responsible for looking at "big picture" issues and devising regulatory solutions which will be in
line with general government policy. A policy group will also help to ensure that issues are dealt
with consistently from one case to another and that the same principles are applied in each case.
Another group that is sometimes found in larger supervisory organizations  is Legal Support.
This unit would be comprised of one or more lawyers who spend all of their time providing
supervisory staff with recommendations  and opinions on legal matters. For example, operational
staff may wish to know whether the insurance act will support a particular action they wish to
take, or they will often have questions as to the interpretation  of insurance act provisions in the
context of regulatory issues with specific companies.
The foregoing discussion pertains to the operational area of the supervisor's office. Of course
the office will also require support in other areas such as human resources, finance,
administration and so on. We assume that these areas will be staffed in conformance  with
normal governmental requirements so that there is no need to deal with them in detail here.
All of the foregoing are nothing more than rough guidelines, which hopefully will be of
assistance for purposes of resource  planning. We stress again, however, that much depends on
the particular situation. Also, in setting out the foregoing thoughts we in no way wish to suggest
that there are not other staffing combinations and arrangements  which will provide high levels of
efficiency and effectiveness. In our view, the abilities and expertise of the supervisory staff will
be a more important determinant of success than will the actual scheme of organization, although
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the "right" organizational structure will enable staff members to maximize their contribution to
the achievement of supervisory objectives.
One final point is that both inspection work and financial analysis are the types of activities that
really have no upper bounds in terms of resource utilization. In both cases, and especially in the
case of inspections, one can always go into more and more detail in understanding  the activities
of an insurer. It is often difficult for inspectors  to keep their investigations  at an appropriately
high level, as human nature is such that it is easy to become overly immersed in details.
Supervisory managers must keep in mind that it is seldom at the level of fine detail that
significant solvency trends and developments  are either revealed or remedied.
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B. Organizational Structures
All organizational chart exarnples  assume a difficult financial environment,  a low level of regulatory
sophistication and a low degree of technological development.  The organizational  charts pretain to
the operational components of solvency regulation  and exclude areas such as Human Resources,
Finance and Administration.
Example 1: Large jurisdiction -250 insurers. Total Staff of 92, of whom 50 are inspectors, 20 are
Analysts. All inspection and analysis positions are specialized as to Life Insurance and P/C
Insurance.
Supenor
Dii~~drir, Uk  lz  tgaAsior  Dktttor,ei,r  hlt
RtndAsl  isfisbdw
SeuiorMmgr,  s|iMar,  L  ig  r 
IbEPdio  Alu  11  Ano  11  Asor  IrEdI  A*sa 11  Off  11en
Mieamlea&u  NewllamLea  STem  Leain  lTeMnLeaiors
2OIn~~~~eton  8An~~~~  2OhMjdos  8Amo
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Example 2: Alternate structure for same situation as Example 1. Total Staff of 90, of whom 50 are
Inspectors and 16 are Analysts. Life and P/C combined under 1 Director but responsible for analysis and
interpretation of financial trends for all insurers. Compared to Exarmple  1, and Director Technical
Analysis / Actuarial, with 3 Actuarial Analysts.
S'ervuor
Suemsor
Diiodor,  huIDiioru  Diudor,  Dnco,legolAdvisor  Divdor,  DiRCIorIFOk
Fmbl  AmIysi RemsoAnceAffaim  Coqufe  Licenmsi
SalorMsger, SeaiorMan]lg  SeniorMnger,  3SeAorReisumc  3ActimlAmysfs  ksistdL2gal  3Coqiorate 3FoIlqAnlsts
lm~~&M  ~  AOOysUJ  Anlsis  Amlst  Advior  WUSOMMw
STeangaLeds  MTamUea  o  YnnlAass
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Example 3: Smaller jurisdiction with 60 supervised  insurers. 13 Inspectors and 5 Financial Analysts. 26




Magerlnpcon  Mange>  Re6mnce  Spd&  ActM  inger  LegalAdvsor
L  L  F~~~~~inancndAnaIysB 
3  Team  Ieades  5hAaIyst  I  Techncal  Ofier
10  hspecit
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Example 4: Same situation as Example 3. Total Staff of 24, including 13 Inspectors and 4 Financial
Analysts. Inspection and Financial Analysts combined under one Manager but functions still dealt with




Minager,Ispnfcons  Reiinrsmnce  Slxcialist  ActWlManger  LegiAlAsdor
am4I  Finncial  Analysis
31Ioclion  Team  Leaders  1  Finncial  Analysis  Team  1  Technical  Offier
1O  hsNctoin  3  Fmnancial  Analyst
dIrd  4hi~~~~~~~11Appendix 5
Example 5: Alternate structure for same situation as Examples I and 2. Total staff of 83, including 60
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. . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Ana[sisAdnlk
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Example 6: Very small jurisdiction, 25 Insurers. Total staff 15, of whom 10 are inspector! Analysts.
Supervisor
Deputy Supervisor,  Acturial Specialist
Operations
10 Inspector/Analysts  and  Technical Officer
1 Corporate  Licensing Officer
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